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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of how and why intervention in the two factor
markets must be coordinated. First, labor and capital markets are
examined in isolation, specifying the causes of their respective
deficiencies, employing a model of segmentation and intermediation.
The fundamental bifurcation of the labor market is traced to the pertur-
bations in final demand. The barriers to economic mobility posed by
social networks are also analyzed. These informal intermediaries are
found to have an important role both in facilitating entry into a firm
and ensuring the retention and promotion of workers after they are hired.
A similar model of capital market segmentation is introduced following
an assessment of small firms' economic role and lack of access to capital
markets. A reconciliation of the two dualist models is offered,
indicating their unique attributes as well as their conceptual inter-
dependence. A case study on Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation
is provided to elaborate the problems posed by development agencies that
attempt to address segmentation and coordinate their factor market
interventions. An institutional analysis of linkage concludes the essay.
This chapter summarizes the opportunities and obstacles confronting
development agencies that couple labor and financial intermediation.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Belden Daniels
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INTRODUCTION
2Our capital and labor markets are structurally flawed. Both of the
factor markets have a strong and well developed sector which operates side
by side with a weak or "secondary" sector. Small new firms seeking capital
must draw heavily on personal savings,having little access to the dominant
financial institutions that serve larger corporations. Similarly, a class
of disadvantaged workers have limited channels through which to secure
information about jobs, particularly jobs that develop their productive
potential. This discontinuity in the input markets has been referred to
in some quarters as segmentation.
The central purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate why attempts to
reduce capital and labor markets segmentation must be linked. Linkage here
refers to three objectives.
First, the economic models used to analyze segmentation in the two
factor markets must be synthesized. Second, the public policies formulated
to address deficiencies in capital and labor markets must be conceptually inte-
grated. Third, the actual institutions that carry out these policies must
be merged or coordinated.
Before one can assess the relationship between the bifurcation of
capital markets and the discontinuities in labor markets, one must clearly
identify the causes of each of these two phenomena. There exist many
provocative parallels in the genesis of capital and labor market segmentation.
The duality in each of the factor markets arise, in part, from the
attempts of certain economic agents to shield themselves from instability
and uncertainty. Both forms of segmentation also derive from the severe
3constraints in the transmission of information--information about jobs
and workers in the case of the labor market and data on firms and sources
of financing in capital markets.
The first factor--the "risk aversion" that segments both markets--
is particularly problematic. Labor markets are internally divided partially
because managers of large firms prefer to relinquish the unstable portion
of demand to smaller labor intensive enterprises. These smaller enterprises
are considerably more flexible and can expand and contract their operations
to accommodate cyclical swings in demand.
Similarly financial markets are segmented partially because investors
and intermediaries are reticent to bear the risks associated with perturba-
tions in small firms' earnings. The behavior of these financial institutions
violates neoclassical efficiency criteria because the type of risk they
fear can frequently be eliminated through diversification: combining an
investment in many small firms would stabilize the income earned by these
investors.
These two risk-related causes of factor market segmentation are slightly
different--and it is critical that their differences are acknowledged. How-
ever, the functional interaction between these two segmenting forces make
it difficult to address labor and capital market segmentation concurrently:
If one tries to increase the efficiency of capital market institutions by
ameliorating their risk aversion one is likely to increase the instability
of employment.
One way out of this trap is to recognize that the other type of
structural economic defect that gives rise to segmentation in financial
4markets--imperfect information dissemination mechanisms--can often be
ameliorated without aggravating the discontinuities in labor markets.
A critical institution that shapes the way information is transmitted
in both factor markets is the intermediary. Factor market intermediaries
facilititate the allocation of capital and labor. There exist both formal
and informal intermediaries, intermediaries in the external and internal
sectors of input markets, and public and private intermediaries. Public
intermediaries are increasingly relied upon to develop distressed local
economies. However a theory of public intermediation is still far from
fully developed.
There are three ideal types of intermediaries. The first are
institutions which simply disseminate information and carry out factor
market transactions on behalf of other economic agents. The information
they transmit describes: (a) factor resources that are idle and seek
employment (unemployed workers and sources of uncommitted financing); and
(b) employment opportunities (job vacancies and investments). The paradigms
of this type of intermediary are the employment agency and the stock broker.
Another type of intermediary is one which holds its own "portfolio"
of factors in addition to transmitting information and engaging in trans-
actions. In the labor market this is exemplified by a temporary agency
which contracts out labor services. A financial intermediary that conforms
to this model is a dealer in stock.
Finally, the third and somewhat more interesting type of intermediary
"transforms" factors before or after they are transacted. Most financial
institutions fit this description since they alter the assets
5they purchase before they are re-sold to liability-holders. For instance
a mutual fund purchases financial assets that are in larger denominations
and somewhat riskier than the securities they re-issue.
Some labor market intermediaries "modify" workers--i.e., a public
manpower agency frequently provides pre-vocational training, counseling,
and a variety of supportive social services to their clients before and
after they are referred to jobs. This essay will focus on the inter-
mediation functions of transmitting information and transferring factors.
Private intermediaries exacerbate the segmentation that exists in
the two input markets. Although the primary cause of segmentation is the
instability of product markets and profit rates, the duality of factor
markets is aggravated by the informal and formal institutions which allocate
labor and capital.
In the labor market friends and relatives serve both to refer workers
to job vacancies and to help them to adjust to their positions once they have
been placed. One important cause of labor market segmentation is the
fact that disadvantaged workers have poor access to the informational and
training resources of these"informal" intermediaries. Their social networks
do not transmit information that is nearly as useful as that disseminated
by higher status groups.
Social ties are also critical to the functioning of formal and informal
financial intermediaries. Formal capital market institutions like banks
depend on the close rapport that develops between their loan officers and
the managers of borrowing firms. Informal loan clubs consciously exploit
the ethnic or occupational nexus that binds their members. In both cases
6the social character of the financial relationships facilitates the exchange
of information and the maintenance of trust.
Small new unstable firms have difficulty establishing this type of
rapport with conventional financial intermediaries. The flow of information
about their projects is constrained by the inability of financial
analysts to communicate with the managers of these firms. The volatility
of these enterprises makes it difficult to collect up to date and accurate
information about them. Their personnel are likely to be experts in
crisis management but not very effective at building stable relationships
with financial institutions.
Thus there exist systematic distortions in factor market information
systems that impair the economic status of certain workers and firms. As
noted above, public agencies that seek to ameliorate both labor and capital
market segmentation should concentrate on resolving these information
dilemmas.
This intervention strategy does not simply ensure a consistency of
policy objectives, but also constitutes the principal rationale for merging
the public institutions responsible for rectifying the capital and labor
market allocation process. Public intervention in capital and labor
markets are complementary. When information drawn from the two markets
is synthesized, development planners can reap synergistic benefits. The
coupling of labor and financial intermediation allows public agencies to
improve both the wisdom and the efficacy of factor market interventions.
The information required to assess whether a firm is impaired by
capital market segmentation is essential in determining whether the
7enterprise can also provide valuable employment opportunities. Conversely
the services and information that public manpower agencies offer can
improve the financial viability of publicly capitalized firms.
Finally, the economic and political leverage possessed by manpower and
development finance institutions can be heightened when it is exercised by
the same institution. This leverage allows public development institutions
to re-structure firms to realize valuable social and economic objectives.
This essay has three major parts. The first (Chapters I and II) deal
principally with labor markets, the second (Chapters III and IV) with
financial markets, and the third (Chapters V and VI) with public policies
that link labor and capital market interventions.
Chapter I describes the features and some of the causes of segmenta-
tion. It focuses on the way in which firms cope with market instabilities.
It also contains a general review of the literature on discrimination,
providing a background for the analysis of social networks in the subsequent
chapter.
Chapter II examines the role of public and private intermediaries in
segmented markets. First, formal labor market intermediaries' role is
briefly described. Then a model of informal intermediation is developed
to account for the job search behavior of black and white workers. This
model is elaborated to illuminate the role of social networks in the
internal labor market--e.g., within the firm. Finally, the policy impli-
cations of the first two chapters will be outlined.
8Chapter III provides some evidence that capital markets are segmented.
In an attempt to assess the social significance of financial segmentation,
a brief review of the literature on small businesses will be offered.
Chapter IV develops a model of financial intermediation and capital
market segmentation. The problems of risk aversion and information
dissemination failures will be explored in depth. This chapter will conclude
with an attempt to reconcile the theoretical frameworks of labor and capital
market segmentation.
Chapter V describes the history of the economic development programs
of Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, an agency that has inter-
vened in both capital and labor markets. This case stidy has a variety
of purposes. It will serve first to substantiate the model of informal
labor market intermediation provided in Chapter II. The case also high-
lights the financial costs and organizational risks associated with capital
market interventions designed to ameliorate segmentation. Finally, the
genesis of Restoration's programs illuminates the obstacles confronting
development agencies when they attempt to link labor and financial
intermediation.
Chapter VI elaborates the rationale for coupling factor market
interventions. To add substantive content to this analysis, the chapter
proceeds by examining the five critical phases of a development program.
The costs and benefits of linkage during each stage will be identified.
Drawing on the case study, this chapter will also identify the institu-
tional and political stumbling blocks that development agencies encounter
when they attempt to synchronize factor market interventions.
CHAPTER I
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION:
BIMODALITY AND DISCRIMINATORY BARRIERS TO MOBILITY
10
Introduction
One of the principal flaws in the U.S. labor market is its
segmentation. Segmentation can be defined in many ways but in this
essay it refers to two specific phenomena: (1) the bi-modality or multi-
modality of jobs when arrayed along dimensions like wages, jobs stability,
opportunities for promotion and training; and (2) the lack of mobility
that obtains between the upper (or "primary") and lower (or "secondary")
segments.
Segmentation exacerbates social inequities by increasing the disparity
between different groups' economic well being. It can also be very costly
for society as a whole. By heightening inter-modal barriers, segmentation
can prevent labor from flowing into expanding sectors. This worsens the
trade-off between unemployment and inflation because the economy will tend
to overheat at higher levels of unemployment. These labor bottlenecks
can also check economic growth by constraining the expansion of viable
new industries.
One policy dilemma faced by public manpower agencies is to identify
firms that can provide valuable training opportunities to workers who have
been confined to the lower segment of the labor market. A related issue
is how to deal with the fears that are aroused when disadvantaged
workers are introduced into primary sector firms for the first time.
These two problems are the principal foci of the next two chapters.
To deal with all of these problems one must understand the forces
that bifurcate the market. The main forces explored in this essay are
(1) the instabilities of markets; and (2) the role of social networks
11
in both allocating jobs and providing support to workers after they
obtain employment. The perturbations in product markets are examined in
the first part of this chapter. I will review the , literature
on the economic instability and bimodality of the labor market. The second
part of this chapter focuses on the issue of inter-modal mobility and
employment discrimination. This discussion will serve as general back-
ground for the analysis of intermediation and social networks offered in
Chapter Two.
Labor Market Segmentation and Demand Instabilities
A well developed literature on labor market segmentation has evolved
over the last decade. It is characterized by two fairly distinct strains,
one rooted in institutional economics and liberal sociology, and another
founded on a more radical intellectual tradition. Although some of the
work in this field tends to be descriptive rather than analytical in
approach, it represents an increasingly cohesive alternative to orthodox
labor economics.
The labor market in the U.S. has two related characteristics1
1. a bimodal, or multi-modal distribution of jobs. This distri-
bution is apparent when jobs are mapped along a multi-faceted
axis that defines quality of employment (a weighted measure
that captures such characteristics as wages, stability,
opportunity for upward2mobility, grievance procedures and
working conditions); and
2. the lack of mobility that obtains between or among the
various "modes", "segments", "sectors", or "tiers".3
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There exist two somewhat different types of bi-modality: (1) a bi-
furcation in the substantive outcomes of the laor market--wages, working
conditions, and fringe benefits--and (2) a dualism in the processes
which "lead" to outcomes--wage bargaining procedures, job hunting tech-
niques and hiring and firing policies. Although closely related, these
phenomena are logistically independent. It is possible for the outcomes
of the labor market to be fairly uniform (or normally distributed) and
yet have two separate spheres with very distinct rules that constrain
economic agents' actions.
David Gordon has generated the principal body of evidence demon-
strating that the labor market is segmented in the first sense.. 4 He has
shown that there exist two fairly discrete classes of jobs. The first
segment-- the "primary sector"--is characterized by low wages, high turn-
over, poor opportunities for advancement or training.5 Perhaps the
classic ideal type of such a job are those provided by fast food non-
immigrant restaurants.6 The "secondary" sector, in contrast, has the
opposite characteristics: higher wages, low turnover, and fairly substan-
tial opportunities for promotion and training.
Piore refined the framework developed by Gordon, noting that the
primary sector itself consists of two rather different "tiers."
The upper tier consists of professional and managerial jobs which have
higher wages but somewhat greater turnover. The lower tier is identical
to Gordon's original description of the primary sector. The chief
focus of this essay is the bifurcation between the secondary sector
and the lower tier of the primary sector.
13
The second type of polarity, the disjunctions in labor market
processes, is also noteworthy. The secondary sector tends to be un-
unionized and thus wage determination occurs outside the bounds of collec-
tive bargaining. Although in theory this would increase the sector's
sensitivity to competitive market forces, this is not always the case.8
However, labor relations in the secondary sector are quite distinct:
there tends to be a "highly personalized relationship between workers
and supervisors which leaves wide latitude for favoritism and is conducive
to harsh and capricious work discipline."9
The genesis of the bifurcation in the labor market is best understood
in terms of the fundamental instabilities that buffet a market economy.
Piore argues that segmentation stems from differences among firms with
respect to the degree of stability in their production processes,
product forms, and final demand.10 The markets of "primary sector" firms
are either stable or fluctuate in a predictable manner and involve
products that can be easily inventories. In industries where total demand
is stable, all of the firms may be large oligopolistic primary sector
concerns. In more dynamic industries, large primary firms are likely to
exploit economies of scale only up to the point where total demand
begins to fluctuate. Above this aggregate level of production, smaller
secondary firms, or divisions of large firms, will fall in and out of the
industry to accommodate the swings in demand. Since these firms or branches
typically are less efficient, having smaller investments in physical and
humancapital, they are the first ones to discontinue operations when
demand declines. However, their labor intensity also makes them more
14
flexible, allowing them to expand quickly when the total industry's market
is revitalized.
The production process of primary sector operations tends to be
sufficiently standardized to require a fixed set of well-defined skills
that are firm-specific. Skill specificity, in conjunction with output
stability, facilitates the development of on-the-job training, promotional
opportunities, and more extensive grievance procedures. These benefits
also accrue from the relatively extensive hierarchical and geographic
breadth of primary sector firm operations. 1 1
One elusive issue in the segmentation literature is the "type" of
product market instability that gives rise to the discontinuities in the
labor market. Thompson identifies three different kinds of cyclical
instability, each of which are potential contributors to the variability
of the demand for labor in the secondary sector market: a) daily
cycles, b) seasonal cycles, and c) business cycles. 1 2
The daily cycles of demand, most noticeable in the retail and
service sector, are largely a result of the geographic concentration of
businesses with similar working hours. Jacobs and Thompson have argued
that the absence of mixed land use schemes and staggered work weeks have
exacerbated this dilemma. By creating a wider diversity of working hours
and combining residential and commercial facilities, development agents
could promote a more continuous utilization of urban infrastructure and
personal service firms. 1 3
Conroy notes that seasonal fluctuations in the demand for labor can
be attributed largely to annual cycles in weather (e.g., agricultural
harvests), custom (Christmas shopping) or production processes (auto
15
model changes).14 Freedman has pointed out that, even though sales
industries have become more concentrated, a variety of trends have
increased the seasonal and daily instability of employment in that sector,
and thus the preponderance of secondary jobs. Among the factors contribu-
ting to this pattern are the growth of nondurable sales firms relative
to the durable retail sector. The latter type of retail firm has histori-
cally required higher skilled labor with a more intimate knowledge of
product characteristics and markets. In addition, Freedman notes:
The trend toward longer business hours, simplification of
tasks, standardization and self-service has made for
increasingly fragmented manning schedules (in all of the
sales industries). 15
Thirdly, a number of industries vary their demand for labor over the
business cycle. Thompson notes the importance of four related industrial
sectors characterized by this kind of cyclical instability:16 (1) consumer
durables, the demand for which declines when households attempt to
stretch out the life of their physical assets; (2) producer goods, which
must be foregone by businesses when demand is low or when loanable funds
are scarce; (3) intermediate goods stored in inventories that are liqui-
dated during a recession; and (4) the goods produced by export industries
(exported vis-a-vis a local economy) which are likely to first feel the
impact of a national or international decline.
Apart from the sectors that have regular undulations in demand
corresponding to recurring market cycles with daily, seasonal or multi-
year wave lengths, there exist many firms with fairly random flucuations
in output. The instabilities are caused by: (a) rapidly changing
fashions, (b) the idiosyncratic demands of other firms, (c) techno-
16
logical change, (d) a thin management structure, or (e) simply a
highly competitive industry.
The apparel industry in the major centers of fashion design is the
prototype of a sector subject to the first type of irregular perturba-
tions. Waldinger aptly describes the way flucuating aesthetic trends
foster agglomerations of highly unstable apparel enterprises in cities
like Paris, Los Angeles, New York and London.17
The printing industry is a good example of a sector governed by the
second type of nonrecurring fluctuations--those associated with the highly
peculiar intermediate demands of other firms. Tobier and Willis note
the way in which the financial capitals like New York require a network
of flexible printing shops which can accommodate unanticipated editing
changes as well as highly specific graphic formats.1 8
Another type of employment variability is associated with innovation.
If a business is in a highly dynamic industry in which technological
change is rapid and where a firm's future hinges on its ability to
develop new products and processes with exceptionally high tolerances,
performance levels, and yields, the probability of business failure can
rise. The literature on the degree and effects of the instability associ-
ated with the high technology industry is not well developed but one
should acknowledge this fourth source of instability. 1 9
The last two forms of employment inconstancy are created in sectors
where management is weak and barriers to entry fairly low. For instance,
some retail and personal service firms have markets that are fairly
stable but have unpredictable output levels because they are poorly
17
managed2 0 and face a great deal of competition. 2 1
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a firm's occupations
are in the primary or secondary labor market strictly on the basis of the
firm's structural characteristics. The archetypical primary sector job
is one in a large firm within a capital intensive and concentrated industry,
where the production process is fairly standardized and final demand is
stable or at least predictable. However this paradigm is often misleading,
and needs to be refined.
One of the most important theoretical refinements that is needed
pertains to the unascertained correlation between labor market segments
and firm size.
It is true that most of the data on wages and fringe benefits
indicate that small firms provide lower compensation packages to their
work forces. This seems to be the case even after one controls for
22 23 24
sector, industry, and the age and race of employees.
However, Freedman demonstrates that it is very dangerous to make
generalizations regarding the wages, advancement opportunities, and
training provided by different sized firms. First she notes that
labeling all jobs in large firms as primary sector employment is inappro-
priate. For instance, although large oligopolitic enterprises usually
have positions that are embedded within broad internal labor markets,
requiring firm-specific skills, and offering opportunities for promotion,
other occupations in these firms are frequently cut off from the rest of
25
the establishment's job hierarchy. For instance, secretaries and
telephone operators are often systematically isolated from the career
18
ladders of the internal labor market. Morse had shown earlier, how this
typically occurs within businesses which allocate the dynamic portion of
their output to a division employing "peripheral" workers--that part of
the firm's labor force that is laid off as soon as a cyclical or erratic
decline in demand occurs.26
Conversely, Freedman notes that some relatively small firms with
unstable product markets have offered good jobs to their employees. This
improvement in job quality, however, is typically associated with an
occupations' success in creating craft union or licensing systems that
constrict labor supply and rationalize the recruitment process.
In addition the empirical data on the relative instability of small
firms is not entirely consistent. Birch has generated the principal body
of data that indicates small firms are much more volatile. In a given
time interval these firms seem to both create a great deal of employment
through births and expansions and concurrently destroy a large number of
jobs through deaths and contractions. In 1972 through 1974 for
instance, the gross percentage of jobs destroyed in small firms was about
28
18%, just over two times the comparable percentage for large business.
However, the net change for small businesses was actually positive and
exceeded that of large businesses because of the former's expansions and
births.
Notwithstanding the rigor of Birch's methodology, the reliability
and significance of his data can be questioned. Brookings, for instance,
has recently generated a comprehensive critique of Birch's work. Although
the Brookings analysts, Armington and Odle, take issue mainly with Birch's
19
estimates of job generation 29 they also critically review his findings
on employment instability.* 30
In her most recent article, Armington concludes:
Small business is often thought of as more volatile, or less
stable than large business. This popular impression appears
to have no basis in fact... 31
(Armington and Odle's analysis is colored however by the fact that they
use a measure of volatility that is somewhat misleading: e.g. the
number of jobs created and destroyed as a percentage of the net new Jobs
created. The Brookings analysts now agree with Birch regarding his basic
finding that small firms generated more net new jobs. 32 Thus given
the same amount of jobs destroyed per net new job created, smaller firms
will actually destroy a larger number of jobs during any given time
period.)
A second issue pertaining to Birch's work is the significance
of his overall findings. One might interpret Birch's work as implying
that if more small firms are created (i.e., through targeting public funds
to these enterprises) there will be less stability of employment in the
economy. Although this proposition has some basis in fact, it receives
little empirical support from Birch's results. This is because Birch does
not describe the inter-relationship between small and large firm's
employment instability.
One might subscribe to a demand driven view that posits an immutable
amount of instability in the economy. If the public sector reduced
*The issue of small business contribution to job generation is
examined in Chapter Three.
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assistance to small firms this instability-would simply be "transferred"
to larger firms. Conversely, if one imposed constraints on hiring and
firing in larger firms it is likely that small firms will become more
numerous and increasingly less stable. Indeed Piore and Berger have
compiled an impressive array of historical evidence to defend at least
the latter assertion.33 In Chapter IV, the phenomenon of inter-firm
"transfers" of instability will be re-examined. I will attempt to
discern when such transfers can be expected.
Another feature of the primary/secondary bifurcation is somewhat
ambiguous: the degree of product standardization in the two sectors.
Increasing the uniformity of a firm's products and the division of labor
in a firm can be associated with either: (1) a shift from primary to
secondary sector employment, when the standardization is so complete that
few skills are required to produce or sell the product; or (2) a shift
from secondary to primary jobs when the production process has become
sufficiently uniform to require a fixed set of skills which can be learned
on-the-job.
Finally, as indicated above, the durable/nondurable product distinc-
tion has a complex relationship to the primary/secondary bifurcation.
Durable and nondurable industries each have their own peculiar forms of
instability. Nondurable sales firms have pronounced cycles, with daily,
weekly and/or seasonal wave lengths. Nondurable manufacturing firms, as
Stone notes, often serve markets which are "more susceptible to style or
component change" creating :sporadic fluctuations in their demand for
labor. 34 On the other hand, durable sales and manufacturing firms
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face declines in product demand during the nadirs of investment cycles.
On balance, workers employed in nondurable manufacturing and sales
industries with cyclical demands for labor, tend to be worse off because
they must deal with more frequent layoffs. This rapid turnover rate
tends to undermine the development of career ladders, formal grievance
procedures, labor organization, and on-the-job training. In contrast,
business cycle variability historically has been more characteristic of
the primary rather than the secondary sector.
Thus, in sum, it is somewhat dangerous to formulate generalizations
about the correlation between firm size, product standardization, product
durability and labor market segment. However, on the most general level,
there is some evidence that secondary employment is concentrated in
smaller firms that produce unstandardized nondurable goods and services.
Inter-Modal Mobility and Discrimination
As indicated above, segmented labor markets are characterized not
only by a polarity in the types of jobs offered by employers, but also a
lack of mobility that obtains between segments. It is difficult to define
an objective standard against which to judge the extent of movement between
the secondary and primary sectors. There are empirical studies which
have measured inter-modal mobility and come out on both sides of this
issue. Carnoy, Rumberger, and Birinbaum have argued that the degree of
inter-modal mobility is quite low, while Leigh and Andisani have
tried to demonstrate that it is substantial.35
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A central theme of the dualist literature is that to the extent that
inter-modal movement occurs, it can not all be explained within a narrow
neoclassical framework. Orthodox economists assert that income and
occupational mobility is a function of workers' skills and education.
Since labor is paid its marginal product, individual workers who would
like to obtain more attractive occupational positions simply need to
increase their productivity through formal and informal training. 36
However there is a vast body of literature, much of it generated by
dualist economists, demonstrating that education is a poor predicter of
economic achievement. Only about a quarter of the inter-racial income
differential can be explained by education.37 A related failure of the
orthodox model is its inability to account for the unequal "payoffs" on
educational investments undertaken by different social strata. Groups
like blacks, who tend to be confined to the secondary sector, reap a much
smaller return on education, particularly for schooling below the post-
secondary level.
A variety of explanations have been given as to why racial minorities,
women and youth are concentrated in the secondary labor market. In his
earlier works, Piore attempted to show how the cultural background of the
"upper", "working" and "lower" classes affect their labor market status.
Drawing on Gans' sociological framwork, Piore asserted that primary workers
prefer stable employment and derive satisfaction largely from their private
relations with the extended family. In contrast, lower class culture,
with its emphasis on "action" and peer group relations is said to reinforce
disadvantaged workers' confinement to unstable secondary sector jobs. 3 8
23
This correspondence or cultural fit can be viewed as a product of the
dynamic interaction between work place and worker, each shaping the other
until the skill and attitudinal characteristics demanded by the job are
in accord with the actual characters of the employees.
But compelling critiques of this line of inquiry have been developed
by Valentine and others. Valentine demonstrates that there are few
fundamental differences between the value systems of lower and working
class cultures in America that could account for these groups' quite
different labor market status.39 Many sociologists have rejected models
that view the behavioral differences among classes as causes rather than
consequences of their position in the labor market. Piore himself, though
still interested in the interaction of cultural and economic variables,
places less weight on the Gansian "supply side" framework in explaining
the persistance of segmentation.
Since groups like blacks do not receive as large a payoff from
education, many social scientists have turned instead to discrimination
as a factor in the allocation of jobs. This phenomenon is particularly
relevant to the segmentation literature because discriminatory selection
procedures divide the labor force into discrete economic groupings and
frustrate inter-occupational mobility.
Freedman and Barett, analyzing the special labor market problems
faced by women, have argued that employers incorrectly assume that most
women's attachment to the labor force is weak, refusing to invest in their
female employees through on-the-job training. Freedman notes middle-
aged women actually have commitments to the labor force comparable to
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those of their male counterparts, although they continue to be confined
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to distinctly inferior jobs. This analysis can be extended to other
groups (e.g., minorities, the handicapped, and the very old and very young)
whose skills, education and/or labor market commitment has been under-
estimated or ignored by employers. To the extent that these groups do
in fact have lower productivity rates or a greater tendency to quit their
jobs, it is very hard to determine whether these deficiencies are the
causes or effects of their peripheral labor market status.
Social scientists have explained employee and employer discrimination
in a variety of ways. As Marshall notes, employee discrimination is
probably the most destructive form of prejudice because it affects not
only recruitment processes but also the success and productivity of a
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worker after he has been hired. This phenomenon will be examined closely
in the next chapter.
Ironically, radical and conservative economists come to a similar
conclusion regarding discrimination practiced by employees: they both
assert that it is economically self destructive. The orthodox contingent
see discriminatory warkers as accepting lower wage rates to fulfill their
perverse "tastes" to avoid physical contact with certain groups, and
thereby damage their own financial well being. The Marxists, on the
other hand, view discrimination as an ideology cultivated by management
in order to fragment the labor force, frustrating workers' attempts to
obtain a higher standard of living or gain control over the productive
process.
Since Chapter II will provide the outlines of an alternative to
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these dominant strains in the discrimination literature, it is worth
highlighting the weaknesses of these two frameworks. The conservative
framework developed originally by Gary Becker rests on the classical
assumption that individual tastes are the proper unit of analysis. This
framework typically presumes that discrimination represents an individual
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attempt to avoid physical proximity with disadvantaged minorities. 2 The
conservative model fails to explain discrimination practiced by super-
visors or managers towards rank and file employees with whom they have
little or no contact. By ignoring these prejudiced actors' collective
ties with the white community, and only focusing on atomistic preferences,
the orthodox analysts cannot account for employees who would prefer that
a member of their own social group obtains employment.
The Marxist analysis, on the other hand, focuses on management's
intra-class identity and assumes that its internal ties are extremely
binding, eclipsing individual managers' interests. By excluding blacks
from firms or from positions held by whites, management is said to prevent
the reconciliation of the white and black working classes and to weaken
their combined political and economic leverage. 43
However, it is not clear that the optimal way to fragment one's own
work force is to exclude all racial minorities. It might be far more
effective, at least in the short run, to hire minority groups to work
side by side with whites, frustrating workers' ability to organize and
communicate with one another.
It is true that in the long run, if every firm pursued this course,
interracial economic inequalities would be eliminated and the tension
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between the races would probably dissipate. But to avoid this outcome
requires managers to base their actions on lengthy time frames and to
place the interests of their colleagues in other firms on a par with
their own.
Presumably the manager of one firm has an interest in taking
advantage of the racial hostility created by all other firms' exclu-
sionary practices (an "externality" of sorts). As long as other firms
segregate their workforces, maintaining social hatreds, the individual
manager has an interest in exploiting these conflicts by integrating his
own firm.
Managers are united to the extent that they will cooperate in pre-
serving the most general dimensions of the market system, an ethic
derived from their economic interests and education. But it is much
more difficult to assert that they will forego substantial profits to
maintain divisions within the labor force.
Radical analysts of discrimination often ignore that employee discrimi-
nation has a life of its own, independent of white managers' attempt to
heighten inter-racial conflicts. It is true that many firms have used
blacks as strike breakers, which has deepened whites' intransigence; but
it is not clear that discriminatory social cultures in the U.S. derive
primarily from the actions of management.44
A more robust analysis of the discriminatory behavior of white
employees can be pieced together from a model of segmentation and inter-
mediation. Although the full description of this model will be deferred
until section IV, a brief summary of the argument follows.
27
White workers in primary sector firms feel threatened when blacks
are introduced into the workplace. The importation . of new social groups
into a firm or occupation is likely to make it more difficult for white
employees to refer their family and friends to job vacancies. More
importantly, new black workers will be perceived as degrading the status
of any occupation they enter.
This reduction in occupational status results in part from the
black workers' social stigma. It also is anticipated that disadvantaged
workers will be used to de-skill or casualize the firm's labor force. If
this is achieved, the current employees might be displaced, or compelled
to accept poorer wages, benefits and promotional opportxnities.
When white workers are confronted with this array of threats, they
have a vital interest in demonstrating that their new co-workers are
incapable of carrying out the productive tasks required by management.
This interest, whether consciously acknowledged or not, may lead the
seasoned workers to make it difficult for their neophyte peers to acquire
productive and organizational skills, or to become socially integrated
into the work place.
Before turning to the analysis of intermediation it is necessary to
briefly describe the social and ethical costs of labor market segmentation.
Unless one specifies why segmentation is inefficient or unfair, it is
difficult to place a value on policies designed to ameliorate it.
28
Social Costs of Segmentation
The most compelling reason to reduce segmentation is simply to
improve social equity. Libertarians have attempted to demonstrate that
the wealthy have entitlement rights to any property they inherit or earn
in a free market.45 Their historical assumptions regarding the legitimacy
of the conditions under which this property was acquired are highly
questionable. 46 Moreover, the contention that the current "rules of the
game" are fair is belied by the literature on the differential payoffs
to education.
But even if the rules were fair in the sense of being meritocratic, a
social system which allocates such highly disparate economic opportunities
to its citizenry is suspect on both social welfare grounds 47and from the
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standpoint of a theory of justice.
One can also develop a critique of segmentation on efficiency grounds.
Discontinuities in the labor market give rise to an inefficient utiliza-
tion of resources. Skill potentials are left undeveloped and workers'
unemployment rates are heightened. Most importantly, the consumers
of products in the most volatile industries do not internalize the social
costs of instability: i.e., the social welfare budget.
A third critique of segmentation relates to the goals of full employ-
ment and price stability. In a society in which neither inflation nor
unemployment seem tolerable, one fundamental goal of macroeconomic policy
is to achieve a better trade-off between the two.
Tobin points out that the inflationary impacts of excess demand
sectors are not fully offset by the attenuated deflationary effects of
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excess supply markets.48 Thurow argues that the skilled sectors of the
economy are likely to overheat first as aggregate demand rises.49 He
concludes that the economy would be able to accommodate a relatively
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy if these skill bottlenecks were
addressed through on-the-job training programs. By reducing the number
of workers possessing few skills who remain cut off from the primary
sector during expansionary periods, a lower level of unemployment can be
achieved for a fixed rate of inflation. *
Lastly, by checking the flow of labor into rapidly growing sectors,
segmentation may adversely affect the economy's ability to grow. Labor
bottlenecks have become much more serious in the last ten years as
reflected in the outward shift of the Beverage curve, the basic measure
of labor market imbalance.51 Medoff argues that the so-called skill mis-
match is a problem that arises when the economy and the labor force are
growing quickly. He also notes that the bottlenecks are aggravated "by
anything which makes the labor force members less able to fill the existing
set of jobs." 52
One can argue that the polarity in the job market can constrain the
flow of labor into expanding sectors, particularly skilled occupations-in
the lower tier of the primary sector. Moreover, discrimination and closed
*This argument does have its shortcomings. When bottlenecks are
cyclical rather than secular it is difficult to relax them without creating
a reserve of unemployed trained workers who are prepared to fill unstable
occupational demands when the economy approaches full capacity. However,
it is possible that these cyclical bottlenecks might be dampened if
skilled labor were more plentiful and less expensive, allowing employers
to retain their own excess reserve of labor. In this case the res*ve
could remain employed throughout the downswing phase of the cycle.
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social networks further limit the capacity of secondary workers to move
into these positions.
To see how this occurs one must analyze the dynamics of labor market
intermediation. Only by analyzing how job information is transmitted and
how workers assist one another in adjusting to the demands of primary
sector firms can one identify the obstacles faced by secondary workers
whose social networks are poorly informed and less influential.
Summary
In conclusion, labor markets are segmented largely because product
markets are unstable or unpredictable. Large oligopolistic firms exploit
economies of scale up to the point where demand begins to fluctuate, after
which smaller firms will fill in the slack. There is quite a bit of
ambiguity in the literature as to which types of perturbations are the most
crucial in bifurcating the labor market; however it is apparent that firms
with shorter cyclical instabilities have a greater concentration of
secondary jobs. The part time and part year job categories identified by
Freedman are more indicative of positions with poor pay, benefits and
opportunities for promotion than are jobs which are affected by macro-
economic business cycles. However, this generalization about the cycle
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length of secondary jobs, along with those pertaining to degree of standar-
dization, size of firm, and industry of the two sectors, must be employed
cautiously, since there exist a vast array of exceptions to the "ideal
types" described above.
The allocation of workers to jobs is no doubt based on many "supply
side" factors including motivation, culture, and skill. However equally
important are discriminatory screening and recruitment institutions.
Although managers are guilty of being prejudiced and exploiting the
discriminatory values of their workers they typically do not create these
values, contrary to the assertions of many Marxists. However, the conser-
vative model which explains discrimination in terms of personal tastes is
also inadequate.
Instead, one must assert that ethnic groups have a mutual interest
that they can pursue collectively. More advantaged ethnic groups have
effective channels through which they can secure information, sponsorship,
and training assistance. As will be argued in the following chapter,
groups with low socio-economic status do not have access to these strate-
gically important networks and thus face problems in obtaining and
retaining jobs.
Chapter III will describe some of the forces which lead to segmen-
tation in financial markets. Many of these forces bear a notable resem-
blance to those that give rise to labor market segmentation. The insta-
bility of product markets that generates the secondary labor market segment
has its parallel in the fluctuating profit rates of firms that have
problems raising financing. The discrimination and flawed information
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networks in the labor market are also echoed in the financial market.
The similarity of labor and financial segmentation makes possible a
synthesis of dualist factor market theory. Moreover this theoretical
correspondence provides one of the major rationales for linking labor and
financial market intermediation.
Labor market segmentation is both inevitable and inefficient. It is
inequitable because the rules of the game, or processes that determine
who wins and who loses, are unfair. But more importantly, the vast
inequalities in the outcomes generated by a segmented market are unjust.
The discontinuities in the labor market segmentation also reduce
economic efficiency, in both a static and dynamic sense. Segmentation is
inefficient, even in a static economy that is not expanding, because
consumers of goods produced in low paying, unstable firms do not inter-
nalize the social welfare costs they impose on the rest of society. In a
more dynamic sense, segmentation makes it difficult for labor to flow into
the emerging skilled sectors that are serving as engines for growth.
This flow is constrained by both the sheer economic chasm that lies
between the two sectors but, more substantially, by the social prejudices
and parochial fears that secondary workers encounter when they attempt
to obtain primary sector jobs. These are the issues addressed in Chapter II.
CHAPTER II
LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIATION:
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS
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Introduction
If manpower planners hope to improve the employment status of
disadvantaged groups, they must first determine how jobs are allocated
in the absence of public intervention. To understand this process it is
helpful to examine the dynamics of intermediation in the labor market.
Intermediaries are defined here as agents that: (a) spread labor
market information, (b) buy and sell labor services, or (c) help a
worker obtain/retain a job by providing training or social support. In the
external labor market--e.g., outside the firm--these functions are performed
by such institutions as newspaper want ads, temporary agencies, and manpower
organization. However, a critical intermediation role, particularly in
primary sector manufacturing operations, is performed by friends and rela-
tives who function as informal referral agents and sponsors.
These social networks also operate within the internal labor market--
e.g., inside the firm. These networks help new workers adjust to the
productive and social demands of the enterprise. In fact, from the stand-
point of an employer, it is precisely their serviceability within the firm
that makes social networks a useful intermediary in the external labor
market.
The neoclassical analysis of intermediation and job search focuses on
the narrow issue of the costs and return of information to an individual.
The orthodox model neglects to acknowledge the social character of informal
intermediaries. There are externalities associated with the dissemination
of labor market information, which ensure that costs and benefits are not
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visited entirely upon those agents engaged in any one transaction. More
importantly, the neoclassical framework ignores the functions performed
by friends and relatives within the firm.
To assist secondary workers to penetrate primary sector jobs one must
first identify which firms are capable of providing such opportunities.
The "firm-screening" process must include an analysis of the enterprise's
technology, markets, and organizational structure. Ideally, a business
should also be coaxed to revise its production strategy to enhance workers'
ability to obtain on-the-job training.
Aside from firm screening, a public manpower agency must also screen
workers who are interested in participating in training programs. Although
there are a variety of legitimate reasons to attempt to "cream"--selecting
only those applicants with the best educational and vocational experience--
this strategy will ultimately result in vitiating the goals of inter-modal
mobility.
Thirdly, the manpower agency should try to deal with the fears aroused
in well established workers when disadvantaged minority trainees are placed
in their firms. To ensure the trainess are retained, it is necessary to
deal with this perceived threat since the older white workers can withhold
training, provide misleading instructions, or refuse to orient their new
colleagues to the organizational structure of a firm.
Finally, the imperfect flow of information and sponsorship in the
labor market has many similarities to the deficiencies of financial markets.
In both markets the movement of factors across market segments is
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constrained by the narrow, personalistic and biased channels of inter-
mediaries. This parallel in input market imperfections provides one
rationale for linking development finance and training programs.
In this chapter I will first focus on the role of formal inter-
mediaries in the labor market. The economies of scale reaped by these
institutions provide one rationale for public intervention. (As will be
seen in Chapter IV, a similar argument can be made to justify intervention
by public capital market intermediaries.) These formal institutions con-
tribute to segmentation because of the fiscal, political, and cultural
constraints that bind them.
However, since social networks dominate the labor allocation process,
informal intermediaries will be the principal focus of this Chapter. The
dynamics of informal inicrmediation in the external labor market will be
examined, contrasting the neoclassical model with a sociological framework.
As noted above, one of the major weaknesses of the orthodox model
is its failure to make the connection between the roles friends and rela-
tives play within the firm to the types of recruitment functions they
perform in the external labor market. Thus the dynamics of internal labor
intermediation will be analyzed in depth. Finally some policy recommenda-
tions will be offered regarding the optimal strategy for assisting
disadvantaged secondary workers in light of the models of segmentation and
intermediation presented in the first two chapters.
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Formal Labor Intermediaries
Formal intermediaries in the labor market exploit economies of scale.
Labor intermediaries (LI's) take advantage of their size in two ways:
0 By creating a central pool of information about jobs and
workers, they prevent any one firm or individual from
bearing the entire cost of finding out about available
workers or job openings.
o By spreading the fixed costs associated with the job
matching process--e.g., the salaries of personnel speci-
alists and computer costs--over a large number of
consumers, they reduce the per unit cost of each piece of
information.
The first economy relates to the distribution of information, while
the second pertains to its production. Thus even if unit production costs
per piece of information collected remains the same as output rises, the
first type of economy of scale allows this information to be shared more
widely and thereby reduces the unit price to any individual user.
However, the second type of economy dictates that unit costs actually
do have an inverse relation to output level. This occurs largely because
the staffing and equipment needs do not rise proportionately when the amount
of information gathered and processed rises. It also occurs because of
the "diversification effect". Firms that typically recruit workers only
in one or two seasons cannot retain an efficient personnel department
during the entire year. But a labor market intermediary, serving many firms
with different seasonal cycles can establish a stable professional corps
of labor specialists, and utilize computers and other equipment on a year-
round basis. Both of these economies reduce the cost of information
production.
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In the case of government sponsored intermediaries, such as a job
referral agency public involvement addresses two specific types of market
failure. The first is associated with the "lemon" problem outlined by
Akerloff. Consumers of news about jobs or workers are not able to verify
the authenticity and quality of information. Without such intervention
the price consumers would be willing to pay for information would decline,
forcing the best intermediaries to either reduce the quality of their data
or go out of business. The former outcome would reduce the perceived
value of intermediation services even further, etc.*
The second classic justification for public intervention pertains to
the economies of scale associated with creating a central pool of informa-
tion. The dissemination of information has many similarities to a public
good. Unless the cost of transmitting data is subsidized bya collective
authority it is likely that it will be under-produced or imperfectly
disseminated. Ironically, subsidies are necessary not because information
is expensive, but because the marginal cost of information is so low.
The marginal cost function of information dissemination is similar to
that of many infrastructure goods: it is constantly declining rather than
U-shaped. As the number of consumers of one piece of information rises,
the added cost of disseminating that dataum to the last additional user
falls. This means that information's marginal cost will always lie below
the average cost curve.
The implications of this type of cost function is that any producer
operating at the so-called efficient level of production--where price is
equal to marginal cost--will sustain a loss. A price equal to marginal
*The information quality issue is examined below in the context of
federal intermediation (see Chapter IV).
cost will be less than average cost; hence, every additional unit of
information sold would increase the producer's losses. Even if marginal
cost stops falling at some point and levels off, a private information
disseminator would have to produce an infinite amount of data to break even.
F'ormal LIs often contribute to segmentation. For instance the U.S.
Employment Service (USES) continues to use fairly superficial measures of
education when selecting workers for primary sector jobs. An Employment
and Training Administration survey revealed that although the USES refers
mostly workers with higher educational attainments, education was not
highly correlated with the likelihood of obtaining a job offer upon being
referred to an employer 2; apparently, formal LI's "cream" to an even
greater extent than employers. In this context creaming refers to the use
of crude measures of productivity which tend to benefit workers whose socio-
economic status is high. This policy will tend to frustrate the attempts
of secondary workers to obtain primary sector jobs and thus heighten
segmentation.
The behavior of formal LI's like the ES can be explained in a variety
of ways. Three reasons stand out: perverse performance measures, high
information costs, and social prejudice.
(1) Perverse Performance Measures
The U.S. Employment Service (USES) is judged largely on the basis of
its placement rates. In 1958, the Secretary of Labor adopted this per-
formance measure because the USES was perceived as an inefficient bureau-
cracy that had not been systematically evaluated.3
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Using the placement rate as the measure of an LI's effectiveness is
inefficient and can enhance segmentation. It induces the LI to target all
of its resources on the workers who are easiest to place, even if these
persons could have found jobs without the assistance of the LI.
(2) High Information Costs
Formal LI's can most easily obtain information on job seekers' sex,
age, race, and educational achievements. Even publicly funded LI's must
operate within tight budget constraints limiting the types of data they
can afford to obtain and process in a systematic fashion. Private LI's
will tend to rely on "cheap screens" to reduce their expenses. They may
pretend their referrals are based on more intensive research, while con-
tinuing to utilize these unsophisticated screening techniques.
Productive workers whose superficial qualifications are inferior
cannot obtain referrals because of the high costs involved in collecting
more subtle information about skills and aptitude. This practice heightens
segmentation by constraing the mobility of workers whose past experience
is limited or whose social status is low.
Even from the standpoint of maximizing the efficiency of labor allo-
cation processes these policies are sub-optimal. As argued above, informa-
tion dissemination is a public good and thus must be subsidized to reach
the efficient level of output. Moreover to avoid the lemon dilemma the
quality of information must be maintained at a high level. Hence if a
public LI intervenes in the market, it should generate information about
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workers that an employer would not normally have recourse to--not just
data that can be obtained by any screener.
(3) Social Prejudice
Another reason that LI's rely on superficial characteristics is
because these signals are often proxies of social status that are respected
by the intermediary's staff. Biased LI workers may actually believe that
a worker's sex, age, race, or number of years of education indicate whether
a worker is productive or even whether he or she deserves a job. Alter-
natively, these workers may believe that discriminatory screening tools
are necessary evilsimposed on LI's by prejudiced employers.4  These
institutional constraints shape the behavior of formal labor market
intermediaries' behavior. Any public intervention in labor markets should
deal with the dangers posed by these factors.
However, one cannot design appropriate policies to reform public
manpower agencies before identifying the critical forces which drive
informal intermediaries. Since formal intermediaries,like the USES,
play a relatively minor role in most lower tier primary sector labor markets,
it is misleading to develop a model of segmentation based on their actions
alone.5 Thus the formulation of public policies pertaining to labor market
interventions must be deferred until the end of this chapter, following a
detailed examination of the functions of informal social networks.
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Informal social networks function as intermediaries in both the
external and internal labor markets. Neoclassical economists argue that
the capacity of these networks to transmit sophisticated labor market
information explains why individual employers and workers rely on them.
Like the orthodox analysis of financial markets, neoclassical models
of labor intermediation are directed toward demonstrating both the reasons
informal networks are used and why they are the most efficient search
techniques.
Although quite robust, the model is flawed by the fact that access
to and need for labor market information is determined by the social
standing of groups of workers, not by that of individuals. The designers
of development programs must confront these issues in order to assist
workers whose social networks are neither influential nor informed.
Informal Intermediation in the External Labor Market
Many labor market studies have revealed that a large proportion of
6
job vacancies--particularly in blue collar occupations--are filled through
social networks. About 50% of job placements in which some intermediary
is involved occur through informal means.
The other 50% is split up among the employment service, temporary
agencies, hiring halls, and a variety of other institutions. The dependence
on very informal information channels in the labor market poses a challenge
for economists; to explain how factors are rationally allocated given the
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fairly idiosyncratic social networks through which this information is
transmitted.
Given the fact that people enter into social relationships for a
multiplicity of reasons, not all of which are based on a desire to maximize
personal wealth, it seems reasonable to suspect that the process of
informal labor market intermediation may not conform to an income maximiza-
tion model. Moreover, since social networks are not all-inclusive, it is
likely that labor market competition is not always perfect, with only a
select group of workers being considered for many job openings. Although
orthodox economists generally have difficulty in dealing with informal
economic institutions that are tied to the social, political, and cultural
existence of a group, there does exist a coherent neoclassical theory of
labor market intermediation, one which purports to fully explain why
informal networks play such an important role in this input market.
The orthodox wisdom, articulated most clearly by Stigler and Rees,
demands that a job seeker should continue to seek additional wage offers
until the discounted value of wages produced by one more search effort is
equal to the expense of carrying out that last exploration. 8
To understand why informal intermediaries are so influential, Rees
argues, it is necessary to make a fundamental distinction between the
intensive and extensive margin of information acquisition.9 Pursuing job
search at the intensive margin involves getting more information about
*A more sophisticated hypothesis of this form would include an
adjustment for risk aversion: workers are more likely to continue their
job search if the marginal expected wage offer has a smaller variance
(or systematic covariation with the returns on his other assets).
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one single job offer, e.g., how long the job is likely to last, how often
merit increases can be obtained, the fairness of supervision, etc. Engaging
in search at the extensive margin, on the other hand, represents the
collection of rather superficial information--e.g., wage offers--from
firms one has not yet contacted. The extensive/intensive distinction
is equally applicable to employers' recruitment efforts: a firm can
obtain more information relating to the qualifications of a particular
job applicant or it can gather more wage bids.
Rees asserts that the labor market is similar to the used car market
in that workers are so multifaceted and difficult to assess that the
return on intensive search efforts tends to be quite high. Given the
employment security offered by many unions, the hiring of a worker often
represents a long term investment. This increases the returns associated
with careful screening of workers.
The distinction between intensive and extensive search, Rees contends,
reveals why the use of informal intermediaries is both pervasive and
efficient. Personal acquaintances of job seekers are capable of providing
the most elaborate information about the latter's qualifications to
employers and more detailed accounts of their own jobs to a job applicant.
He notes,
The problem facing the employer is not to get in touch with
the largest possible number of potential applicants; rather
it is to find a few applicants promising enough to be worth
the investment of thorough investigation.1 0
Rees' argument rests on the assumption that there are large variations
in productivities among individuals. "Thorough investigation" is needed
to discern which applicants are the most productive. It is noteworthy that
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one of the ways that Rees attempts to demonstrate the high degree of
variability in the "quality" of labor is to refer to the wide range of
wages received within a narrowly defined occupation in the Chicago labor
market. This approach inspires an obvious critique: his argument is
circular. He assumes that the wages received by workers in the same
profession are correlated with their productivities. He then argues that
the variations in productivity manifested by these wage differentials can
only be discerned through informal intensive exchanges of information.
But one might equally well argue that the prevailing dependence on narrow
personal networks leads to imperfections in the labor market that make
possible large differences in wages among workers of equal skill and
productivity.*
Although the neoclassical explanation of the dependence of job
seekers on social networks is somewhat compelling, it is based on the
questionable assumption that all actors engaged in labor market search
processes equate their individual marginal costs and returns of information.
Though this may be an accurate way of modeling some employers' decision to
acquire information about job seekers, it is not clear that workers' job
search efforts can be described on the basis of their own personal cost
and return functions.
First, it is very difficult to predict whether investment in addi-
tional information will increase one's future discounted wage (or profit)
*Elsewhere Rees and Schulze attempt to demonstrate that in Chicago
the variations in wages are correlated with, among other things, differences
in education. To the extent that they achieve this goal they still fail
to demonstrate the link between education and productivity, a relation
which has been highly scrutinized by such economists as Thurow, Bowles,
Gintis, and Berg.10'
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stream sufficiently to justify such an action. It is unlikely that the
marginal cost of additional information rises smoothly and intersects a
continuously declining return function at some discrete point. Moreover
the return function cannot be determined ex ante while one is still engaged
in search. To accomplish this a search agent would have to know the wage
of the job (or the productivity of the employee) before the fact.
However, the most important flaw of the neoclassical analysis is its
failure to account for decisions that are made on the basis of social
rather than individual considerations. Social groups as collectivities
must weigh the costs and returns in labor market information dissemination
and acquisition, but it is not always useful to conceive of their members
as facing such constraints individually. In part, the need to analyze
search activity on a higher level of social aggregation stems from the
externalities associated with the diffusion of job information.
The exchange of information on the margin is often virtually costless
as far as the individual actors are concerned as long as the group to
which they belong is cohesive. However, maintaining the cohesiveness of
a group may involve substantial costs in terms of preserving institu-
tional structures, protecting neighborhood boundaries, or sustaining
participation in social activities. Sometimes much of these costs are
hidden, because they are directly associated with other social returns
such as increasine fellowship among friends. The costs involved in
enhancing the internal integrity of the group may not fall on the same
actors that benefit at any moment from its existence. Thus the cost of
information transfer among workers seeking jobs is often borne collectively
--not atomistically by the few actors engaged in any one transaction.
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Similarly, the returns associated with informal labor market inter-
mediation are not entirely reaped by the individual who obtains a job
lead. If a worker is placed in a good job then he is more likely to
become an effective intermediary himself at some point in the future. The
group as a whole clearly benefits any time one of its members is placed
in a position where he or she is capable of assisting others. Thus
neither the costs nor the benefits of information dissemination are
visited entirely on the individuals involved in any particular exchange.
However, the externalized returns deriving from the placement of a
friend in one's own firm are not confined to an expansion of the job
information available to the social network. Indeed this benefit may be
fairly small when a large fraction of the group is concentrated in a few
firms in the same labor market. In this case, the new worker receiving
employment is likely to secure information that was already accessible to
the group. As Granovetter has shown, relatively weak ties to workers who
are employed in remote enterprises are the most useful in providing new
job information, since these workers are most likely to provide leads that
one does not already possess.11
There are other perceived returns that are reaped by a group when it
places one of its members in an occupation or firm that they already
dominate. These returns are the flip side of the losses that the group
would expect to sustain were a member of a lower status group successful
in penetrating their field. Once the ethnic and racial stratification of
the economy is an accomplished fact, workers are likely to be materially
threatened when they are forced to work side by side with new groups
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possessing a lower socio-economic status.12 The introduction of such low
status groups may be interpreted as an attempt to mechanize or degrade
their occupations.
Frequently employers try to increase the flexibility of their labor
force, decrease their wage bill, or reduce their workers' ability to
place new demands on management by transforming many of the firm's jobs
into part time, temporary positions. Freedman has documented the fact that
durable sales and clerical occupation have experienced such transforma-
tions. As Freedman notes, such attempts to degrade an occupation are
typically accompanied by the recruitment of new demographic groups who
have fewer economic opportunities. Hence many actors in the labor market
associate the introduction of workers bearing a lower socio-economic
status with these structural transformations. 13
White workers who witness the entrance of blacks into their occupations
may conclude that management is trying to undercut their wages, working
status with these structural alterations of their vocational role.
White employess will feel most threatened when they are forced to
work with disadvantaged minorities who have few skills and a peripheral
relationship to the labor market. Such inter-group contact will heighten
the danger of a noxious re-structuring of their occupation. Kornblum
notes that the white steelworkers who display the most racist behavior
are those who have frequent contact with newly hired unskilled blacks. 1'.
Additionally, Hosbaum, in his analysis of the British aristocracy of labor,
discovered a similar pattern at the turn of the century. The most
reactionary craftsmen were those who had been forced to work side by side
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with large numbers of low skilled laborers. The very proximity of these
groups raised the craftsmen's fearsof mechanization. (Once the process of
mechanization was completed, however, these workers were among the most
radical in the labor force, calling for a unification of labor to combat
capitalists' control of production.)4.2
Regardless of whether whites believe such a structural metamorphsis
in their occupations and firms is taking place, they may fear that their
future promotional opportunities within and outside of the firm will be
serverely constrained if the new ethnic or racial group succeeds in
adapting to the work place. In the first place, the older, more established
white workers may have to compete with a larger group if the skill supply
expands rapidly, particularly if seniority is not decisive in determining
promotion. Furthermore, they may feel that their occupational status will
be stigmatized by the new group, threatening the continuity of existing
career ladders. Finally, even if the promotional opportunities of the
white workers currently employed in the firm are protected, their families'
and friends' ability to fill future job vacancies is likely to be curtailed
if the latter must compete with an additional set of workers.
Whether or not these phenomenon actually occur is irrelevant. What
is essential is that they are likely to be anticipated given the social
stratification of the work place. The fact that women and blacks have in
fact been used to "casualize" a profession, has undoubtably popularized
this view. The history of unions' attempts to exclude blacks can be
understood as driven largely by such concerns.
Thus a vicious circle emerges: the discrimination experienced by
secondary workers confines them to lower status jobs. However, their
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lower economic status is one of the main factors arousing the fears of white
workers who are responsible for exclusionary practices.
Before one can formulate a model of how conflicts between primary and
secondary workers impact on the latter's ability to secure information
and assistance in their job search efforts, it is necessary to examine the
empirical data that has been collected on this topic. Studies on the job
search behavior by race are the most detailed and instructive. They are
also fairly surprising in that some of the critical empirical findings are
counter-intuitive. These findings, however, can be utilized to develop a
comprehensive conceptual framework which specifies the nature of the employ-
ment barriers faced by secondary workers.
Empirical Findings on Inter-Racial Differences in Job Search Behavior:
Specification of an Interpretive Model
The empirical findings on jobs search behavior by race can be used
to elaborate and confirm the model of segmentation and inter-group conflicts
described above. The substantiation of the model will be very indirect
since it involves the specification of some unmeasured variables. However,
the framework developed in this manner can serve to generate some useful
interpretative hypotheses. I will focus on the experience of blacks since
their labor market behavior is fairly well documented and because they are
concentrated in the secondary labor market.* 15
*Although I will focus on the experience of blacks in the labor
market, much of the analysis will be applicable to other groups with a
low socio-economic status. In fact, throughout this essay blacks are
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The conflict between primary and secondary workers should make it
difficult for blacks to obtain job leads from white blue collar workers
who feel threatened by the former. Aside from having poor access to the
information resources of more advantaged groups, it is reasonable to
suspect that blacks possess less useful information themselves. Thus,
one might predict that blacks rely less often on informal networks in
their job search efforts. Some economists have indeed asserted that
blacks find their jobs through formal intermediaries or direct applica-
tion more often than do whites because they possess weaker and less
informed social networks. This conclusion seemed to be substantiated
by the research of Reynolds and Hilaksi.16
But this view of the job search problems faced by blacks is not
entirely accruate. Reynold's study was limited by its narrow focus on
certain manufacturing industries and applies only to various blue-collar
occupations. Although Reynold's work is quite relevant to an analysis of
segmentation it is useful to examine a mix of occupations in developing a
model of inter-racial differences in job search behavior.
Hilaski's survey was conducted in depressed urban areas where a large
fraction of his white sample were Hispanic. Since many immigrants' job
search strategies conform to the "chain migration" intermediation model
described by the MacDonalds, Hilaski's estimate of whites'relative
dependance on informal intermediaries was biased upwards. 1 7
used as an example of a group who are concentrated in the secondary sector.
However, I do not mean to suggest that all blacks are members of the
secondary sector, or that whites and other racial groups are confined
to the primary sector, an assertion which is obviously false.
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Notwithstanding the validity of these two authors' work, recent
research drawing on a large longitudinal survey has indicated that blacks
are more likely to draw on informal networks, with only part of the dif-
ferential being attributable to the divergent occupational distributions
of the two races.18
However, a rather confusing pattern emerges, when one examines how
the use of informal intermediaries varies by race and occupation: while
blacks in the professions and in service occupations rely more often on
informal networks, black managers and laborers are less likely than
whites to find their jobs in this manner.
One way of sorting out this perplexing picture is to distinguish
between a group's need for information or sponsorship and their access to
such resources. Both ultimately depend upon the group's social position.
A group's access to information depends primarily on the occupations and
industries in which they are employed, the stability of their employement,
and their labor force participation. As argued above, a disadvantaged
group peripherally employed in menial occupations will have less access
to valuable labor market information. If the group has no access to a
piece of information, then its cost can be conceived as being infinite.
If access is an extension of the concept of the cost of information,
need can be interpreted as a modification of the idea of a return. A
central hypothesis generated by Rees' analysis is that information at
the intensive margin is more valuable when one is qualified for jobs whose
benefits and working conditions are complex and varied. In this case
the job seeker requires more information to get an accurate description
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of the job. Similarly, Stevens argues, an employer only needs intensive
information when he is seeking employees for jobs that have complex
qualifications, demanding workers with a subtle mix of characteristics.19
Stevens concludes that the marginal return for information acquisition at
the intensive margin is low in certain unskilled and semi-skilled labor
markets in which workers and jobs are fairly standardized.
But a group's socioeconomic position may be related in the opposite
manner to their need for informally provided information and sponsorship.
Employers are more likely to demand intensive and experiential information
about candidates whose social status is viewed as inappropriate for a
position. Some groups are excessively vulnerable to screening procedures
used by employers to reduce the burden of application processing. An
informal sponsor can compensate for such vulnerability, and thus may be
exceptionally useful to those groups who do not possess attractive inspec-
tional qualifications: blacks, women, the elderly, etc. In other words,
some groups may have a relatively high need for sponsorship because 'they
do not have characteristics which frequently substitute for having a
sponsor in the labor market.
Job seekers need intensive labor market information both to obtain
and evaluate job offers. To obtain a job offer, it is often useful to
receive detailed information about the firm's structure and goals, the
tasks performed by incumbents of the position for which one is applying
and/or the personality, interests, and biases of the personnel with hiring
power. This information can be utilized in writing a resume, responding
to questions in an interview, or simply deciding how to dress and present
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oneself when submitting an application. A group's need for this information
is a function of many of the same socio-economic variables discussed
above under sponsorship needs, in addition to the group's familiarity
with job application procedures. Again, an ability to perform well in a
job interview may substitute for other qualifications which are highly
correlated with the group's social status.
Finally, information relating to the personnel in a firm is also
helpful in deciding whether to accept a job offer, particularly for
minority groups who must assess the biases of potential co-workers,
trainers, and supervisors (though, obviously, disadvantaged minorities
have the least discretion about which jobs to select). As will be
discussed in depth in the next section on the internal labor market, a job-
seeker who can look forward to establishing positive bonds with his co-
workers is most likely to be retained and promoted.
Returning to the analysis of black job-finders, one can offer some
very tentative hypotheses concerning the differential use of informal
intermediaries. To recapitulate, black professionals and service workers
rely more often on informal networks than whites in the same occupation;
black managers and laborers use such job-finding techniques less often
than their white counterparts.
One might assert that blacks who seek professional jobs have a signifi-
cantly greater need for personal intermediation than do whites because they
do not posess the qualifications, interviewing skills, and/or social status
which substitutes for sponsorship and application preparation information.
This greater need may be partially offset--but not outweighed--by their
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poor access to information and sponsorshiop. Conversely, blacks seeking
jobs in service occupations may have a relatively small need for personal
intermediation because they are widely viewed as suitable candidates for
a variety of menial service jobs. However, blacks may have greater access
to informal networks associated with these occupations since they are
disproportionately concentrated in these fields--a factor which may over-
whelm their lack of need for information and sponsorship.
In contrast, black managers may have poor access to corporate social
networks which circulate information regarding managerial job openings, a
weakness which more than offsets their greater need for personal inter-
mediation. Moreover, one might suspect that if the occupational data were
disaggregated further, the inter-racial differentials among both managers
and laborers would be reduced. Black managers are relatively concentrated
in the public sector where personal contacts may be somewhat less crucial
for job hunting because government agencies often must use civil service
exams as screening devices. Similarly, black laborers may have a relatively
low need for informal ties with employers, since the former are concen-
trated in the more casual sectors of industry where direct application
techniques prevail.2 0
There are several lessons to be learned from this model of inter-
racial differences in the use of informal intermediaries. First, informal
intermediaries are a key element of any group's job search strategies, as
reflected in the continued use of social networks by both races. The fact
that blacks hold inferior positions in the economy despite their greater
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reliance on informal intermediaries should not be interpreted as proof that
their networks are worthless.
It is true that black networks carry less valuable job information.
However, for workers who must overcome barriers such as discrimination,
informal intermediaries play a critical role. Many blacks may not have
an accurate conception of the content of the jobs they are qualified to
fill. Even those who do may need intensive information about the employer's
personality and the firm's productive and organizational structure in
order to perform well in an interview. Information on the prejudices of
a firm's employees may also be useful in determining whether to accept
such an offer once it has been advanced. Finally, to compensate for their
social stigma and lack of inspectional qualifications, members of disadvan-
taged groups require good sponsors who are trusted by employers.
Most o f the studies on intermediation focus on workers who actually
obtain jobs.21 Thus the greater utilization of intermediaries by blacks
is somewhat misleading. Many blacks simply can not obtain any job because
of their poor access to information networks. As noted above, black's
access to job information is truncated because the other members of their
social networks experience a high degree of unemployment and low labor
force participation rates. Thus unemployment breeds more joblessness
within the group.
In addition blacks who are employed possess more unstable jobs with
fewer supervisory responsibilities, diminishing further the groups'
collective ability to identify job openings. Lastly, the sponsorship
powers of these black employees are likely to be negligible, given their
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ephemeral attachment to the firm and superficial relationships with
staff who do possess hiring powers.
Thus, the problems of helping blacks obtain a larger number of jobs
is inextricably connected with the goal of improving the quality of jobs
they hold. Were a greater number of black workers employed in stable
jobs, with some oversize responsibilities they would be more likely to
quickly learn about job openings. As Osterman notes, the ability to obtain
a job is partially a function of the speed with which job vacancy infor-
mation is obtained.22 Secondly, if blacks held jobs with a greater
degree of authority they could also exercize more influence over key
decision makers in the firm.
A third and closely related connection between the status of employed
members and the amount of job information flowing through social networks
relates to the internal labor market, the focus of the next part of this
section. Groups who hold jobs in enterprises that provide some on-the-job
training can play a very supportive role to friends or relatives hired by
the firm. These workers can function as informal supervisors and trainers
to their colleagues. It is precisely this role which makes them such
attractive employment recruiters from an employer's perspective, as they
ensure that a new worker will adjust to the demands of the work place
fairly rapidly.
If manpower planners are going to attempt to improve the employment
status of disadvantaged groups like blacks they should ultimately
attempt to improve the strength of their informal recruitment networks.
Blacks must be placed in higher quality jobs where they can collect more
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job information, function as a better sponsor, and provide training and
supervision to members of their social networks. However, in the first
phase of this strategy, some black workers must retain jobs in firms
where they will have few sources of informal support. To understand the
problems they will confront in this situation one must analyze extensively
the functions performed by social networks within the firm. Only with a
full understanding of what blacks will have to forego can one hope to
assist them in the adjustment process. Thus we now turn to a description
of labor market intermediation in the internal labor market.
Informal Intermediation in the Internal Labor Market
Manpower analysts have noted that many blacks participating in sub-
sidized on-the-job training programs are fired soon after they are placed
in a primary sector firm.23 Other trainees leave of their own accord.
Still others are never promoted because they never secure the respect of
their supervisors.
Historically, during periods in which blacks penetrated industries for
the first time, managers frequently complained about these new workers'
performance. For instance, Haynes interviewed a Detroit manager who
during World War I hired blacks to meet his burgeoning production demands.
This manager asserted:
". . .[T]he Negro is . . . too slow. He does not make the
speed that the routine of efficient industry demands. He
is lacking in the regularity demanded by the routine of
industry day by day." 24
David Brody, commenting on a concurrent move by blacks into the steel
industry notes:
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they...appeared poorly suited to the job demands in steel,
had a very high turnover rate, and frequently clashed with
whites in the mills." 2 5
Some of the perceptions regarding blacks' "suitability" to industry
may have had some basis in fact. Blacks migrating from the South had not
yet grown accustomed to the rhythm or ambience of the industrial work
place.26 Moreover, today some secondary workers may be so accustomed to an
unstable economic existence that they find it difficult to adjust to the
rigors of a full time job. But as noted above, Valentine and others have
provided fairly compelling critiques of sociological analyses that attri-
bute secondary workers' difficulties to their unique cultural background.
These comments undoubtably reflect a great deal of racism on the
employers' part. Moreover, the categorical eligibility requirements of
on-the-job training programs continue to stigmatize their participants.
As Hammermesh notes, the very stipulations which ensure an effective tar-
geting of these programs serve to degrade the training participants in
the eyes of the employer.2 7
However, the pervasiveness of the comments on blacks' high turnover,
slow learning and inability to get along with their peers requires a
broader answer, one that can serve to explain how employers' biases might
be confirmed by their own experiences.
This is the critical reason for turning to social networks in the
internal labor market. If it is possible that these networks are respon-
sible for blacks' difficulty in adjusting to the productive and social
demands of the firm, then one must assess their structure and malleability.
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Very little theoretical or empirical research has been explicitly
focused on the issue of how informal networks affect the training, super-
vision, or integration of new workers into the social structure of the
firm. By extrapolating on the findings of Piore, Kornbum, and a number of
other economists and social scientists, one can see why informal worker
associations play such a crucial role. Social networks help new employees
acquire the interpersonal, productive, and organizational skills they
require in order to improve their social and economic standing within an
enterprise. Only by understanding the extensive influence of employee
networks, can manpower analysts begin to develop strategies for assisting
workers who lack such elaborate forms of social support.
One indication of the efficacy of employee networks is the negative
correlation between the use of employees as recruiters and the turnover
rate within a firm. This correlation has been documented by Bailey and
Freedman, Ullman and Gannon.
There are two major ways one can account for the low turnover rates
generated when employers use their current employees as informal labor
market intermediaries. First, as noted above, both job seekers and
employers are able to obtain more intensive, experiential and reliable
information through such networks, before either of them make a final
decision to accept a job or job-seeker respectively. Moreover, if an
employee is sponsored by a dependable figure in the firm, the employer is
likely to have more faith in the new worker. Managers will be less prone to
dismissing him if a supervisor complains about his behavior; if the new
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recruit is sponsored by an influential figure within the firm the
employer may even be afraid to dismiss him.
However, there are more basic forces operating in the workplace which
increase the retention rates of informally recruited employees, particularly
in primary sector jobs where workers are required to develop productive
and organizational skills which are firm-specific. New employees who have
a rudimentary bond with experienced workers in the firm--a bond based on
common social or economic heritage--adjust to the work place fairly
effortlessly. To see why this occurs it is useful to examine how a suppor-
tive network helps a new worker realize his or her basic social and economic
objectives.
Among primary sector workers' ultimate goals, three economic pursuits
and one non-economic aim stand out. Workers hope to improve their employ-
ment security, upgrade their working conditions, and expand their promo-
tional opportunities. (Conversely, they try to avoid demotion or the
degradation of the terms of their employment.) In addition, most workers
try to obtain some kind of emotional support from their co-workers.
In the remainder of this section I will elaborate why workers in
primary sector firms need to obtain information and training to achieve
their goals and how social networks facilitate their education. First
I will look at the issue of productive training narrowly defined; indicating
how skill development relates to primary sector workers'personal, social
and economic goals and why a close relationship with one's coworkers
expedites this process. Then I will turn to the significance of broader
forms of training: organizational and political learning. In each of
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these cases I will draw on the economic and sociological literature to
highlight the importance of informal intermediation.
Acquiring skills is a prerequisite for many of the goals pursued by
primary sector workers. Clearly an employer will try to avoid dismissing
a productive worker. More importantly, when production or social problems
arise in the work place, employers are less likely to perceive them as
emanating from the behavior of a productive employee, and thus less likely
to sanction him.
Workers who are able to acquire skills quickly will gain an under-
standing of the firm's technology. This understanding can be helpful
in many ways. If an employee is familiar with the production process, he
is more likely to be able to convince his supervisor to allow him to revise
his working conditions in minor but personally attractive ways, justifying
such changes on the grounds that they are efficient and more consistent
with management's overall productive strategy. Conversely, he is more
likely to be able to argue against any proposals which affect him adversely.
Finally, workers who are skilled typically command the respect of their
peers, as long as they do not violate informal production quotas or
other group norms.29
Proximity enhances on-the-job training significantly. If a supervisor
expects a seasoned worker to informally assist a new recruit, then the
degree to which the training is carried out quickly and effectively is
largely a function of the amount of time that the two workers spend
together, and how much energy both put into the relationship. Since a
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great deal of training occurs during periods that are often perceived as
work breaks,30 it is particularly important that the two workers are
compatible. They must make an effort to stay together at those times
when they have the most discretion over whom they chose to be with. A
British study of work relations substantiated the somewhat obvious
hypothesis that work breaks are less likely to be spent together when
the two workers have different social and racial backgrounds.3 1
If the new employee must work very closely with other members of a
team, then it is even more essential that he forms positive bonds with his
co-workers. Kornblum notes how work teams using large or dangerous equip-
ment must learn to interpret each other's cues, and anticipate each other's
movements.32 Such coordination is most effectively developed when workers
form enduring relationships, and is almost impossible to achieve when
there is a high degree of conflict within a team.33 Reading subtle verbal
or physical cues is very difficult for members of different ethnic groups
who do not share a common language or gestural repertoir.34
A great deal of valuable on-the-job training occurs when workers fill
in for an employee who is ill.35 The sponsorship of a co-worker who
agrees to watch out for a new recruit may be helpful in convincing a
supervisor to allow the latter to temporarily try out interesting and
challenging tasks.
A friend who informally assists in on-the-job training is more likely
to be sensitive to the trainee's pedogogical needs. The friend is more
likely to use terminology and metaphors that are familiar to the trainee.
Training typically involves the transfer of responsibilities from
trainer to trainee. 36 It is quite helpful if the former selects the tasks
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he assigns to the latter not simply on the basis of which duties he would
prefer not to perform on a given day, but rather in a logical sequential
manner which conforms to the worker's true training needs. Any training
involving the demonstration of manual techniques should ideally be carried
out slowly so that the new worker understands what physical manipulations
are required.
The argument presented above is not intended to imply that primary
sector workers need extremely accommodating teachers in order to learn how
to carry out their assignments. On the contrary, the internal labor market
is usually structured to ensure that workers will eventually learn what
is required of them, even if no seasoned "mentor" makes an effort to train
them. However, workers are frequently tested by their supervisors and co-
workers soon after they are hired. The new recruit acquires an image
which is not easily shed. Unless a worker can prove himself fairly quickly
he is liable to face such problems as lack of promotional opportunities,
frequent disciplinary action or social exclusion from the work group.
These problems can be aggravated if a worker's class, ethnic or racial
background is different from that of others in his occupation. Blacks
participating in on-the-job training programs are particularly vulnerable
to these difficulties.
Davidson notes that white lower level supervisors encountering black
workers for the first time form judgments regarding the latter's ability
fairly quickly. In his empirical research, Davidson found that supervisors
often rewarded blacks whose performance initially appeared to be above
average. The supervisors gave these black workers more interesting tasks,
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increasing the flexibility of their hours, and generally enhanced their
autonomy, while articulating approval of their behavior. The reverse
occured when supervisors were displeased by the new worker's performance.
Those blacks who received positive feedback developed an affirmative
attitude toward their job; conversely, negative supervisory "signals" led
to a belligerent posture towards the firm and deterioration in the perfor-
mance of these employees.
For blacks in primary sector firms who are often received with a
certain amount of suspicion by lower level white supervisors and who
initially adopt a somewhat hesitant if not defensive attitude toward white
personnel, it is of paramount importance that this process of inter-active
signaling starts off in a constructive direction; negative cues can quickly
degenerate into explosive relations which make it impossible for the new
recruit to ever accept or be accepted by the work group.
Hence, unless a worker receives fairly extensive on-the-job training
and is able to quickly fulfill the minimum expectations of his supervisors
and co-workers, he is likely to be trapped in a self-reinforcing cycle of
negative interactions.
However, as was argued above, the degree to which he can be trained
quickly and effectively hinges largely on his social relations with his
teammates or co-workers. If a worker's racial or social background
precludes immediate social acceptance by the work group, then his training
will not proceed in an optimal manner. Ineffective on-the-job training,
in turn, will heighten the tensions between the new recruit and his
supervisors and co-workers.
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Aside from developing production skills, a worker needs to acquire
an understanding of the firm's administrative and political structure, and
the roles, interest, and personalities of significant actors who inhabit
the enterprise. First a worker must learn which workers, managers, and
union officials possess formal and informal decision making authority.
The new worker must discover how he can impress such persons, given the
latters' conception of what constitutes a productive worker and their
cultural or political biases. He must learn how far he can deviate from
the formal rules of the enterprise in the presence of various individuals,
how he can exploit the rules to his own advantage, and how he might go
about changing some of the less durable rules.
Along the same lines, the neophyte worker who hopes to obtain a promo-
tion should be sufficiently familiar with the organizations to develop
specific occupational targets. As noted above, workers with these aspira-
tions need to be warned in advance when a vacancy occurs, before a position
is posted. Ideally, he or she becomes cognizant of the firm's growth
pattern, in order to guess when and where vacancies will occur. Moreover,
the employee seeking advancement should know how to "cut a deal" with his
supervisor. Davidson notes that supervisors frequently engage in implicit
contracts* with employees interested in obtaining a recommendation for a
promotion; new workers may not initially be aware of the terms of such
contracts and how to enter into them.
*The use of the term "contract" in this context is not meant to refer
to the literature on wage stability but rather to an informal procedure
whereby workers take on additional responsibilities in exchange for a
recommendation for promotion.
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A knowledge of organizational norms is just as valuable as formal
production skills when debates arise over restructuring the production
process and the reallocation of tasks. The worker must learn how to evoke
these norms. He must demonstrate how past practice, if followed accurately,
would compell a supervisor or co-worker to accept an arrangement which is
personally rewarding.
Eventually the worker must also become familiar with the history of
union negotiations, so that when a new collective bargaining issue arises,
he can convince the union steward to adopt a particular platform, appealing
to the latter's commitment to precedent.
Kornblum has demonstrated that new employees need to develop positive
relations with seasoned workers in order to become familiar with the
political and organizational structure of the firm, its physical layout,
and the personalities of key actors. Moreover access to these workers
often hinges on one's racial background.
Kornblum notes how workers who formed bonds with more experienced
personnel in the Chicago steel mill learned what to expect from individual
supervisors and where to hide in the plant during unauthorized work breaks. 3 8
Such information was commonly available to both black and white work
groups in the firm, since even the lower level blacks with seniority
were knowledgable about these issues.
However, more sophisticated information about management and union
officials was frequently denied black workers. In the Chicago steel mill
this collective knowledge was transmitted by disabled "light duty" white
workers:
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For the most part they are older steelworkers, usually over
the age of thirty-five,who have suffered disabilities either
through injury or ill health and have too many years of
seniority to seek more suitable employment in another plant
but too little seniority to take their pensions. Light duty
men are scattered through No. 3 Mill's labor force because of
the benevolence of management and often at the insistence of
local union officers. Deprived of their full physical capa-
cities, as well as their job security, the light duty men
...make up for their loss of status by becoming carriers of
gossip and rumour between work groups. Unforunately their
excellent knowledge of No. 3 Mill's "ropes" and of the per-
sonalities of the plant's managerial personnel is available
only to men of similar communal backgrounds. 3 9
Valuable political and organizational information in the work place
is more likely to be allocated selectively within social networks than
is information relating strictly to productive techniques. Aronowitz
argues that it is usually possessed by elite craftsmen whose work takes
them into many different departments of a firm.40 He notes that it is
usually only shared with higher status groups within an enterprise. The
example of the light duty men illustrates that such information is not
always the exclusive preserve of highly skilled craftsmen, although it is
rationed through informal social networks nonetheless.
It should be noted that lateral mobility within the firm, although
useful for experienced workmen in acquiring valuable information, can
also be a hindrance in forming alliances with other workers when an employee
is initially hired. Kornblum notes that those new workers with the most
constructive relations with their peers, tended to be assigned to a
fairly stable work team, regardless of the work group's racial composi-
tion.41
Aside from providing skill and organizational training, friends on the
job can defend one's interests in strategic situations. If a supervisor
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is willing to accept advice pertaining to a proposed reorganization of
production, a seasoned influential worker can often ensure that the new
employee is not burdened with the bulk of the unattractive tasks. Further-
more, friends can take on one's work load, if one is unable to come in on
time.
When there exists some kind of solidarity among employees who are
required to meet production quotas or are paid by the piece, the more
prolific workers are likely to restrain their efforts. This occurs not
simply because the group has an interest in minimizing the quota (increa-
sing the piece rate), but also because the collectivity is sometimes
sensitive to the problems faced by less productive individuals. Work
groups in which solidarity is absent will tend to make the jobs of
untrained, slow or disabled workers considerably more difficult.4 2
An even more striking social pattern associated with production
quotas occurs when employees complete the work assignments of their less
productive co-workers. Barbara Garson interviewed tuna fish workers who
periodically assisted their peers in completing their production quotas:
It wasn't hard for me to do a little extra. And I always43
felt when I get older, then let someone else help me out.
These patterns of assistance are most likely to arise among workers who
have established positive ties with one another and who share a common
social background. In these cases, workers are able to understand,
identify, and sympathize with each other's predicament.
In sum, just as social groups help their members to find jobs they
also assist them in adjusting to the productive and organizational life
of the firm. The fact that seasoned employees provide valuable supervision,
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emotional support and training to their friends, may be one reason that
both employers and job seekers find informal intermediaries in the external
market so attractive. Even if workers failed to provide intensive and
reliable information about the qualifications of their unemployed friends,
the former might still be optimal recruiters if they offer extensive
social and pedagogical support to the workers they recommend to an
employer.
Using the terminology introduced in the preceding section one can
describe the predicament of new black primary sector workers as one of
having both the greatest need and the lowest access to internal labor
market information and sponsorship. Moreover, their lack of access is
likely to be self-perpetuating: the social distance between the new black
employees and the more established white work group prevents the former
from acquiring essential productive skills. Without these skills, black
workers cannot gain the respect of either their supervisors orco-workers.
This will increase their turnover rate and further reduce their access to
more stable informational networks. This "Catch 22" explains a substantial amount
about the problems faced by blacks upon entering an all white primary
sector firm. In particular, it explains why many on-the-job training man-
power programs have fairly low retention rates.
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Summary and Policy Recommendations
In developing a strategy to ameliorate segmentation one must
scrutinize t h e "intermediation" and demand forces which contribute to the
bifurcation of labor markets. On the demand side, these forces include
the technological, organizational and market phenomena which determine
whether a firm provides on-the-job training and promotes from within.
With regards to intermediation, one must recognize the dynamics of informal
labor market networks: how groups of workers assist one another in finding
jobs and adjusting to the demands of the workplace.
A variety of issues arise in formulating policies to reduce segmenta-
tion. I will focus on the problems that are confronted in one of the most
common types of programs used in assisting disadvantaged workers: an on-
the-job training project in which a public formal labor market intermediary
(LI) provides wage subsidies to an employer in exchange for which the
latter agrees to hire low-income workers selected by the LI.
The most important decisions and tasks an LI must make in such a
project are:
o Which firms are suitable candidates for such a program?
o Which workers should be referred to the employer?
o In what way, if at all, should the employer be asked to change
his management plan to improve the training program?
o How should the LI deal with the fears that training programs
arouse in the firm's current work force?
The institutional audience for this discussion includes all public
or private not-for-profit LI's that offer firms wage subsidies. However
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there is a broader application of these strategies. Any development
agency that has financial resources at its disposal--resources that can
be used as levers to shape the recruitment and training policies of private
enterprises--can contribute to such an effort. The applicability of the
following recommendations to this type of institution will be touched on
briefly below. However the viability and importance of the link between
manpower and development finance agencies will be explored in much more
depth in the conclusion of this essay.
The task of selecting appropriate firms to participate in an on-the-
job training program is very complex and must take into account a wide
range of factors. The public labor intermediary's "firm-screening"
strategy should acknowledge all of the forces which bifurcate the labor
market, and particularly those operating on the demand side.
As noted in the last two sections, these forces relate to many
economic features of a firm. The relevant considerations include the
following:
o the firm's technology and organizational structure;
o the firm's market;
o the firm's "corporate culture";
o the age and expansion potential of the firm; and
0 the tightness of the occupational labor markets from which
the firm recruits its work force.
The types of firms which provide good on-the-job training tend
to have work stations close to one another both physically and functionally.
New trainees must be assigned to positions that are
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proximate to those of more established employees and these senior workers
should possess skills and perform tasks that are just slightly more
sophisticated than those of their junior colleagues. If new workers func-
tion either in isolation or interact with workers whose skill levels are
extremely high, the probability of acquiring skills on the job declines.
The degree to which such a spatial ordering of the firm is possible
hinges on both its technology and organizational structure. The technology
will determine to a large extent whether a continuity in skill levels is
required to produce the firm's output. The organizational structure
partially shapes the spatial ordering of work within the enterprise.44
Secondly the firm's product market must be fairly stable. If the
level of output in the firm varies widely either in a cyclical or a sporadic
manner, the employment tenure of workers is likely to be reduced.
If a firm requires workers with skills that are unique it is less
likely that managers will be able to recruit from vocational or educational
institutions. Even when the skills demanded are fairly general, however,
if they are in short supply then an employer will have more incentive to
provide training. This is not only due to the downtime and recruitment
problems posed by the scarcity of labor but also because a firm can
gain more control over the rate of wage increases if it trains in-house
and does not have to bid on workers in the external labor market.45
Thus even if a firm has unstable employment it may be suitable for
an on-the-job training program if its technology and organizational
structure permit a sequential skill ordering of work stations and if the
business confronts bottlenecks in its labor markets. Hence some small
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dynamic firms, particularly in growing sectors, may be suitable candi-
dates for such a strategy despite their high degree of volatility.
Notwithstanding the importance of the above considerations, there
are groups of businesses in the same industries, using the same technologies,
and serving similar markets with the same degree of stability that
provide different levels of on-the-job training. Osterman has attempted
to explain this phenomenon by turning to the concept of corporate culture.
Presumably, the history of firms and ' the background of their top executives
affect the latter's choice of training strategies in unique ways.46
Indeed the culture of an organization can determine many features of
employees' behavior including their willingness to take risks, the value
they place on dialogue or conformity, and the posture they adopt vis-a-vis
external threats. 47 However such a cultural analysis of training
patterns is less susceptable to empirical versification and is often a less
useful predictive tool. The problem is that the main way Osterman and
other analysts determine when a corporate culture is conducive to on-the-
job training is simply on the basis of its training and promotion policies.
This transforms the concept of culture from an explanatory device to a
circular self-referential term.
Nonetheless, if a training analyst can discern in personal interviews
the degree to which a firm's management places a value on in-house skill
development, a value that derives from the managers' educational background,
ethical framwork, or the history of the firm, then culture can serve as
a valuable conceptual organizing device to explain these phenomena.
Finally a firm should be given special consideration in an on-the-job
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training strategy if it is fairly new and expected to grow. This prefer-
ence is deserved because the management's recruitment strategy is unde-
veloped and thus more suspectable to manipulation by public agencies. 48
It may be easier to place an initial group of trainees in such a firm
because its recruitment structure is not yet defined.
But even more importantly, it is possible that the firm can be
a source of future jobs if its manager's hiring policies can be shaped
in one of two ways. Assuming that the first group of referrals
become well respected employees, the employer might be convinced to use
these workers as informal recruiters.
In this case it is critical that these first workers not only become
productive but that they gain some of the supervisory and pedagogical
skills that would make them good informal intermediaries in the internal
labor market. If they do not obtain these skills an employer is less
likely to select them as informalrecruiters. They will also be less
effective as a supportive intermediary in assisting new trainees to adjust
to the demands of the work place.
Alternatively, or possibly in addition, the employer might be
convinced to recruit from the public labor market intermediary itself on
an ongoing basis. In either of these cases it is likely that the
workers who are selected to fill future vacancies will have the same
social and economic characteristics as that of the initial trainees. How-
ever, these two recruitment options are often blocked in older firms
where vacancies are only created through turnover and where management
already has a set of workers on whom he relies for recruitment.49
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Workers with a great deal of tenure will suffer when an employer
stops utilizing their recruitment services, particularly if they have
family and friends who are attracted to the jobs in the firm. If the
employer is moderately satisfied with his existing recruitment strategy
he may not want to risk trying an alternative technique. Although he
may be willing to hire a few workers referred to him through a public
intermediary in exchange for some substantial public subsidies, he is
unlikely to consider a major restructuring of his hiring policies.
Short of anew growing firm, the next most attractive opportunity for
creating new recruitment networks is in a firm undergoing a major expan-
sion. If the expansion is large enough it is possible that the manager's
most trusted employees will be unable to supply him with a sufficient
number of qualified candidates. In addition the expansion might repre-
sent a discrete juncture in the development of the firm when its manage-
ment is willing to re-examine its hiring policies and consider either using
different employees as recruiters or tapping a public labor market
intermediary. However the threat to the firm's existing employees and
the risk borne by the manager in changing recruitment sources must still
be recognized.
The best strategy for dealing with expansions is one adopted by the
Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corp., the development agency whose history
is examined in the case study. If a business can be convinced to hire
some disadvantaged employees prior to the expansion phase, then these
workers can serve as informal intermediaries when the firm is augmented.
The problems confronted by a development agency when it implements such
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a strategy will be analyzed in the case study.
After selecting the firm that should participate in an on-the-job
training project a number of other policy decisions must be made. The
manpower agency must determine in what manner the management plan should
be revised to improve the training process,which workers should be
selected to participate in the program, and how management or the public
intermediary can address the fears of the firm's current work force.
The first task, revising a management plan after a venture has been
tentatively selected for an on-the-job training program, is quite diffi-
cult, and rarely attempted. Such revisions could involve a restructuring
of any of the factors addressed above as screening criteria, but particu-
larly the firm's technology, organizational structure, and market niche.
There is often some flexibility in the way in which a firm organizes
production or the markets it decides to enter. Unfortunately it is
extremely difficult for public manpower agencies to convince the firms
they subsidize to consider such changes either before or after start-up.
The two principal stumbling blocks for a public LI interested in such
reforms are: (a) securing enough information about the industry to
develop a reasonable recommendation; and (b) marshalling sufficient
economic leverage to obtain an agreement from management. Information
is particalarly critical Unless one is very familiar with the firm
(i.e., its history, competitive advantages, and overall strategic goals),
as well as the industry (i.e., the sector's market segments, feasible
technologies and organizational options), there is no way to identify the
more flexible parameters in the venture's management plan.
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A great deal of financial leverage is also necessary to gain compli-
ance with the public manpower agency's recommendations. Internal issues
are largely perceived as the perogative of management. This perception
is attributable to the lack of precedents for such intervention. However
the lack of precedents itself reflects an ideological bias against public
intrusions into a firm's operations.5 0
Finally, such recommendations are likely to draw criticism from
some of the more powerful actors both within and outside of the manpower
agency. The: criticism is driven in part by earnest fears that the agency
ruins its chance of securing opportunities to place disadvantaged workers
when it confronts management in this fashion.51 This perspective is sub-
stantiated by manpower agencies' mixed track records and poor reputation
among private businesses. 52 In fact the trend of the last four years
in many manpower agencies is to devote all of the organization's resources
toward improving these negative perceptions.5 3
The two principle obstacles which prevent training agencies from
intervening in a firm's affairs--poor information and lack of leverage--
can both be overcome through a linkage of intermediation institutions.
As will be seen in Chapter Six, scarce information and financial leverage
can be provided by development finance organizations working in concert
with labor market intermediaries.
The selection of trainees to participate in an on-the-job training
programs is another problematic issue confronting a labor market inter-
mediary. As noted above, many formal LI's have tended to "cream" the
applicant pools because: (a) they are judged on their placement rates;
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(b) they believe that most employer's hiring criteria require the use of
narrow screening criteria; and (c) they believe those criteria are
legitimate and efficient.
If carried out on a sustained basis, creaming can vitiate the goals
of reducing segmentation. Creaming often generates the same allocation
of labor to jobs as the private market and thus does not achieve such
public objectives as ameliorating labor bottlenecks, reducing dependence
on welfare, or generating a more equitable distribution of jobs.
Finally, creaming might prevent a public LI from placing
workers who have social ties with truly disadvantaged groups. The other
members of the "creamed" workers social networks--persons
whose access to job vacancy information, on-the-job training and sponsor-
ship is improved by the latter's placement--are not likely to be secondary
employees. Unless an employee has ties with secondary workers, he cannot
serve as a useful informal intermediary to them in either the external
or internal labor markets.
On the other hand creaming can sometimes increase the chances that
the workers referred by a public LI will be accepted by the firm. It may
also enhance the workers ability to be retained. Even when it does not
succeed in selecting workers who are more productive or better prepared
for a specific job it might screen-in workers who believe they are qualified:
these workers are likely to be more confident and less likely to blame
themselves if they are unable to meet the productive demands of the firm.
Finally if the workforce is split along racial rather than class lines,
refering higher skilled blacks might provide disadvantaged minority
trainees with a sympathetic sponsor.
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It is difficult to weigh these different considerations. Even if
creaming selects workers who can adapt to the social organization of a
firm, this very process of adaptation will reduce their ties to the target
group the LI is trying to assist. Thus an LI should be very careful
before it adopts a creaming strategy. Although it may be legitimate in
selecting the initial referrals to a firm, it is unlikely to be justifiable
on an ongoing basis.
A third and last issue that the public LI must address is how to
deal with the fears of a firm's existing employees. It was argued above
that any attempt to intervene in the internal labor markets of large
primary sector firms should be founded on anunderstanding of the threat
disadvantaged workers pose to other majority workers. Aside from displacing
the friends and relatives of white workers, new black trainees are fre-
quently perceived as degrading the status of any occupation they enter.
This status degredation is not only a function of these workers' social
stigma but is also attributable to the fact that disadvantaged groups
are used to de-skill and casualize a firm's labor force.
Thus the recruitment of black workers is often perceived as the first
step in the economic deterioration of white workers in a firm. Since
blacks must frequently rely on the existing work force to teach them
productive and organizational skills and orient them to the social
structure of the firm, it is crucial that the antagonism between the
new recruits and older coworkers is minimized. Although this dilemma
cannot be fully resolved, there do exist techniques that can be
employed to ameliorate the threat blacks pose to the dominant groups.
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If management's decision to participate in an on-the-job training
manpower program, involving the subsidization of blacks in previously
all-white positions, is not based on a desire to convert the firm's
production process into one that can employ unskilled, less stable, or
lower paid labor, this intention--or rather lack of intentions--should
be made clear to the current work force. Such a declaration, if believed,
will reduce the perceived threat to white workers encountering substantial
numbers of blacks in their occupation for the first time.
If there exists a union, the strategy used in training the new workers
should be a focus of collective bargaining, so that the white workers
feel that they have been able to affect the outcome of the program. These
actions may help convince the white employees that management is not
purposefully attempting to degrade their occupation.
More importantly, negotiations prior to start-up may reduce the
chances that a union will try to block a training program at the last
moment, using its political or economic strength to ensure that the
employer does not hire the LI's referrals. (This problem will be re-
examined in the conclusion of the essay.)
Thus,. before initiating a training effort, a manpower agency
must give thought to how the firm's current work force will respond to
the project. Even after start-up,however, various interventions by
management and the public training agency might be necessary to ensure
the older workers do not frustrate the program's aims. Although this
issue is even more difficult to address, I will outline a few rough
hypotheses based on the literature and the model of intermediation
presented above. The hypotheses receive some support from the case
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study presented in Chapter V. (Again these postulations will relate
to inter-racial conflicts, however,one can extend their underlying
logic to other sorts of social divisionslincluding those based on
ethnicity, sex and age.)
White workers should be coaxed into assisting new black trainees,
but if possible, this assistance should not be the result of an inflexible
command imposed from above. Those whites who demonstrate an exceptional
ability to train and supervise blacks should be rewarded both through
the relaxation of their production quotas and by promotion.
In order to develop a positive view of their relationships with
blacks the older white workers must perceive them as ones which they
can enter into and withdraw from freely in conformance with changes in
the collective norms and felt needs of the group. Kornblum reports that
the occupations in which blacks and whites worked most cooperatively in
Mill No. 3 were those where a certain degree of teamwork was called for,
but also where whites could avoid intimate interaction with blacks if
they chose to do so. The option to disengage themselves from a
personal relationship seemed to make the possibility of a willfully
established friendship a real one.
Group counseling can be useful if it helps prevent black workers
from blaming themselves for their failure to become quickly integrated
into the work environment. Only if they discuss the social barriers they
mutually face are they likely to understand and be able to surmount them.
However, the manpower agency should avoid extending excessive support to
the trainees when the provision of such support alienates the white workers
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appreciably.
In addition, management should avoid supervisory techniques which
act to fragment and retard the formation of black work groups. Hughes
notes that black workers hired by an all white firm were splintered
when supervisors repeatedly warned them to be careful because their
performance was being monitored individually.53 The new workers inter-
preted this warning as a demand to perform better than their peers. The
resulting competitive and individualistic orientation made it difficult
for the black employees to provide emotional, pedagogical or organizational
support to one another.
Black workers who succeed in establishing supportive networks are
more likely to improve their conduct and attitude towards supervisors,
avoiding the degenerative cycles of interaction described by Davidson.
The stability of work groups coupled with group counseling is likely to
enhance such networks.
Although all of these measures may ease the integration of black
workers into a firm, white employees are still likely to fear a loss of
prestige and economic power accompanying the introduction of groups with
lower socio-economic status. The more established white workers are
capable of imposing sanctions on management in the firm of slowdowns,
sabotage, strike threats or simply the obstruction of the OJT process.
As Marshall argues, it is sometimes necessary to reduce the potency
of these threats by initiating counter-balancing coercive measures to
penalize employers who capitulate to their white worker's demands: e.g.,
withholding public support from such discriminating firms.54 Public
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agencies should insist that managers dismiss workers exhibiting blatantly
racist behavior.
In sum, only by simultaneously attempting to ameliorate some of the
worst fears of more privileged workers, while mobilizing sufficient
political and economic strength to ensure that they do not dominate the
recruitment and training process, can manpower planners hope to assist
disadvantaged groups in their attempts to secure a more stable
and rewarding position in the internal labor market.
In conclusion, secondary workers' economic problems stem in large
part from the relatively uninformed and powerless social networks in
which they are embedded. Although they are cut off from the more valuable
sources of information, sponsorship, and training, they are still forced
to rely heavily on informal intermediaries. Their dependence on such
networks is attributable to two factors: (1) They do not have the creden-
tials that substitute for personal intermediation in the external labor
market. (2) They must learn how to transcend employers' racial (or
sexual) biases when they engage in job serach. If they are lucky enough
to land a good job, they usually do not have access to the critical sources
of instruction, organizational training and social support which ensure
retention and promotion.
To address these problems manpower analysts first learn to identify
firms capable of providing on-the-job training--e.g., those with the appro-
priate technology, organizational structure, markets and corporate culture.
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They must also attempt to modify any one of these structural elements
which is incompatable with their clients' training needs. Selecting the
optimal group of secondary sector workers is difficult since creaming has
both its strengths and weaknesses. However, in the final analysis, any
recruitment method which screens out workers with poor educational and
occupational achievements will have little effect on segmentation.
Finally, perhaps the most problematic issue confronted by a public
LI is how to deal with white workers' response to the introduction of
disadvantaged trainees. A variety of eclectic suggestions have been
offered here--encouraging open discussion of a training program with
white employees and union officials, and attempting to dispell unwarranted
fears; ensuring that junior and senior workers are stationed close enough
to learn from one another but not so close that white workers feel they
cannot withdraw freely; rewarding white workers who provide good training
but not issuing an unenforcable rule that all others must follow suit;
providing enough counseling and support to ease the transition of the new
trainees while attempting to avoid raising the ire of more established
workers; and generally allowing the black workers to collectively support
one another while imposing the harshest discipline on blatantly racist
behavior. Some of these recommendations are confirmed in the case study
but most of them require additional substantiation.
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The problems faced by secondary workers are analogous in many
respects to those experienced by small new firms seeking capital. These
businesses' difficulties also stem from narrow information dissemination
systems. Additionally, both factor markets are bifurcated by the attempts
of powerful corporations (financial and non-financial) to shield themselves
from the effects of economic instability.
There exists a growing body of literature that suggests that the
financing problems faced by these small, young firms may hinder the
job generation process. To develop a coherent economic development
program, development officials must discern how the goals of generating
employment and reducing labor market segmentation inter-relate.
The evidence that capital markets are segmented is quite fragmented.
Although must of it is inconclusive there do exist some compelling
indications of substantial market failures posing special problems for
small new firms. However fragmented the work on capital market segmen-
tation, the empirical literature on small firms' contribution to the economy
is much weaker. Nonetheless, the balance of evidence suggests that
small firms may facilitate job and income growth, and technological innova-
tions. All of these issues will be reviewed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
CAPITAL MARKET SEGMENTATION
AND THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESSES
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Introduction
Like the labor market, the market for capital is segmented. Segmen-
tation of financial markets occurs when issuers and/or investors develop
inflexible preferences relating to the characteristics of the assets they
choose to buy or sell, preferences which do not change even in the face
of substantial discrepancies in the rates of return and/or riskiness of
the securities in the different segments.
Capital market segmentation is comparable to that obtaining in labor markets.
It is characterized by two similar phenomena: a bimodality in the sources, availability
and cost of capital andsome degree of immobility between an "undeveloped"
segment in which capital is scarce to a "developed" segment where access
to capital is plentiful and cheap. The main difference between the
immobility concerns of the two segmentation theories is that while the
labor framework focuses on the barriers facing specific suppliers of the
factor--e.g., workers who cannot secure good jobs--the issue emerging
in the financial literature is the peculiar problems experienced by
certain demanders of the factor--e.g., firms with poor access to capital.
The composition of the two segments of the financial market are
said to be distinguished largely on the basis of scale: the "under-
developed" sector is inhabited by a subset of the economy's new small
firms--firms which rely principally on personal capital or the short
term loans offered by commercial banks. Long term financing is more
difficult for these young enterprises to secure, unless they are in one
of the most well studied industrial sectors, and then only at excessive
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capitalization rates. This scale issue has its parallel in the labor
market literature since the ideal types of the two principal job segments
are differentiated by size of firm.
The reason financial segmentationhas become a focus ofpublic policy stems
from the belief that small businesses generate a great many social benefits.
It is asserted that small businesses produce a disproportionate number
of jobs, profits and new technologies. If one or more of these claims
are valid then it is necessary to try to determine why these firms experi-
ence problems raising capital, and how the most destructive financing
barriers can be addressed. Another related "targeting" objective is to
identify the small firms that generate the greatest number of these
social benefits without exacerbating labor market segmen-
tation. This policy trade-off highlights implicitly
the first reason that capital and labor market segmentation must be
analyzed in tandem: Public development agencies must determine when
the policy goals of job generation and job mobility are in conflict.
To fully understand why financial segmentation occurs and how it
relates to labor market segmentation it is first necessary to describe
the orthodox conceptual framework and its empirical assumptions and
predictions. It is then useful to see how investment patterns actually
diverge from this model. I will outline in this chapter some of the
empirical evidence that has been marshalled to demonstrate that small
firms are systematically excluded from the capital markets. Much of
this evidence is anecdotal or inconclusive, but certain pieces of data
are suggestive of fairly significant violations of the orthodox frame-
work. This chapter will conclude with a brief review of studies
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purporting to demonstrate that small firms generate a disproportionate
number of jobs, profits and technologies.
Chapter IV will offer some causal explanations for financial segmen-
tation. I will try to examine why financial intermediaries do not succeed
in allocating capital efficiently in our economy, focusing on the issue
of information dissemination and risk aversion failures. That chapter
wfl -conclude with a comparison of the job generation and segmentation
roles of small firms. An attempt will be made to describe which small
firms might produce the largest social gains without generating excessive
social enqe.t
The Neoclassical Framework and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
Orthodox theory dictates that in a market economy capital will be
allocated to the most profitable investments. In effect this means that
capital will continue to flow into any new firm until its return on
investment, when adjusted for risk, is equivalent to all others in the
economy.1 After a certain scale of operations is reached, there are
decreasing returns to investment in any given venture. Thus, to
equilibrate the capital market, capital must continue to be
injected into a business until it is no more profitable than other
enterprises.
The only problematic issue is how to define risk. It is fairly
simple to establish the meaning of "risk" in relation to an
entire portfolio, the mix of investments which comprises the wealth
of one individual. A risky portfolio is one which does not generate a
secure well defined return, but rather offers the possibility of reaping
very high yields while simultaneously posing the threat of substantial
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losses. In statistical terms the variance of potential returns in a risky
portfolio is quite high because the probability distribution of possible
outcomes is flat: large probability weights are applied to both very pessi-
mistic and optimistic outcomes. Thus variance is used as the measure of
portfolio risk.
The riskiness of an individual asset is quite different from that
of an entire portfolio. As long as the asset is not the only form of
wealth possessed by an individual, the variance of its return does not
reflect the risk it imposes on the investor. Rather one must identify the
marginal risk the asset contributes to the investor's portfolio: e.g., the
increase or decrease in the portfolio's variance caused by adding this
security to the individual's other assets.
A security with a high variance can actually decrease the risk of a
portfolio if the asset's return has a low correlation with those of the
other securities in the portfolio. In other words, if the asset tends to
generate high returns when the other securities are doing badly (and vice
versa), then holding that asset tends to stabilize the total return of the
portfolio, ensuring a more well defined outcome in each period. This dis-
tinction between portfolio and asset risk is the basis of the concept of
diversification.
The most elaborate and up-to-date neoclassical theory of financial
decision making is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by
Sharpe and Lintner.2 CAPM assumes that capital markets are perfectly
efficient, though efficiency has a fairly narrow meaning in the context
of the model.* Efficient capital markets are said to exist when
*This is not equivalent to the pareto optimal definition of
efficiency, but it does preclude the type of information problems that
give rise to segmentation (see below).
92
information about firms flows easily, and is quickly impounded in the
pricing of securities. If the stock market is efficient in this sense
then investors will hold a similar mix of risky assets. All of the
issues sold on the New York Stock Exchange would be held in identical
proportions by investors because the latter are assumed to have the same
information about all firms. If they would like to hold a riskier
portfolio individuals can "leverage themselves"--borrow funds and
expand their equity investments. Alternatively they can invest in U.S.
Treasury Securities if they want to minimize their exposure to risk.
But in any case, the risky securities they do hold (i.e., all equity
stocks) will be held in the same proportions. Essentially this means
that the portfolio held by all investors is one in which the dollar amount
invested in each firm is proportional to the total market value of that
firm's outstanding stock.*
CAPM draws on this notion of efficiency, and applies it to the
concept of diversification to develop a rigorous definition of risk,
and a predictive theory which describes how much investors will be
compensated for bearing risk. CAPM predicts that the only kind of risk
for which investors are compensated is "systematic risk." Systematic
risk is that portion of the variability in an asset's return which is
correlated with the performance of the stock market as a whole (this
*A number of other conditions must be met to fulfill the require-
ments of the main version of CAPM including: 1) investors must be per-
fectly rational; 2) marginal transactions cost must be infinitessimal;
3) investors must be solely concerned with maximizing their expected,
mean future wealth and minimizng the dispersion or riskiness around this
central tendency; and 4) the returns to all stocks must be symmetric
(if not normally distributed).
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type of risk is captured by the statistic "beta"'*). Since the stock
market's performance is usually thought to reflect the health of the
economy, systematic risk reflects the covariation of one firm's achieve-
ments with those of all other firms. Hence firms with the lowest syste-
matic risks (e.g., negative beta's) are those which tend to do best
when the rest of the economy is doing poorly and, conversely, run into
troubles when most other businesses are highly profitable.
Statis tical Evidence of Capital Market Segmentation
There exists a few forms of evidence that contradict CAPM's
empirical assumptions and predictions. In particular there are indications
that a large amount of wealth--particularly that possessed by owner/
managers of small businesses--is undiversified, and that dissemination
of information about small new firms is far from perfect. The implica-
tion of both of these phenomena is that small new firms have limited
access to capital markets.
The following analysis focuses on two specific types of evidence
relating to small firms' problems in obtaining financing: (a) small
young firms are often capitalized by the personal savings of owner/
managers and their families; and (b) the only small firms that succeed
in obtaining external financing are those that can provide excessive
returns to investors.
* Cov (Rm, Rx)beta = Coy ;R) where Rm= the return on the market port-
folio; and Rx= the return on the asset.
This formulation only applies to stocks. The price of risky debt is
a function of the firm's beta and variance of returns. Thus an analysis
of lending institutions' risk avoidance behavior is more complex.3
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Daniels and Kieschnick have eenerated and
preted a great deal of evidence pertaining to these two empirical
phenomena. These authors' work represents a seminal contribution to
the literature on capital market imperfections. However, their research
does possess a few theoretical and methodological deficiencies which
are worthy of note. Many of these deficiencies were simply a product of
the poor data that is avialable on small firms. Fortunately, there exist
some very recent empirical work which offers a somewhat more robust
foundation for the development of a model of capital market segmentation.
Using a small sample from the Dun and Bradstreet files, Kiechnick
has shown that many small enterprises are capitalized almost entirely
with personal savings. Of the capital invested in the fifty two firms
Kiechnick examined, 81% came from their managers. Although the size of
the sample population does not seem to be statistically significant,
this phenomenon is suggestive of a very important market failure.
When small firms are owned entirely by their managers, then the
orthodox analysis of risk breaks down. If an owner/manager has a large
proportion of his wealth invested in the firm then he is not holding
the perfectly balanced portfolio envisioned by orthodox theory. Instead
he is bearing a great deal of unsystematic risk--risk that would nor-
mally be diversified away if he held the optimal mix of financial assets.
Holding such a lopsided portfolio forces him to be concerned with the
variance rather than the beta of the firm's earnings; the former not
the- latter will determine the variability of his future wealth.
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Since small businessmen tend to have an extremely high exposure
to the unsystematic risks embedded in their firms' earning streams,
they are likely to have mixed feelings about their investments in
these firms. This increases the chances that they will foresake their
efforts to establish their own concern and seek a job in a larger firm,
investing their personal savings in assets with a better risk/return trade-off.
Moreover~, _ the reliance on entrepeneurial capital
violates the so-called "separation theory" of neoclassical theory.5
This theorem purports to demonstrate how a market economy efficiently
channels financial resources from owners of capital to the most
profitable firms, avoiding any dependence upon the coincidence of
management abilities, technological creativity, and wealth. But the
reality of the history of many small beusinesses demonstrates that
personal wealth is, in fact, essential to this sector. The autarchic
character of the "secondary" financial sector radically reduces the
chances that viable ideas will be nurtured and turned into profitable
enterprises.
However it is important to note that some small firms are starved
of capital because their owners prefer to retain complete control. Rather
than issue stock, placing legal control in the hands of others, these
managers choose to forego the flexibility of equity financing. Even debt
financing is shunned by some small business owners because bond covenants
and loan agreements constrain a manager's hand in a way that can be
distasteful. In these cases, financial segmentation is self-imposed.6
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Regardless of its causes, the poor diversification of small business
owners' wealth violates CAPM. But a theory of capital market segmentation
hinges largely on the supposition that small firms can not obtain financing
in sufficient quantity or at a fair price.
It is difficult to determine how much of this imperfect diversifica-
tion is attributable to poor access to capital markets rather than a taste
for control. However, small businessmens' desire to maintain control over
their operations can not account entirely for the second type of empirical
deviation from CAPM: the excessive returns reaped by small businesses.
The data on small firms' high returns constitutes one of the most
compelling bodies of evidence demonstrating the inadequacy of the orthodox
model of financial markets. However, discussions of capital market imper-
fections often confuse the significance of various types of evidence on
returns, each of which relates differently to a critique of the neo-
classical framework.
The review of the literature on excessive small firm returns will
proceed in the following manner. First I will examine the problems with
studies that focus purely on the issue of accounting profits. Next I
will-analyze the data on stock returns of different sized firms. In
each case, I will attempt to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
the research indicating how its findings relate to a model of capital
market segmentation.
The first and less compelling form of evidence of capital market
segmentation pertains to small firms' overall profit levels.
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Daniels and Kieschnick, drawing on data assembled by the FTC
analyze a short term accounting measure of small firms' after-tax return
on equity (ROE), e.g., accounting profits during one fiscal year divided
by the book value of stockholders' equity. For the period- 1965-1976,
the authors find that the smallest size class of firms outperformed all
of the other classes by an appreciable margin: the small firms earned an
average real rate of return on their investments of 13.84% compared to an
average of 12.05% for the entire universe and 12.91% for the size class
with the next best performance (firms with total assets exceeding one
billion dollars).
The fact that small firms earn super-normal real profits would seem
to violate the so-called separation theorem which dictates that all firms
will continue to obtain financing until their real marginal return on
investment is equal to that of all others.
However there are a variety of problems with Daniels andKieschnick's
analysis. The first difficulty pertains to their measure of real profits,
return on book equity (ROE). This measure does not take into account
equity holders' capital gains, the real rate of depreciation, or various
cash flow distortions generated by standard accounting practices.8 The
bulk of these effects may work in favor of the hypothesis that small firms
generate high profits. This is because these enterprises may reap
relatively higher capital gains, a type of return not captured by their
income statements. Additionally small firms understate their profits
for tax purposes. However, the study does not demonstrate that this is
the direction of bias so its findings are inconclusive.
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A more significant problem with this study is the inadequate treat-
ment of risk. The authors did not have sufficient data to divide risk
into its systematic and unsystematic components. Kieschnick and Daniels
do, however, measure the variance of returns provided by different port-
folios of securities. Each of the portfolios is distinguished by the
size of issuing firms. They find that the portfolio consisting of small
firms' securities does indeed have a higher year-to-year variance of
returns. However, they assert that this higher variance could be
diversified away if the small firms' stock were mixed with other
securities.
Unfortunately, the authors do not present any empirical evidence
that would allow one to assess the validity of this assertion. Unless
one determines how much of the higher variance risk consists-ofsystematic
uncertainty--uncertainty that correlates with the performance of all other
stocks--one can not judge the significance of their data.
In fact there is evidence that small concerns have a somewhat
higher systematic risk. Basu shows that small firms have not only a
higher variance risk, but substantially larger betas.10 Hence the
critical question is whether small businesses' high profits can be
explained away by their higher systematic risks.
A third problem with the use of profits as an indicator of under-
financing of small firms, is that average returns on investment may be
quite different from marginal returns. The fact that smaller enterprises
realize higher profits on average does not mean that the return on an
additional investment in these businesses is higher than that realized
by larger firms on the margin.
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Finally, even if the studies reviewed above dealt with the issues
of (a) risk assessment, (b) accounting distortions, and (c) marginal
vs. average returns, a super-normal small business profit rate would not
prove that these firms have poor access to capital. The persistence of
high profits could still be explained by the phenomenon of a taste for
control. If small businessmen insist on retaining their autonomy,
rejecting all types of capital that have any strings attached, they will
prevent their firms from expanding to the point where profits are
equilabrated with those of other firms. Although the separation theorem
(which dictates that real returns are equalized across all firms)would
be violated, this evidence could not serve to demonstrate that small firms
are excluded from capital markets.
Most of these problems are circumvented by examining small firms'
stock returns. Stock returns are quite different from profits. Below
I will first draw a few theoretical distinctions between these two
measures and then present the empirical evidence on returns. This evidence
does reveal that the returns reaped on the equity of small businesses are
super-normal, indicating the existence of a pervasive capital market failure.
If CAPM is correct, there should not be any systematic differences
among the stock performance of different classes of firms. If information
flows freely in the public and private stock markets then prices of
equity will equilibrate: all types of stock should provide the same
average returns after controlling for systematic risk. If instead,
certain types of enterprises--e.g., small firms--have excessive stock
returns over a sustained period then one can conclude that information
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barriers exist in the market.
Secondly, the issue of control does not relate to small firms'
stock returns over time. Even if small businessmens' concern for
control results in excessive profits, small firms'stock returns should
be normal. Once a stock issue is in the market its performance hinges
solely on the expectations of investors. When market participants
anticipate excessive profits in the issuing firm, the firm's stock
price should be higher initially, reflecting the discounted value of
larger expected cash flows; but in a CAPM world, the subsequent price
appreciation should be normal. If investors knew that returns would
be abnormally high for any class of stock, they would immediately bid up
the price of those securities until the expected future price appreciation
(after controlling for risk) was the same as that of all other securities:
thus the expectation of future super-normal returns is a self-defeating
prophecy.
Hence high profits should not generate sustained excess stock returns.
However the converse does not hold. High returns may lead to higher
profits. It is reasonable to believe that differentials among stock
returns will ultimately result in discrepencies in the marginal returns
on real investment, thereby violating the separation theorem.
The connection between high returns and profits is somewhat indirect
and must be specified with care.10 Super-normal rreturns are often
achieved in the absence of high profits. For instance, the Chrysler
Corporation in 1982 had fairly low earnings but its stock outperformed
all other firms in the Fortune 500. This occured because the financial
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community expected Chrysler's earnings to be even poorer than they
actually were.
It is conceivable that this assymmetric relation between profits
and returns could be sustained. If investors initially wildly underesti-
mate a firm's earnings stream, and only slowly acknowledge that business'
viability, returns on the firm's stock will exceed the norm for an
extended period of time.
But there does exist a connection between underpricing of equity and
high profits, particularly for new firms. If small firms' equity is
systematically undervalued when it is first issued and the market only
gradually comes to this realization, stockholders of small enterprises with
achieve excessive returns over a discrete time interval. However, if
owner/managers and venture capitalists must continually sell equity to a
public market which undervalues their investments, they will be less
willing to undertake new projects. Since unseasoned issues are under-
priced, the original financiers of the venture reap sub-normal returns
when they liquidate their own investments. This means that the:project
on the margin--e.g., the new venture providing a real return on investment
that is just equal to that provided by all financial securities in
the stock market--will no longer be attractive. Entrepeneurs would do
better by buying stock in the secondary market rather than providing
start-up capital to such a project. Were they to invest in the start-up
they would not be fully compensated for the opportunity cost of capital.
This argument is made somewhat clearer by an illustration. Assume
all new small business stock must reap a 20% return annually while all
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other stock provides a 10% return. Second, assume a venture financed
entirely with equity will provide cash flows of $100,000 each year and one
million dollars upon liquidation in ten years. Its initial net present
value discounted at the large venture rate is exactly one million, but if
it were forced to achieve the small venture hurdle rate of 20% its value
would be only $580,000. Now assume an owner/manager invested $909,000
in the venture last year and had hoped to sell it for one million, believing
that investors would discount his firm's earnings stream at the rate of
10%. Instead of earning a 10% rate of return on his own investment, this
owner/manager must sustain a loss of 38%. This demonstrates why small
ventures with average rates of profit will.become unattractive.
Hence it is likely that small business ventures that surpass only
the average hurdle rate will receive much less personal financing from
owner/managers and venture capitalists.* If capital no longer flows into
the marginal small business ventures, by definition only projects pro-
viding excessive real profits will be financed. The separation theorem
which demands that all marginal returns are equilibrated would be violated.
Thus, in sum, excessive stock returns for one class of ventures will
ultimately foster super-normal profits.
Some of the empirical evidence on small firms' stock returns is not
very compelling. One of the sources of data which Daniels uses to
demonstrate that small firms have high stock returns are some older
studies on publicly held equity. One study demonstrates that a portfolio
of all the equity in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has lower returns
than that of a portfolio consisting of stocks listed on the American
* Some owners of small businesses may not care about the price of
their firms' equity. Those who do not intend to sell any part of their
enterprises will not need to worry about underpricing. Others may not mind
earning less than the opportunity cost of capital if they enjoy the "management
experience" or if their occupational alternatives are seriously constrained.
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Exchange (AMEX).12 It is a well-established fact that the average size of
firms with stock traded on the AMEX is considerably smaller than than of
firms listed in NYSE.13 Daniels also cites a number of other studies
which demonstrate that small firm stocks have average returns that are
higher than that of larger enterprises.
Again, the deficiency with almost all of this data is that there is
no control for risk.1 4 As argued above, one would expect small firms'
equity to realize higher than average returns since their stock is riskier,
e.g., possesses a higher beta. The real isslue is whether the differential
in small and large firms' stock returns can be explained away by their
disparate betas.
Some very recent work on small firms' stock does offer support for
Daniels' basic thesis: the stock returns of smaller enterprises are
larger than those of large concerns even after investors are compensated
for bearing higher systematic risks. Reinganum has demonstrated that,
after controlling for beta, small firms' stock achieves excess returns.15
This finding was initially dismissed because it was believed the
author relied on a statistical artifact associated with the thin volume
of trading in small firm securities (which is itself a theoretical
anomaly).16 Other analyses traced the "scale effect" to tax shelter
behavior, because much of the residual in small firms' abnormally high
returns was found to occur in January.1 7
However, in a series of recent articles the generality and robustness
of Reiganum's findings have been corroborated, illustrating that one can
not attribute small firms' high returns entirely to thin trading,18 tax
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shelter behavior,19 high earnings/price ratios,20 or even higher transac-
tion costs.21 Thus Reiganum's results constitute one of the most clearcut
indications that financial markets systematically under-invest in small
firms.
Although these studies focus solely on stocks that are publicly traded,
the findings point to the existence of more pervasive imperfections that
cut across many sectors of the financial market. The fact that some
small firms continue to seek financing in public capital markets despite
the systematic under-pricing of new issues means that there do not exist
other financial institutions which assess their values accurately. If
there did exist such institutions, small firms would turn to them for
financing rather than the public markets where their equity is under-
valued. Financial intermediaries must be either underpricing all firms'
securities or rationing their resources so that not all viable small
firms have access to capital. Either phenomenon contributes to segmenta-
tion.
Hence some small businesses with real rates of return that are
equivalent to those of other enterprises will go unfinanced.
These businesses will be passed over either because the hurdle rate for
new small ventures is artificially high or because some new projects are
just excluded altogether from capital markets.
In the next chapter I will examine several theoretical reasons
which might account for these phenomena. I will focus on two issues:
(a) why information on small new projects might be imperfectly dissemi-
nated; and (b) why excessive risk aversion develops within the financial
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community, placing a disproportionate burden on smaller firms with a
higher variance of earnings.
Before this is done it is useful to provide some background on the
social benefits generated by small businesses. The relevance of this
whole analysis hinges on the belief that public development agencies
should be concerned about the problems experienced by small firms
It is necessary to assess the claims that these enterprises generate a
disproportionate amount of social good.
Small Firms' Contribution to Growth
The three claims usually made with regards to small firms are that
they generate (a) higher profits, (b) a larger number of net new jobs,
and (c) a wider array of innovative technologies. Clearly one cannot
assess the value of addressing capital market segmentation until one has
analyzed small firm's contribution to growth. I will briefly review the
literature on these issues.
The research on the social benefits generated by small firms is
still quite impressionistic and inconclusive. Although the public concern
about small firms has roots in the progressive anti-trust movement and
the late New Deal, the research on this sector's economic role is only
now producing interesting results.22 Most of the current research is
focused on the formidAble methodological- issues associated with conducting
longitudinal studies based on somewhat biased and incomplete data files.
However, few empirical analysts have made a concerted effort to measure the
interconnection between small and large firms' growth. Without such a measure
it is Ouite difficult to estimate small firms' impact on the economy.
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The first claim made on behalf of smaller firms--that they realize
high profits--has just been tentatively confirmed above. Thus I will
not re-examine this issue. However, it is important to note that profits
are not the best measure of the income generated by a firm since they
do not include the returns to other factors of production, most notably
labor. Before one could assert that small firms actually make a greater
contribution to national income it would be necessary to assess small
firms' value added vis-a-vis that of larger enterprises.
David Birch has undertaken the most exhaustive empirical investiga-
tion of small firms' job generation behavior. Birch found that three-
quarters of the net new jobs created between 1969 and 1976 were generated
by firms with less than 100 employees.23 Only about a third of the work
force were employed in small firms in 1969, so these enterprises made a
disproportionate contribution to employment growth.
A number of critiques of Birch's findings have emerged. Ledebur
argues that the 1969-1976 period studied by Birch may be unique: Birch's
findings could be attributed to an unusual resurgence of small firms
during the '75- '76 recovery.24
Another extensive critique was developed by Odle and Armington at
Brookings using more recent data from Dunn and Bradstreet.25 Odle and
Armington initially found that only 37% of net new jobs were created by
small firms between 1978 and 1980, a percentage comparable to the share
of the labor force that these businesses employed in the base year. But
when the authors examined a somewhat longer period, 1976 -1980, their
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estimate of small firms' contribution to job growth rose somewhat to 51%.
Odle and Armington have attributed part of the remaining discrepancy
between their findings and those of Birch to the latter's confusion of
establishments and firms. Birch has asserted that this was not the
case and has responded with his own criticisms of Brookings methodology.
The Brookings/Birch debate currently is focused on the fairly narrow
methodological issues of how to compensate for inadequacies in D & B's
file management procedures, includings its: (a) poor coverage, (b) lags
in acknowledging births, and (c) tendency to drop records capriciously.
Although this controversy will undoubtably contribute to the sharpening of
longitudinal measurement tools it may not add clarity or depth to the
conceptual frameworks used to analyze the employment growth process.
There are two important qualifications that should be made regarding
the significance of Birch's findings. The first point made by Harrison is
that small firms may appear to have done well in the last decade not
because they are a vital source of new employment, but simply because
larger firms were doing so poorly.27 With the saturation of their domestic
markets and the maturation of their technologies, most of the job creation
undertaken by larger firms was overseas.28 The question arises whether
public policy should be directed toward heightening the shift of employ-
ment toward smaller firms or attempting oD re-structure larger enterprises
so that they can once again serve as sources of job and income growth.
Clearly this complex issue cannot be answered simply on the basis of
small businesses' historical share of net job creation.
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Second, using any of the evidence cited above to speculate about
the effects of allocating investment to small firms, begs the most
important questions. An issue that has not been addressed by Birch is
whether small business growth contributes to or inhibits the job generation
potential of other firms. Before one can assess small firms' economic
contributions, one must determine the extent to which the growth of these
enterprises has come at the expense of larger concerns.
The Brookings study provides some means of dealing with this issue.
Odle and Armington identify the sectors in which small firms are growing
most rapidly relative to their larger competitors. They find that small
businesses have the highest relative growth rate in declining industries
and regions. This fact is somewhat surprising given the prevalent view
that the growth of smaller firms is concentrated in leading edge techno-
logically progressive sectors.
The Brookings authors interpret this sectoral specialization of
small firms as follows:
The tendency of small firms to enter and expand into relatively
weak areas of production provides an important moderating influ-
ence that can slow or interupt the decline of weakening regions
and industries.
Another somewhat more pessimistic though not inconsistent conclusion
might be drawn as well: the expansion of small firms with informal
labor relations systems, lower wages and less employment security may
have accelerated the decline of larger businesses in mature regions and
industries. The legitimacy of either hypothesis points to the weakness
of the empirical data.
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Clearly, to come to grips with the interactive relationship between
small and larger firms more empirical and theoretical research must be
conducted. It would be useful to obtain micro studies that tracked the
transfer of markets from failing large firms to newer and smaller businesses
in a specific sector. However, it is also necessary to develop a concep-
tual framework which specifies what type of evidence is indicative of
pejorative inter-firm displacement rather than positive re-structuring
within an industry.
The third claim made on behalf of small businesses is that they
generate new technologies. This issue is inextricably tied to the job
generation debate in that new technologies often create jobs. Even labor-
saving technologies can increase employment when the product demand is
sufficiently elastic to raise the derived demand for labor.29 Labor
saving innovations can also increase employment in other industries when
the former reduce the cost of inputs and the quantity of output demanded.
Most importantly, but least understood, new technologies can serve as a
catalyst for a series of other compatible technological innovations 30
which collectively generate new employment. Aside from generating jobs,
new technologies can also increase wages or the amount of leisure consumed
by society.31 None of these predictions, however, speak to the issue of
the distributional consequences of technology.32
There is some evidence that small firms generate more technological
innovations than do larger firms. However, again there are both methodo-
logical and conceptual problems with most of these studies.
The first conceptual issue is the distinction between the absolute
number of innovations generated by size of firm, and some measure of
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innovative efficiency. To demonstrate small firms' innovative behavior
the Commerce Department's Panel on Innovation simply counted the number
of innovations made by different sized firms. They found that about 50%
of new technical breakthroughs were attributable to the efforts of smaller
enterprises. A slightly more sophisticated analysis was done by
Scheirer who compared the ratio of innovations to sales, finding that
small firms performed well along this dimension. Robert Samuelson has
recently criticized these studies for misspecifying the measure of inno-
vativeness. He notes that a large firm, which is involved not only in
the conception but also in the application, distribution and marketing of
new technologies, is likely to have a high overhead, a large number of
non-technical employees, and a low rate of innovation to sales.
Samuelson argues that small firms are not more necessarily better at creating
innovations simply because they concentrate their efforts more on product
development activities. Presumably Samuelson would prefer assessments
which weigh the innovations achieved by smaller firms against the inputs
used in this process.
There do exist a variety of other studies which have demonstrated
that smaller enterprises produce an exceptionally large number of innova-
tions per research and development dollar expended.35 This input/ouput
measure of efficiency would seem to address Samuelson's criticisms of
the small business advocates.
However, input/output efficiency in R & D is certainly not
only relevant measure of innovativeness. A central issue is whether
large firms have the inclination to innovate as reflected in their
willingness to commit resources to research.
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It is dangerous to simply compare the number of technologies generated
by different sized firms.* These gross aggregates do not specify the
incentives to innovate associated with different industrial organizational
structures. Even if small firms produced few innovations, one might
argue that their presence is needed to compel larger industries to
innovate.
Clinton Bourdon notes that when a firm is in little danger of
losing its market share to other enterprises, the incentive to pursue
technological innovation declines.36 Thus in industries characterized
by a stable oligopoly with fairly fixed market shares there is little
compulsion to innovate. But where there exist threats from smaller firms,
the larger concerns will respond by investing in R & D.
Bourdon argues that after World War II, for instance, the indus-
try leader in the communications sector, AT&T,perceived threats to its
market domination of certain market segments (i.e., common carrier systems.).
Consequently, the firm allocated more resources and increased the pressure
on its R & D division, Bell Labs, to develop promising innovations.
Clearly, if one simply counted the number of innovations generated by
small and large firms in the communications industry, it is unlikely that
one would ascribe an important innovative role to small firms. But
*An obvious criticism of the Commerce study that Samuelson does not
make is the somewhat arbitrary nature of any operational definition of
innovation. New technologies can be embodied in new products, new equip-
ment, new ways of manipulating tools, or simply new ways of organizing
production (e.g. the assembly line). The last two forms of innovation
are particularly difficult to identify. Finally, even if the Panel on
Innovation succeeded in identifying all of these types of new technologies,
it was unable to develop coherent criteria for assessing which innovations
were most significant.
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according to Bourdon the small firms'incentive function was pivotal.
Thus one must analyze the role small businesses perform in defining the
market strategies of other firms before assessing their contributions to
innovation.
However it is useful to add two words of caution here. The argument
offered above was not directed toward demonstrating that competitive
industrial structures are optimal with regard to the maximization of
innovation. In fact, this fairly conventional model of the positive
association between competition and technological innovation has been re-
assessed by many social scientists recently. This reappraisal is largely
due to the current interest in Japanese industrial policy.37 There appears
to be somewhat less competition both within and between firms in Japan
and yet the incentive to innovate remains strong. The synergistic benefits
associated with noncompetitive cooperation,combining the technical know-
ledge of many different economic agents,seem to be appreciable in Japan.
Whether Japan's innovative strategies have any applicability to
American economic institutions is very difficult to determine. The point
is simply that one must account for the inter-active relationship between
firms.
Secondly, one should not assumethat an industry inwhichboth small and
large firms play a vital role is necessarily one in which the larger
players perceive a need to innovate. The classic segmented structure
identified by Piore and Chandler involves larger oligopolistic firms
that are quite content to relinquish the variable component of demand to
their smaller competitors. Thus it is critical to differentiate this
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type of symbiotic rapport between different sized firms and the more dynamic
competitive relationship described by Bourdon.
Finally, one cannot judge small firms' contribution to the economy
without assessing the extent to which they exacerbate labor market seg-
mentation. As noted in Chapter I, the evidence regarding the correlation
between the secondary labor market and the small business sector has not
been well documented. Many large firms provide unstable dead end jobs
and quite a few small firms provide high quality employment opportunities.
But the evidence that does exist suggests that small firms' jobs
are on the average poorer paying even after one controls for industry and
occupation. Moreover, Birch's finding that small firms' employment levels
are more volatile is consistent with Brookings' recent studies if one
takes into account the latter's unique measures of volatility (see
Chapter I). Thus the correlation between the secondary labor market and
the small business sector may be positive. Clearly one must disaggregate
the universe of small firms to get a better sense as to which sectors--high
tech, personal service, or mature manufacturing industries--are responsible
for lowering the quality of small firm jobs.
Like the research on job and technology generation, the empirical
work on quality of small firms' jobs has not succeeded in estimating the
effects of public policies aimed at assisting small firms. It is unknown
how the birth of additional small enterprises effects the job creation
potential, technologies, or instability of larger firms. Hence, it is
critical to determine how public assistance to small firms affects the
economy in the aggregate.
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Before one can assess this impact one must specify clearly what type
of assistance needs to be provided to small enterprises. The type of
assistance one provides to these firms hinges, in turn, on the causal
framework one adopts regarding the genesis of capital market segmentation.
The two principal causes that will be examined in Chapter Four are quite
similar to those pertaining to labor market discontinuities: risk
aversion and imperfect information dissemination systems.
Policies that ameliorate capital market segmentation will have slightly
different impacts depending upon which of these two problems are addressed.
Although many small new firms are impaired by both of these obstacles,
some are affected more by one than the other. Thus to discern the effects
of public interventions one must specify more clearly the causes and
solutions to capital market discontinuities. This is the topic of the
following chapter.
Summary
In sum, small new firms do seem to have poor access to capital
markets. This is evidenced by the fact that many of these enterprises
rely heavily on the personal wealth of their managers for financing.
Unfortunately the data on this pattern is somewhat sketchy. However a
more robust indication of the barriers small firms face is the excessive
returns they provide in the stock market.
Investors systematically underprice unseasoned small business
securities. This seems to reflect a problem in information dissemination
systems: if investors knew that such firms generated excessive
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returns they would pay a much higher price for them. In fact, the realiza-
tion that small firms' stocks generated these high returns would itself
be self-defeating in the sense that funds would continue to flow into this
segment of the market until the differentials were wiped out.
The high returns provided by small firm stocks suggests that only
those firms with excessive profits (after controlling for risk) are
receiving capital. Although one must be very careful in distinguishing
between stock returns and profits, it is reasonable to believe that these
imperfections will make managers of small businesses and venture capi-
talists more hesitant to invest in new ventures. Only more lucrative
projects will be financed both because: (a) owner/managers are undiver-
sif4 ed so they need to receive additional compensation for bearing unsystema-
tic risks; and (b) if they do want to liquify their wealth or expand
their businesses 5entrepeneurs must obtain capital from sources that under-
price their firms' equity. Together these two effects will constrain the
flow of personal and venture capital into small firms.
The evidence on small firms' job and technology generation capabili-
ties is still somewhat sketchy. The balance of research does seem to
suggest that smaller firms play a critical role in these two respects.
In much of the rest of this essay it will be taken for granted that capital
market segmentation may hinder aggregate employment growth and techno-
logical innovation.
However, the central question pertaining to these two issues has not
been addressed: i.e., the relationship between employment and innovations
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created by smaller enterprises and the performance of large firms. Until
this question is answered, the analytic and empirical foundation for
development finance policies will be insecure.
Finally, to assess the effects of financial segmentation on labor
market discontinuities one must first identify why small firms have
difficulty raising capital. A causal model of capital market segmentation
will clarify the connection between the flaws in the two factor markets.
Such a framework will also indicate the types of mitigating measures that
are required to ameliorate financial segmentation. These are the foci of
Chapter IV.
CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES:
RISK AVERSION, INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
AND CAPITAL MARKET SEGMENTATION
118
Introduction
Intermediaries in both labor and capital markets contribute to
segmentation. Limited information, social prejudice, and the ability
to maintain a dominant economic position are the major forces which
lead intermediaries to reinforce the discontinuities in input markets.
There are many parallels in the behavior of labor and capital
market intermediaries. Both types of institutions are embedded in an
economic nexus that limits their range of information and the breadth of
their social ties. Social networks play a greater role in labor market
intermediation than they do in facilitating financial transactions. But
both types of intermediaries rely on personal, social, and geographic
bonds to supplement or fortify their exchange relationship.
The agents inhabiting the lowest tier of the two factor markets--disadvan-
taged workers and small firms--are not only rejected by most intermediaries
but also have the greatest need for their assistance. Secondary workers
who do not have the credentials that often substitute for sponsorship have
poor access to the most effective informal labor intermediaries (LI's).
Similarly, small new firms that have neither retained earnings nor
direct access to the public exchanges are shunned by many of the major
financial intermediaries (FI's). Thus FI's and LI's often exclude the
economic agents who would receive the greatest benefits from their services.
Chapter III described some of the empirical evidence that financial
markets do not succeed in allocating capital efficiently. In particular,
small firms are provided insufficient amounts of capital from external
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sources. They seem to be constrained from expanding to the point where
their marginal real returns on investment are comparable to larger
enterprises. These phenomena violate both the separation theorem and
the diversification predictions of CAPM.
This chapter will attempt to provide some explanations for the under-
financings of small firms. The principal foci will be the problems
associated with FI's information collection activities and the way they
assess risk. First the orthodox justification for FI's existence will
be described. Then I will outline three different kinds of segmenting
forces: (a) those arising from the market, (b) imperfections created by
public regulations,and (c) rigidities associated with institutional and
social biases . Finally the relationship between labor and capital market
segmentation will be re-examined and some initial policy recommendations
will be offered.
The Orthodox Framework
Financial intermediaries (FI's) facilitate the transfer of loanable
funds from borrowers to the portfolio of lenders. Some FI's-, like stock
brokers, never take title to these assets, acting only as representatives
of the buyers or sellers of financial securities. But the most common
type of FI stockpiles the "direct" securities sold by "ultimate borrowers"
(i.e. morgages) and sells their own "indirect" assets (i.e. savings
accounts). These FI's transform the assets they buy before they re-issue
them as indirect securities. This type of FI includes almost all of the
other categories of financial institutions including commercial banks,
savings institutions, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds,
finance companies, and credit unions.
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Although almost all orthodox economists contend that FI's heighten
economic efficiency, there is no monolithic doctrine as to how this goal
is achieved. In fact, as the Capital Asset Pricing Model was being elab-
orated during the last decade, the "raison d'etre" for FI's became a more
troubling and controversial issue. Many financial economists are currently
attempting to apply CAPM to an analysis of the structure and function of
financial institutions; however, the synthesis is far from accomplished.1
One of the reasons for this controversy is the ambitious assumptions of
the model.
Notwithstanding this debate there does exist a dominant orthodox
argument regarding the functions performed by FI's. In his primer on
capital markets, Lester Chandler argues that FI's increase the efficiency
of capital markets by taking advantage of several different types of
economies of scale. These scale economies are quite similar to those
achieved by forrmal labor market intermediaries.2
Through economic expansion FI's gain the capacity to transform financial
assets to better conform with the preferences of ultimate borrowers. In
particular, they are able to reduce the risk*, increase the liquidity of
assets, or raise the expected return in a manner that could not be
achieved independently by those who purchase their financial claims. FI's
achieve this goal by reaping four distinct advantages associated
*Risk here refers to total variance (systematic and unsystematic
risk) which is the measure of portfolio risk not security risk. The
assertion that FI's can assist investors' diversify hinges on the assump-
tion that many desirable financial assets are indivisible or offered in
fixed quanta.
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with their size:
1) By purchasing assets in large denominations and issuing
smaller indirect securities, they reduce transaction costs;
2) Through more extensive dirversification, they can improve
the risk/return trade-off for ultimate lenders;
3) By applying knowledge gained through economic research to a
broad range of large investments, they reduce the "per unit"
cost of the information acquisition function; and finally,
4) By taking advantage of partially offsetting inflows and
outflows of their "depositors" they are able to increase
the liquidity of the securities they issue.
The following critique of orthodox theory of financial intermediaries
will focus on three types of market imperfections. The first are market
failures in the traditional sense in that they arise as a result of unregu-
lated market forces operating in an economy consisting of income
maximizing agents. The classic market imperfection of this type is fostered by
concentrated markets. Two features of overconcentration in financial
markets will be examined below: its impact on the price of information
and the risk aversion of intermediaries. Another set of classic imper-
fections arise from financial regulation; I will focus principally on
public controls over the liability and asset structure of financial insti-
tutions. (HowevEr, regulatory constraints on market entry are also an
important focus c- the literature and relate directly to anti-trust policy
objections.) Fir. ly, the third type of imperfection explored below are
the institutional and social constraints on FI behavior. This issue
will be analyzed in the most depth, the two former problems being
touched on only briefly.
The central purpose of this section is to outline theoretical reasons
to explain (a) wh-y small firms have been forced to rely on personal capital
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and (b) why, when they do obtain external financing, these businesses are
compelled to provide such high returns to investors. Two central themes
will be developed. One pertains to the high cost and inherent ambiguities
involved in acquiring, analyzing, and disseminating information about
small, younger firms. The other theme relates to the perceived risks
involved in investing in these firms.
Segmentation Caused by Market Forces
The Capital Assest Pricing Model (CAPM) is founded on the assumption
that all investors share the same portfolio of risky assets. Usually the
standardization of investors' portfolios is said to be achieved via the
quick and efficient transmission of information. This ensures that
every investor shares the same forecast of firms' future earnings potential.
Thus the efficiency of information transmission makes possible the consis-
tency of security selection procedures, pricing and risk assessment.3
Actually quite a bit of information about a firm must be collected
in order for investors to arrive at a proper assessment of its stock
value. Not only the probability distribution of earnings in each
period must be calibrated, but the expected correlation of future earnings
with the market r st be known by all market participants.*
*In fact anotner even more complex characteristic of firms' earnings
must be universally known for investors to share an assessment of stock
value: the so-called "up-date risk." Aside from the systematic risk gene-
rated when the firm's actual stream of earnings is correlated with the
market, there is . risk borne by investors when expectations change
regarding future earnings of the firm. If these expectations of future
earnings tend to -'hemselves shift in tandem with the market then the
investor is said incur an up-date risk. This heightens the complexity
of the informaticn that must be shared by all investors, 4
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The orthodox model posits the existence of agents who perfect the
market by producing And disseminating information about firms' future
earnings streams: the security analysts or loan officers employed by
financial institutions. The expertise of these individuals can be tapped
in framing the portfolio of any investor who does not have the time or
inclination to carry out his or her own analysis of economic phenomena.
There is reason to question CAPM's presumption that portfolios are
tailored to incorporate the best information available. First,information
gathering and analysis carries a cost. Following the neoclassical logic
one would surmise that some public information will be ignored if the
cost of acquiring and analyzing that data exceeds the return generated
by re-structuring a portfolio.
Small new firms are likely to be the most difficult to analyze. When
a firm attempts to penetrate the financial market for the first time
there exist few if any sources of secondary data that describe the firm.
Moreover, having had fewer credit checks or market studies performed by
suppliers, customers, landlords, and creditors each new investor will
have to bear the burden of developing a new assessment of the firm's
operations and/or compell the firm's managers to develop intricate finan-
cial statements -r business plans to their own specifications.
Thus the fa that information on small firms is relatively
expensive is one explanation for the fact that investors demand a higher
rate of return on investments in these enterprises. The excess rates of
return on small firm's stock may reflect this hidden cost of data collec-
tion.
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Simply the existence of information costs might be viewed as an indi-
cation that markets are imperfect. Indeed the classic version of CAPM
assumes that information costs are infinitessimal. However, if the market
investors assess information costs accurately then the financial market might
still be efficient in the sense that no actor can do better without
incurring information costs that are larger than the gains realized
through trade.
Neoclassical search theory dictates that economic agents equate the
marginal cost and return of new data. In other words, an investor must
continue to collect more information until the return on the last bit of
data exceeds this cost. Since information about small businesses is
relatively expensive (see below), investments in this sector absorb large
amounts of social resources in the form of data collection. One
could assert that the higher cost of funds to the business sector are
appropriate given the higher information costs generated by such
investments.
It is true that if small firms generate externalities in the form
of reducing unemployment (and concomitantly, social welfare costs) and
stimulating economic growth through technological innovation then the
information biases against small firms will be more costly to the society
as a whole. However these problems might be more properly viewed as
the consequences of (a) the labor market's failure to clear, or (b) defects
in the patent laws or innovation process which prevent firms from appro-
priating all the gains from technological breakthroughs.
But the high cost of small firm information, in conjunction with
other flaws in information systems do add up to a capital market failure.
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One of these flaws, the resemblance of information to a public good was
touched on in Chapter II.
As argued above, information has many similarities to a public good.
Unless the cost of its dissemination is subsidized by a collective authority
it is likely that it will be under-produced or imperfectly disseminated.
This is because the marginal cost function of information dissemination,
like that of many infrastructure goods, is likely to be constantly
declining rather than U-shaped, and its marginal cost will always lie
below its average cost. This means that any producer operating at the
so-called efficient level of production--where price is equal to marginal
cost--will sustain a loss.
This market failure is closely related to the economies of scale
reaped by formal financial intermediaries (FI's). One reason these
large FI's exist is that they can apply the same piece of information to
larger security transactions and a variety of financial decisions. But
the falling marginal cost of information indicates, nonetheless, that
some useful information will be offered to investors at a price that
exceeds its marginal cost.
One deficiency in the above argument is that it only applies directly
to the transmission of existing information, not to its production. It
is possible that after a certain scale of production there are marginally
increasing costs for generating new financial information. The declining
cost function of information dissemination may not affect new small
firms since there is less data that has already been produced about these
enterprises.
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However, it is very difficult to draw a clear distinction between
information production and dissemination. Information is "spontaneously"
generated about almost all firms,. but most of it is not systematically
compiled, analyzed, or transmitted to interested users. Suppliers learn
about firms' creditworthiness in an informal manner. Few communicate
their assessments of their customers to credit rating agencies in a
systematic manner. Reporters of trade journals, and magazines like Inc.
and Venture collect additional information, much of which does not appear
in any issue for lack of space, or due to an insufficiently small group
of interested readers. The information no doubt, if priced at its
marginal cost of dissemination, would find a somewhat larger market. Thus
to say that there are market failures in information transmission systems
is very similar to saying that information production is itself flawed.
Thus, it is likely that this market failure in information dissemina-
tion will have a great impact on small new firms. Data about these
firms is relatively scarce and expensive. The market's failure to price
information at its marginal cost will force FI's to demand a higher rate
of return on their investments in smaller enterprises. This is one
explanation of the stock return findings discussed in Chapter III.
Another of the market failures identified by Daniels and Litvak
which inhibits the performance of FI's is the geographic and economic
concentration of the financial industry.6
In their analysis of this phenomenon the authors draw on the work of
Heggstad and Edwards who found that the most concentrated financial
markets are dominated by relatively risk averse FI's.7 Heggstad and
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Edwards focused on commercial banks and the short term debt market.
Although risky debt cannot be diversified in the same fashion as stocks,
the authors' findings on risk aversion are still relevant to the
issue of small business financings.
The risk carried by debt is a function of both the variance and the
systematic risk (beta) of a firm's rate of return. Monopolistic banks
are able to minimize the risk they bear below the level achieved by
competitive banks. Since small firms' debts carry a great deal of variance
risk they find it more difficult to obtain loans from concentrated banks.8
Heggstad and Edwards following Galbraith and Caves attributed this risk
avoidance behavior in part to the desire of the managers of large corpora-
tions to stabilize their own jobs.9 Alternatively one could see these
actions as improving the portfolios of the owners or depositors of the
bank, since the unsystematic variation in a borrower's earnings increases
the value of the bank's equity and debt.
There is some question as to the current validity of Heggestad and~Edwards'
proposition that small banks are willing to carry riskier portfolios.10
However, their work did posit a credit rationing device that may
affect the small business community. Any market imperfection which
increases FI's variance risk aversion is likely to have its greatest
impact on small firms since they have the largest perturbations in earnings.
Geographic concentration can also be detrimental to small firms.
Regional brokerage houses used to disseminate information about firms
whose scope ofoperations was circumscribed. The decline of these local
houses has made it even more difficult to obtain useful data on
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smaller enterprises.11
Regulatory Imperfections
The second type of financial market failure described in the litera-
ture is that associated with public intervention. Litvak argues, for
example, that the fiduciary laws which bind institutional investors
exacerbate small firms' financial difficulties.12
Fiduciary laws are frequently interpreted in such a way as to force
fund managers to assess each investment in isolation rather than as a
constituent component of a diversified portfolio. This has the effect of
highlighting a security's total variance risk rather than its systematic
risk (the beta risk which is actually borne by the investor when he adds
the security to his portfolio). These fiduciary laws often prevent the
inclusion of small firm's securities in a pension fund because the latter
have a high variance of returns.13
Another type of law that may heighten FI's risk aversion are ceilings
on the interest rates of bank loans. If the risk premium on a loan is
insufficient to compensate a financial institution for the actual risk
associated with a firm's debt, the former will refuse to make the loan.
The macro result of these laws are to reduce the amount of financing
that is available to new ventures. With the relaxation of the lending
regulations for depository institutions this market failure will presumably
be ameliorated.
A third regulatory failure examined by Daniels and Litvak are govern-
ment laws which force firms issuing securities in the public exchanges to
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write detailed prospectuses and annual reports. They point out that
the cost of generating these reports does not rise proportionately
with a firm's size, thereby raising small firms' cost of information
dissemination per dollar of invested capital. The authors commend the
SEC for relaxing its registration requirements in the last five years,
reducing the information costs imposed on small firms.
In fact the SEC laws were created to deal with the information market
failures that plague the financial industries.15 However, since information
is a public good, an insufficient amount of-data transmission will take
place as long as its dispersal is not subsidized.* Newer more anonymous
enterprises will bear the brunt of this market failure.
Institutional Failures
There are several institutional patterns that might account for
the financing problems experienced by small new firms. This section will
offer a few hypotheses about institutional structures that bias the
investment decisions of financial intermediaries against small firms and
firms owned by minorities. The principal phenomenon to be explored are
the following:
o the difficulty of equating the marginal cost and return
of information due to irregularities in return patterns
and the need for meta-information;
o the difficulty of assessing a firm's systematic risk particu-
larly when it is in a new industry and the resulting
confusion of variance and beta risks;
o the sunk personal investments that FI's have in their
relationship with larger business customers;
o the importance of social networks and communication patterns
in financial intermediation.
*James Landis, the brilliant regulatory strategist of the SEC, did
succeed in addressing the "lemon" market failure described by Ackerloff.
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As noted above neoclassical theory dictates that any economic agent
who engages in an information search must equate the marginal cost and
return of new data. Thus any worker seeking a job, employer seeking an
employee, buyer seeking merchandise, or investor seeking an investment
must continue to collect more information until the return on the last
bit of data exceeds its cost. Presumably one would collect the cheapest
and most informative data first and then accept information that is
increasingly less attractive in quality and price. Eventually the cost
of information will exceed the discounted value of the heightened expected
returns it generates. This is the rational stopping point for any search
17
agent.
The problem with the neoclassical approach is that it tries to fit
information acquisition behavior into a narrow atomistic maximizing model
which is inappropriate. The fact is that decisions regarding whether or
not to collect additional information about a security or firm are so
complex that the actors are compelled to resort to rules of thumb, organi-
zational regulations, or traditions which frequently do not conform to
the maximizing prism through which the orthodox analysis views economic
behavior.18
It is almost impossible for a stock analyst or loan officer to
compare the marginal cost and benefit of collecting more information.
One way of seeing why this is the case is to look at the infinite regress
problem involved in such decisions: before an investor can accurately
compare the cost and return of information about a firm that is seeking
capital, he or she must collect some sort of "meta information" about this
The registration edicts he designed prevented the degenerative cycles
which reduce the quality of financial information.16
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information.~ This meta-information, in fact, must be very sophisticated,
for it must include some kind of probability distribution of the risk and
return payoffs associated with "investing in information" (a peculiar
type of investment, because the asset purchased is simply data that
describes other potential financial investments). Clearly this leads to
an infinite regression of investments for it would also be necessary to
collect meta-meta-information etc.
There is a way that one might try to escape this conceptual trap, but
it poses its own peculiar problems. One might assume that the marginal
cost (MC) and return functions for producing new bits of information are
nicely sloped: a U-shaped MC curve and a return function that intersects
it at one identifiable point.* In this case one might try to continue
collecting information until one found that the return on that information
no longer exceeded its cost.
Even if the curve had this convenient countour the question would
arise as to how one determines when the return on information has begun
to be exceeded by its cost. For some types of information this is unprob-
lematic. For instance, if one is forced to buy a book with financial
data without getting an opportunity to look at it carefully first, it may
become clear upon reading it that it was not worth the investment. How-
ever, many types of information have no discernable payoff until after
*Here I am referring to a different type of information cost function
than that cited above in the discussion of information as a public good.
The horizontal "quantity" axis (independent variable) is not the number of
people consuming the same bit of information collected, but rather the
number of pieces of information collected about a single potential investment.
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one has synthesized them, obtained additional data and made some initial
investment plans. For these types of information the stopping point of
information acquisition is more ambiguous.
Moreover there is no reason to suspect that the cost and return
curves are shaped in this fashion. Many types of data collec-
tion may have costs and returns that vary sporadically as the course of
the research proceeds. The somewhat random nature of any literature
search can foster a very unpredictable and
volatile pattern of returns. Regardless of the efficiency of the analysts,
information collected toward the end of a research effort can be either
the most trivial or the most critical inputs to an analysis.
The most attractive strategy for an employee of an FI in dealing with
the inherent ambiguity of information decision-making is to examine only
those investments where the data collection costs are well defined,
discrete, easily assessed and low. Since the cost of information is
generally easier to determine ex-ante than , it's "payoff," it
is likely that investment analysts will economize by analyzing only
those assets for which these costs are inconsiderable. 19
Not having recourse to a truly rational decision rule, FI's are
unable to establish whether they are ignoring projects for which informa-
tion returns and costs are high. They feel compelled to minimize their
apparent losses by economizing on information expenditures. Without access
to excellent meta-information, they must rely on this somewhat arbitrary
schema.
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This strategy will tend to make it more difficult for smaller, younger,
less well-known and more dynamic firms to obtain capital. Few secondary
sources of data exist regarding these types of enterprises. Secondary
information has the attraction of not only being cheaper in many cases
than first hand research but its cost is well defined. Primary research
about a firm or industry does not always have a discrete time frame and
thus may vary widely in cost. Moreover, it is not apparent ex-ante
whether any worthwhile information will be available if no one has
examined the industry yet.
This is not to suggest that all small new industries will be ignored
by financial institutions. If one examines current investment trends it
is clear how FI's interest in a particular industry is sparked. If a:
specific sector is able to achieve extraordinary returns on a sustained
basis without the assistance of the organized financial markets then it
is likely that some FI's, if only venture capitalists, will be tempted to
make a few investments in that industry. Once the initial investments
are made, some FI's will have access to a storehouse of information about
the firms in that sector: a description of their management structure,
resource constraints, markets, and cash flow needs. Additional investments
in the industry can then be made quite easily without confronting difficult
information decisions. FIs which were not involved in the original
investments can purchase secondary sources of information at low and
discrete costs.
This scenario describes the recent experience of certain high tech
industries, particularly the electronics, computer, and bio-engineering
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sectors. Although some economists argue that government should direct
more financial resources into these "sunrise" industries, firms in these
sectors do have access to substantial amounts of capital drawn from both
the public exchanges, private placement, and other financial markets.
But the electronic and bio-engineering industries are exceptional
in this respect. As noted above, many small firms must rely entirely on
the savings of their manager. Kiechnick has asserted that close to 80%
of all small businesses are financed principally by owner/managers.2 0
Until a new industry passes a difficult threshold where its ability to
generate large profits is no longer questioned it cannot obtain external
financing. Thus, innovative firms must sometimes prove themselves on the
basis of entrepeneurial capital.
Another reason small firms have difficulty raising capital may
relate to the ambiguity in risk assessments. Investors find it very
difficult to measure the systematic risk of a firm's equity. They quite
naturally conflate the idea of systematic contribution to portfolio risk
(beta) with that of variance in the earnings of an isolated security (sigma).
To derive beta, one must know the future covariation of a firm's earnings
with those of all other enterprises, a very abstruse concept that is unintelli-
gible to most financial analysts. 21
It is difficult enough to try to determine how a generic type of
venture or industry has performed vis-a-vis the market in the past.
Although the large brokerage houses are beginning to report historical
betas by firm, these are typically derived only for large conglomerates
with many lines of businesses and thus are not industry specific.
Without industry specific betas investors and corporate managers cannot
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assess the systematic risk of a new venture in an existing industry.
Ventures in entirely new industries are even more difficult to assess
because few if any relevant historical betas are available.
Even if one could obtain industry specific historical betas it is
extremely hard to project how the correlation of an industry's earnings
with the market will change over time given possible shifts in resources,
tastes, technologies, and political or institutional forces.
In contrast, it is somewhat easier to get a sense of the variance
of a firm's future income. If a firm's market is expanding rapidly, its
technology rapidly changing, or its resource base somewhat precarious,
the probability distribution of the enterprise's earnings over the next
ten years is likely to be flatter: e.g., there is a greater likelihood
that the firm's income will be substantially different (either higher or
lower) from the "expected" or mean outcome.
Investors continue to confound this notion of variability of earnings
with the risk that they bear when they purchase a security. Aside from
being easier to measure, variance conforms with an intuitive conception
of risk. The continuing use of sensitivity analysis among financial
analysts, and the practice of identifying pessimistic and optimistic
22
scenarioq for a venture reflects the prevailing concern for variance.
Since small firms tend to have a greater variability of earnings, as
manifested in their higher growth and failure rates, adopting sigma
(variance) as a measure of risk, instead of beta tends to disproportionately
heighten the hurdle rates of these firms. By raising the hurdle rate
used to discount the future earning streams of small businesses, investors
underestimate the latter's financial viability.
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Because inexpensive trustworthy information about a firm or investment
is difficult to secure, informal flows of information are valued quite
highly by FI's. This is one reason why international financial centers
like Manhattan evolve and are maintained. The face-to-face contact and
random but sustained flows of financial news which are available in the
world's financial headquarters reduce the expense of informational
acquisition and dissemination. 23
Aside from this special type of agglomeration, there are other ways
that informal informational flows are cultivated in the financial world.
Shepherd argues that the "banking relationships" that exist between large
financial and corporate executives are among the most personal and inti-
mate in the business world. 24 He notes that the relations between bankers
and their larger customers are characterized by a social bond that is
supportive of both actors' economic interests. (Here "bankers" is used
to refer to any personnel employed by an FI who are responsible for
purchasing financial assets).
Bankers benefit from their intimacy with corporate executives because
they obtain extensive information about the operations of their clients'
firms and industries, thereby improving the soundness of their lending
decisions. Presumably the relationship must retain enough formality to
allow the banker to turn down his client's requests when they violate the
interests of the bank. Shepherd does not comment on whether bankers
feel personally obligated to bail out their corporate friends when they
experience financial crises. But in any case the clients benefit by
cultivating a rapport with their bankers if only because of the financial
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advice they receive. Undoubtably their access to credit is enhanced in
this manner as well.
Shepherd argues that it is very difficult for a small new firm to
approach a bank to compete for its funds, in an environment dominated by
these strong personalistic ties. Since the banker has already invested
in his relationship with the older larger firms, the costs of gaining a
thorough knowledge of the latter's operations are already sunk.2 5
Assuming the bank has no excess loanable funds,* it is unlikely that the
banker will attempt to replicate this social/informational investment
without a very strong monetary incentive. In addition, if the small firm
is in the same industry as the larger firm, the former represents a threat
to the bank's large investment in the latter. In this case the bank's
managers would want to ensure that the small firm does not succeeed in
displacing its larger competitors. Thus the bank may have an interest
in cutting off sources of capital to the smaller firm.
It would seem that Shepherd's analysis relates most directly to FIs'
relationships with firms in the same industries as their current clients,
and to short run, rather than long run, strategic decisions.
Shepherd's point about intra-industry competition takes on added
importance in light of the information hypotheses offered in this essay.
As argued above, it is precisely the firms in industries that have
received financing in the past which are the easiest to evaluate because
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the FI's staff are already familiar with the key economic issues relating
to that sector. But if Shepherd is right, it is these firms which pose
the greatest threat to the FI, for they could reduce the value of the
FI's portfolio by endangering its existing loan clients. If the young
firms that are easiest to evaluate are viewed as dangerous competitors
and all other new firms are too difficult to analyze, then FI's will
concentrate all of their capital in more established enterprises.
In sum, smaller young firms may have difficulty raisina cani-
tal. FI's do not have recourse to any perfectly rational decisions rules
for making informational investments and therefore rely on somewhat
arbitrary strategies which economize on information expenditures. Sys-
tematic risk is also extremely difficult to assess. Information is much
cheaper and more elaborate when it is secured in informal settings or
through personal relationships. These relationships must be cultivated
over a long period of time and are easier to maintain when a business'
earnings pattern and management structure are stable. Small dynamic
firms are more difficult to analyze. Their managers are frequently
engaged in resolving crises, and may not have the time to ensure that
their relations with FI's have the depth and continuity required to main-
tain a banker's trust and understanding.
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Intermediation and Discrimination
The kind of social intimacy sought by bankers with their larger
customers has broader implications for the functioning of financial
institutions. In particular this personalistic strategy relates directly
to the last market failure identified by Daniels and Litvak: discrimination. 2 6
Information flows are facilitated--or will appear to be facilitated--when
executives deal with firms managed by people they can trust and identify
with, whose behavior they can understand and predict and with whom they
can easily communicate. All of these constraints make it more likely
that FI's will discriminate on the basis of class, race, sex and ideology
when they select firms to finance.27 J. P. Morgan revealed how subjective
most financial decisions are when he responded to a question regarding the
criteria he applied in determining the credit-worthiness of loan applicants.
He was asked whether commercial credit was based "primarily on money or
property." He answered, "No sir. The first thing is character . . .
because a man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds
in Christendom." 28
Bates and Bradford have demonstrated that lack of access to the
financial community forced black entrepreneurs to concentrate in labor
intensive sectors requiring small amounts of start-up capital. Consumer
industries like personal services and retail were the only fields in which
black businessmen were successful until government agencies like the Office
for Minority Business Enterprises made financing available during the
sixties.
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Undoubtably this sectoral concentration is fostered by discrimination
practiced by customers as well as financial institutions. Until recently
black entrepeneurs could rarely depend on selling goods to white firms
or consumers, and thus could only depend on black final goods markets as
a source of revenue. (Even these markets were difficult to secure because
of the widespread perception that white merchants could offer better or
cheaper goods to the black community.)
Discriminatory lending practices contribute to segmentation by
cutting off financial resources to large segments of the business
community.29 Carol Greenwald argues that discriminatory behavior among
FI's could be ameliorated if financial institutions adopted more rigorous
affirmative action programs.30 Indeed, if there were more blacks and
women working in FI's both blatant social discrimination and prejudicial
actions caused by poor information flows would be reduced. However, there
is still the possibility that the communication problem has been institu-
tionalized in FI's investment assessment criteria and the culture of the
organization.
On the other hand, when FI's deny financing to businesses managed
by minorities they are often correctly assessing problems faced by these
firms. Their reticence to finance a minority enterprise may reflect
their recognition of discrimination practiced by other groups in the
firm's immediate economic environment: the enterprise's other creditors,
customers, skilled employees, suppliers, or the owners of a franchise or
licensing company. In a sense these different types of discrimination
reinforce one another since they all contribute to a perception that the
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firm is bound to fail because it cannot establish a positive raport with
the other critical actors impinging on its productive viability.
One way that various ethnic groups have dealt with FI's discriminatory
behavior, is to try to establish informal financial institutions of their
own. The groups who have had the greatest success with this strategy tend
to be those who have experienced an appreciable but not insurmountable
amount of discrimination. These were ethnic groups who could obtain the
patronage of white customers but who, nonetheless, were viewed as inferior
by most of white society, including the managers of FI's.
For example, immigrant groups such as the Japanese and Chinese have
strengthened their commercial economic base by organizing provincial associ-
ations which performed an array of social and economic functions.31 Most
notably, these associations developed informal credit unions in which a
small group of shopkeepers, restaurant owners, small manufacturers and
other petty bourgeois entrepreneurs provided financing to one another.
Both the Chinese and Japanese financial instutions involved a
rotating loan service. Each month at a ceremonial dinner a shopkeeper
would receive a small sum from each of the other members. Since no
interest was charged, the members who received the first loans would
benefit most. The host of the dinners typically did not have to contribute
any capital.
Like credit unions, the rotating loan clubs exploited the peculiar
comparative advantages intrinsic to informally organized intermediaries.
The social intimacy that exists among the membership of these groups
radically reduces the cost of information acquisition and loan evaluation.
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It is much easier to assess the viability of a business when it is in the
same neighborhood and industry as one's own firm and when its manager is
well known and trusted in the community. Secondly the group's members are
less likely to borrow funds simply to forestall a business failure if
this will damage the economic status of the other members. If there is
some degree of mutual social obligation and a commitment to the financial
interests of the entire group, then members will refrain from borrowing
funds that they can never repay. Clearly this requires some kind of
collective identification.
The ability of the.. .ko (or tanomoshi) routinely to
provide credit without requiring collateral depended... on
the strong, informal and moralistic social relations of
lenders and borrowers. These...social relations served as
an alternative form of security against the pure risks of
lending. Building and maintaining (social trust) required
more or less continuous attention to the punctilio of
decorum, honor, and especially family reputation. 32
The problem confronted by any informal credit association is to avoid
the type of negative vicious circles described by Akerloff.3 3 If the
association reduces its monitoring efforts or the intra-group identification
declines, some poor loans will be granted, triggering a spiral of decline
for the association. After some poor loans are granted, the members will
feel compelled to charge a higher (or positive) interest rate on the loans
to compensate for the risk of default. But once the interest rate rises,
those who have the best firms and somewhat better access to conventional
sources of capital will begin to leave the association seeking better terms
of financing. This in turn will increase the proportion of poor loans that
are made, forcing the interest rate even higher, and leading other credit-
worthy borrowers to look elsewhere for capital, etc.
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This cycle can only be broken if the membership's commitment to the
group, and the groups' control over its membership is heightened. The
esprit de corps which must be cultivated is enhanced if the group members
cut themselves off from or are shunned by the dominant culture. However,
the members must have sufficient economic opportunities, access to product
markets, and accumulation of capital to make each of the firms potentially
viable.
This analysis of the relative success of Japanese and Chinese loan
clubs contrasts sharply with that of Ivan Light. Light attributes
blacks' difficulties in setting up informal FIs to the experience of
slavery which narrowed their "cultural repertoire." Light notes that
these institutions existed in Nigeria, and argues that blacks' collective
34
memory of them was destroyed.
My interpretation, in contrast, relies on scattered evidence that
Japanese and Chinese immigrants experienced somewhat less discrimination
35
than blacks. Thus entrepeneurs could secure a portion of the white
market and obtain supplies on reasonable terms from white firms. One
reason that these groups may have experienced less prejudice than
blacks is that they were numerically smaller and thus did not pose as
great a threat to the vast majority of the white working class. 36
The problem faced by minority groups who attempt to develop informal
loan clubs is analagous to the difficulties faced by minority workers in
the labor market. Unless these minority petty entrepeneurs can accumulate
(either in the labor market or through private FIs) a small amount of
capital, they will have few resources to establish a rotating lending
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institution. They must either develop positive relations with white
suppliers and customers or create their own distribution network and
market. The former objective is considerably more difficult than the
latter. Since many minority groups are residentially segregated they can
often secure a retail and personal service market in their own communities.
But a wholesaling operation requires considerably more capital, personal
connections and expertise. Thus unless minority entrepeneurs can tran-
scend some initial discriminatory barriers they will have difficulty
insulating themselves from FIs' social prejudices. This is one reason
these loan clubs are rather rare.
Similarly, as argued above, unless a few minority workers succeed in
penetrating primary sector firms, obtaining on-the-job training from their
white peers, the disadvantaged group as a whole will have difficulty in
developing informal networks that transmit information about valuable
employment opportunities.
This analogy in the barriers faced by black entrepeneurs and black
workers highlights the fairly robust parallels in labor and capital
market segmentation. Both factor markets are characterized by flawed
communication channels through which only selected information passes to
a narrow set of individuals. In the labor market, these informal networks
determine which workers learn about job openings and have access to on-
145
the-job training.
Similarly, informal networks determine which firms are able to form
lasting relationships with financial intermediaries. Many firms already
have a head start in establishing this rapport: the FIs have a "sunk"
investment in their affiliation with these enterprises. Since it is
inherently difficult to assess the value of new informational investments,
many FIs will over-economize on the resources they commit to this effort.
This brief description of the analogy in the causes of segmentation
in the factor markets is insufficient. One of the principal aims of this
essay is to discern the logical relationship between these two markets'
discontinuities. Having fully elaborated the two models of segmentation
it is now possible to address this question in earnest.
The Theoretical Link Between Capital and Labor Market Segmentation
One cannot assess the social value of reducing financial segmentation
until one has determined the structural relationship between the disconti-
nuities in the capital and labor markets. How does assistance to small
firms who have poor access to capital affect labor market segmentation?
As noted above, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that small
firms do in fact generate larger numbers of jobs, technologies and profits,
but that the employment they provide may be less stable and is lower
paying. However, the statistical data is weak or inconsistent. Addi-
tionally, the theoretical framework used to develop the empirical models
are relatively crude, largely because they do not specify the interactive
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relationship between firms of different sizes.
The weakness of the empirical literature makes it very useful to
try to sort out the logical relationship between the two models of
segmentation. Only in this manner can one start to determine whether
both factor markets' imperfections can be dealt with in tandem. Since
the model of financial imperfections presented above is so complex it
is necessary to focus separately on two types of capital market segmen-
tation: those pertaining to (a) risk aversion and (b) information
imperfections.
I will first analyze extensively the connection between the capital
market imperfections fostered by excessive risk aversion and labor market
segmentation. Two main points will be made:
(a) The labor market segmentation model developed by Piore is
logically distinct from the financial framework pertaining
to risk aversion developed above.
(b) On the other hand the two forms of segmentation are func-
tionally related in the sense that addressing this par-
ticular type of capital market failure is likely to
exacerbate the discontinuities in the labor market.
Before elaborating the first point it is necessary to note an
important assumption that is required. (The second point is more robust
and does not rely on the following supposition.) I will accept Piore's
most general description of the primary sector: e.g., a sector consisting
of firms that exploit the economies of scale associated with the division
of labor, and the related- investments in human and/or physical capital.
This does not mean that all secondary employment is in small firms,
since larger enterprises may contain labor intensive divisions that
absorb product market instability. Moreover this assumption allows for
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the existence of some small firms with higher paying skilled employees
who are protected by licensing measures or craft unions. However, in the
main, it presumes that primary sector employment is concentrated in
large units of production, and particularly in oligopolistic enterprises.
The dualist model developed by Piore suggests that managers of large
enterprises try to insulate themselves from market instability. In a
similar fashion, the capital market segmentation model traces many of the
financing problems of small businesses to a perverse aversion to variance
risk among financial intermediaries. This concern violates CAPM's neo-
classical efficiency standards because in theory much of variance risk
can be diversified away. Thus, one might conclude that the phenomenon
responsible for segmented labor markets has also narrowed small firms'
access to capital: namely an excessive variance risk aversion among the
corporate sector and its financiers.
The critial distinction in refuting this generalization and demon-
strating the logical indpendent of the two frameworks is the difference
between the stability of product markets and that pertaining to rates of
return.
Even if a manager or financier of a large primary sector firm was
completely indifferent towards variance risk, accepting CAPM's dictum
that unsystematic fluctuations in returns are irrelevent, they may
still go to great lengths to minimize unsystematic variations in product
markets.
If a firm is trying to reap economies of scale through investments
in machinery and human capital and a more extensive division of labor
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then it must minimize downtime. During periods when the firm is operating
below full capacity, valuable capital and specialized personnel investments
are lying idle. If there were no transaction costs, equipment inventories
and workers could be easily sold/dismissed and repurchased/rehired, making
fluctuations in demand less problematic. But in the real world transaction
costs are substantial. This is due in part to the fact that many firms
in the primary sector employ machinery and workers that are unique,
reducing their "salvage value" and increasing the costs associated with
re-employment of factors. Finally, even in a plant operating below
capacity, many types of equipment and personnel cannot be relinquished
because they are still used sporadically. Thus reductions in output can
be very costly.
Hence, downtime and unstable markets not only increase the variance
of returns of large oligopolitic firms but they also decrease their
expected mean return. A large firm which has a stable demand is likely
to do better on average than one with a turbulent market. Any force which
reduces the mean return on investment is clearly one which even orthodox
financial managers must worry about. Thus, when the dualists assert that
large firms try to minimize the variance in their markets, the former
do not have to presuppose that these firms are also concerned about
variance of returns. Investors may or may not recognize that the
variance of returns is an inappropriate criteria for measuring asset
risk, even when they use variance of markets as an indicator of larger
firms' profitability. In other words, it is possible for labor
markets to be segmented and yet have perfectly efficient
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capital markets.*
The second proposition regarding the relationship between labor
and capital segmentation is somewhat more robust, and does not rely on the
economy of scale assumption posited above. This proposition is as follows:
if one ameliorates those financial difficulties small businesses experi-
ence as a result of excessive risk aversion, one will increase the insta-
bility of employment and heighten labor market segmentation.
It is actually possible to develop a coherent case on both sides of
this issue: a "pro" and a "con." The weaker "con" position will be described
first. Drawing on a simplified version of Piore's model, one might
contend that markets have a certain amount of instability that cannot be
eliminated. Certain perturbations in demand over the daily, seasonal
and business cycles are uncontrollable. Although counter-cyclical macro-
economic policies and the restructuring of consumption patterns might
dampen these cycles somewhat, the economy will still be left with a
measure of instability.
Thus, as argued in Chapter III, attempts to reduce the amount of
production carried out in firms which currently absorb a great deal of
*As noted above this argument relies on the assumption that extensive
economies of scale exist in most industries and that the bulk of the
primary sector is located within rather large units of production. There
exist extensive critigues of this assumption both from a theoretical
and empirical perspective.30 Some advocates of industrial policy assert
that the U.S. is losing its competitive advantages in sectors of long run
standardized product markets--the sphere in which economies of scale are
critical--and must now shift to unstandardized industries which require
small units of production.3 1 If this is the case, and America responds to
the challenge, the dualist literature will have to be massively revised.
No longer will our industries consist of a few large players and many
secondary satellites. I will not attempt to trace the full theoretical
ramifications of this shift in U.S. economic structure on dualist theory.
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these oscillations may simply force other enterprises to accommodate a
larger fraction of the economic instability. Hence ameliorating FIs'
risk aversion will not change the aggregate number of unstable jobs but
only the locus of these secondary sector opportunities.
One might even argue that the financing difficulties faced by small
unstable firms actually increases the number of secondary jobs. Many
small firms are actually discontinued because they cannot raise a
sufficient amount of working capital in a timely manner. (Although working
capital is somewhat more accessible to small firms than long term financing,
both can be hard to obtain. Entrepeneurs' dependence on personal savings
reflects the general lack of external capital sources from which smaller
businesses can tap.) If entrepeneurs had access to public financing and
these growth crises became less numerous then employment stability might
be enhanced.
Finally, to the extent that small firms generate a larger number of
net new jobs, they may serve to ameliorate labor market segmentation.
When the labor market is tighter and workers have a larger number of
employment opportunities they may have somewhat greater leverage over their
employers. Intuitively it seems clear a wider opportunity set should
improve the quality of employment since workers are likely to select the
best job first.
However, there are major objections one can raise to each of these
arguments, particularly when the strategy used to reduce capital segmenta-
tion involves reducing FIs' excessive risk aversion. As noted above, some
of small firms' financing problems derive from their fluctuating returns.
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Investors conflate variance and systematic risk either because it is
inherently difficult to measure the latter or because their portfolios
are insufficiently diversified. Concentrated financial markets may
reduce risk-bearing to suboptimal levels. Finally some public regulations
like asset limitations, interest ceilings, and fiduciary rules deny funds
to riskier enterprises.
The aggregate effects of these market failures is to either
(a) increase the hurdle rate for unstable business activity above what it
would be in the absence of segmented capital markets; or (b) simply
deny funds altogether to risky firms. Any policy intervention designed
to increase FIs' inclination to bear variance risks will necessarily
result in a greater volatility of economic activity. It is true that
small firms do not always displace larger enterprises, particularly when
they enter new markets. But precisely because these firms have the
option of creating new markets based on new technologies and products,
one cannot view the economy as possessing a fixed amount of instability
that must be distributed among various firms.
To the degree that capital markets encourage firms to penetrate
markets where the variance risks are greater, one must anticipate
that contractions and failures will become more common. Increasing
investors' ability to bear variance risk will also strengthen and expand
those mature industries which have the greatest instability of employ-
ment and earnings. Currently these firms cannot obtain funds as easily
or as cheaply because of the confusion of variance and systematic risks.
Reducing the cost of capital and improving its accessibility will allow
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these firms to expand to the point where their marginal systematic risk/
return payoff is equivalent to other industries. Heightening the insta-
bility of profits will increase employment turnover unless managers of
these dynamic enterprises happen to be commited to protecting their
employees from economic instability.
Although Berger and others have suggested that the small business
community is committed to retaining employees during downturns, the
evidence to date is rather sketchy.32 The notable feature of the above
argument is that it transcends the debate over whether or not small firms
provide jobs that are relatively insecure. Regardless of the instability
of smaller enterprises currently or even in the future, decreasing the
hurdle rate of high variance firms will increase the volatility of earnings.
As more firms experience wider swings in their profitability they will be
forced to contract or terminate operations more frequently, thus giving
rise to more employment turnover.
Hence, the fact that many FIs mistakenly conflate variance with
systematic risk might be welcomed by those who want to stabilize employment.
Although the stockholders can diversify unsystematic risks of a firm it
is much more difficult for employees to do so.*
*To diversify the risks associated with a firm's operations, workers
could actually "sell short" some equity in the business. These short
sales would appreciate in value if the firm collapsed. However, at a
time when managers, policy analysts, and some unions are conceiving of
ways to tie employees' interests more closely with their firms' profita-
bility through such techniques as employee stock ownership, short
sales are not likely to be well received, regardless of their attrac-
tion as risk diversification devices.
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On the other hand, even if one believed that small firms' financing
problems simply shifted economic instability from smaller to larger
enterprises, this phenomenon might be viewed as constructive. Larger
firms are more capable of allocating the risk associated with market
instability in an equitable manner: output contractions can be accom-
modated by spreading the reduction in production man-hours over a larger
number of workers. Thus work-sharing arrangements can be initiated
more easily.3 3
The second point in favor of small business assistance--the need to
ameliorate financial growth crises--is also problematic. One must discrimi-
nate between two different types of growth crises experienced by small
firms. If capital is withheld from these firms because they have excessive
variance risks, then the critique presented above is applicable. Providing
financing to such firms will increase employment instability, not reduce
it. However, if the lack of access to working capital is attributable
to other factors then assistance is easier to justify (see below).
Finally the third argument linking segmentation reduction to job
stability goals has some problems as well. First, as noted above, small
firms' job generation capabilities have only been documented in a narrow
fashion, if at all. No one has determined the amount of displacement
that occurs when small businesses are born or expand. To the extent that
small firm growth comes at the expense of larger firms, there is no
reduction in unemployment, and thus no broadening of secondary workers'
"lopportunity set."
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Even if the number of jobs created by small firms is much larger
than those displaced in larger firms, a question remains regarding the
quality of this new set of opportunities. The fact that workers have a
larger number of options does not mean they have a better array of oppor-
tunities.34
Finally, if the involuntary unemployment rate among secondary workers
actually does decline through small firm job growth, and workers initially
gain some added leverage and choice, secondary employers still have at
their disposal relatively costless recruitment devices for securing per-
sonnel who were formerly outside of the labor force, e.g., the elderly,
young, discouraged workers, migrants, housewives, etc.35 Once these
workers are brought into the labor force they are likely to remain there,
enlarging the number of workers competing for jobs and decreasing
secondary workers' leverage.
The above arguments did not rely on the assumption that primary
sector jobs can only be found in large firms. However, there is an
important premise that was implicitly taken for granted: the view that
heightening employment instability will increase the number of secondary
jobs. Short job tenure does reduce the incentive to provide on-the-job
training (OJT) and opportunities for promotion. Employers providing
OJT need to be assured that their workers will remain employed in the firm
long enough to pay back the former's investment in human capital.3 6
Moreover, the type of "training through osmosis" described by Piore
is dependent on a gradual skill development process and slow movements up
tall career ladders occuring over an extended period of time.
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As noted in Chapter I, it is possible that there are some major
exceptions to this association between job stability and OJT. Osterman
has identified occupations with short tenure where OJT was considerable. 3 7
However the goal of employers in providing this training was to reduce
instability. In addition the high rate of turnover in the cases
examined by Osterman was caused by workers seeking better opportunities,
not by the perturbations in demand.
In sum, it is possible that some dynamic sectors that are growing
rapidly might provide OJT if they cannot recruit trained workers from
educational institutions. Nonetheless, demand instability (as opposed
to turnover caused by tight labor markets) does serve as a disincentive
to train workers. Thus financing high variance firms is likely to
reduce the incentives to provide on-the-job training.
One way to reconcile the two factor market-public agendas is to
focus on the information failures rather than the excessive risk aversion
in the capital market. To the extent that small firms' financing
problems stem from imperfect information collection and dissemination
processes the goals of reducing financial and labor market segmentation
might be pursued in tandem. Assistance should be provided to small
enterprises whose earnings are no more volatile than those of larger
firms, but whose anonymity cuts them off from established capital markets.
Financing can be provided to these firms without aggravating labor
market instability.
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Assuming these anonymous small firms are net job generators to the
economy, this strategy might succeed in increasing aggregate employment
without heightening labor market segmentation.
Thus it is necessary to distinguish between the market failures
that arise due to information failures and those that derive from excessive
risk aversion.
The following is a summary listing of the two types of market
failures.
Factors Which Impede the Production and Dissemination of Financial
Information :
1. The inherent ambiguity of information investment decisions
(e.g., the meta-information problem) which leads FI's to
economize on data production costs.
2. The declining marginal cost of information dissenination
which fosters a sub-optimal amount of data dispersion.
3. The over-dependence on social networks and discriminatory
investment screening procedures.
4. The institutional and geographic remoteness of over-
concentrated financial markets.
5. The fact that larger FIs have sunk information investments
in fully developed relationships with larger corporations,
investments which would become less valuable if smaller
more efficient firms in the same industries were financed.
Factors Which Heighten Risk Aversion:
1. Certain investors, like small business owners themselves,
are insufficiently diversified.
2. Larger banks use monopoly power to reduce the variance risk
of debt.
3. FIs, investors and corporate managers confuse variance and
systematic risk.
4. Laws which limit the unsystematic risks borne by FIs or
impose a ceiling on their interest rates.
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It is important to realize that the most dynamic unstable firms
suffer from both types of capital market failures. Their volatility
makes it difficult to collect accurate information about them. Their
executives are likely to be experts at crisis management, but not very
effective at building stable coherent relationships with suppliers, credit-
rating agencies, or FIs. Any information that is assembled about these
firms is likely to be out of date before it is usable. Thus one must be
careful in dealing with the information market failure if one wants to
avoid helping high variance firms.
Although excessive risk aversion can reduce the number of unstable
jobs, development agents should still be concerned about its influence
on the aggregate employment level. If Birch is right, the innovation and
job generating abilities of small dynamic firms are considerable. It is
possible (though not inevitable) that the creation of employment oppor-
tunities will give secondary workers a wider choice of jobs and thereby
improve their status. Both primary and secondary workers are in a weak
position when high rates of unemployment raise fears of economic depreva-
tion. Finally, even if the quality and stability of work is reduced by
assisting under-financed small firms, helping the unemployed obtain some
kind of job should be an economic priority, particularly for distressed
urban regions.
Whichever firms are provided assistance, the process of targeting and
delivering resources to small firms that generate large social benefits is
itself an information-intensive activity. It is first necessary to screen
firms that are both financially viable in terms of some type of risk/
return framework.
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There must be some way to trade off uncertainty (variance and/or
systematic) against expected private and social returns. In any case the
traditional measures of risk and return will enter the social calculus.
If the excessive risk aversion of private capital markets are being
addressed then the public FI should target resources to firms with high
variance risk (though not necessarily higher systematic risk than would be
borne by private FIs). If a firm creates social benefits in the form of
training disadvantaged workers or creating a particularly large number of
jobs then a lower financial expected return might be accepted. If informa-
tion failures are the focus of public policy then the risk/return calculus
should not be any different from that of a private FI but the development
agency should subsidize the production, analysis and dissemination of
information.
All of these assessments require a great deal of data. To assess
the risks and expected return of a firm one must obtain a vast amount of
information on its technology, input requirements, production plan, compe-
tition, and market strategy. To determine whether the firm is likely to
provide on-the-job training, data on the proximity of work stations,
organizational structure and tightness of labor markets are needed.
Finally, to establish whether the firm will be a net job generator it is
necessary to assess both its positive contribution to employment (direct,
indirect, and induced) and its negative impact on other firms through
displacement.
Clearly there is a great deal of overlap in the data required
to make each of these assessments: in each case, information on markets,
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technology and organizational structure are quite important. The institu-
tional compatibility of these three missions is explored in Chapter VI,
and in the appendix.
Summary
In conclusion, the reticence of financial intermediaries and corporate
managers to invest in relatively anonymous small projects forces
private individuals to be their sole financiers, a group who are ill-suited
to bear the type of risk generated by these porjects. Instead of financing
these ventures indirectly through corporate earnings and intermediaries,
thereby ensuring that unsystematic risks are largely diversified away,
our financial system gives the responsibility of bearing the total variance
risk of these projects to owner/managers. These individuals must not only
be risk-lovers and wealthy, but they must also have management skills.
The autarchic character of the secondary financial sector reduces the
chances that viable ideas will be nurtured and transformed into profitable
enterprises.
Social ties are critical to the functioning of both formal and informal
financial intermediaries. Formal FIs like banks depend on a close rapport
between loan officers and the managers of the borrowing firms. Informal
credit unions exploit the social nexus existing among their members which
facilitates the exchange of information, the maintenance of trust, and
the conservation of a collective identity. Without this social foundation
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the association could enter a negative cycle of decline.
The social basis of lending practices is the manifestation of critical
informational problems experienced by FIs--problems that are not entirely
accounted for by the orthodox theory. The market does not generate finan-
cial information in adequate quantities or at a reasonable cost. Moreover,
decisions about whether to invest in information are inherently ambiguous.
FIs instututionalize certain responses to these problems in order to
minimize debate about informational issues and to establish some stability
in banking practice.
The labor and capital market segmentation models are logically
distinct. However, it is likely that any attempt to address the financial
market failures through reducing or compensating for private FIs' risk
aversion is likely to exacerbate the discontinuities in labor markets.
Reducing the hurdle rate or improving the access to capital of high variance
firms will heighten the instabilities of employment. Dealing with the
imperfections in information dissemination, on the other hand, will not
necessarily increase labor market segmentation. In any case, whichever
capital market deficiency is addressed, it is necessary to compile a great
deal of data on the firms that are believed to be deserving of assistance.
This data is quite similar to that required to assess the firm's on-the-
job training capacity. The similarity in public intermediaries data needs
provides another synergistic rational for linkage.
Labor market intermediation is characterized by an even greater
dominance of informal social ties which facilitate and channel information
required by employers and workers. Again, there are winners and losers
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in the world of labor intermediation. Disadvantaged minorites with few
economic resources are shut out of many labor intermediary networks just
as small firms are excluded from certain key financial markets.
The informal social processes that constrain and bind group networks
are critical to the functioning of intermediaries. Thus they must be
acknowledged in developing alternative mechanisms for channeling capital or
allocating jobs. In order to deal with the problems caused by segmenta-
tion one must fully understand how these networks are maintained and the
purposes they serve. Sections IV and V will examine these issues in more
depth.
The information collection function is critical to any segmentation
reduction strategy. This has important ramifications for the optimal
institutional structure and political environment of public intermediation.
Development institutions must have the means to assemble and analyze
detailed data on firms. The organization's resources should include both
money and time.
Given the political constraints under which development institutions
function, only one of these two resources is usually available. Even when
a development agency has the financial resources and political consent to
address capital and labor market failures it rarely has the time to
achieve this goal. Conversely, when time is in abundance, financial
resources tend to be scarce. This pattern will be examined in detail in
the following case study on Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation.
CHAPTER V
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Introduction
To understand the nature of the comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages of coupling labor and financial intermediation one must examine the
history of development agencies which have struggle-d to pursue this goal.
The Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation in Brooklyn, New York. is
an example of a prominent development agency that has made several attempts
to link these two functions. Given the fact that Restoration is one of
the oldest Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and thus has served
as a model for many other neighborhood based economic development entities,
the history of its training and investment programs is particularly note-
worthy.
Notwithistanding the fact that Restoration's programs have on occasion
been viewed as paradigms of the "CDC strategy," one must recognize that
the historical development of the corporation is somewhat unique. Thus,
before examining Restoration's attempts to coordinate financial and labor
market intermediation, it is necessary to briefly describe the agency's
origins and programmatic structure.
An overview of the evolution of the economic development investment
programs will follow. The periods 1967 - 1972, 1974-1978, and 1978-
1983 will be examined separately since Restoration's development goals were
substantially different during these three intervals.
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of Restoration's attempts to marry investment and training
programs. I will examine the political and financial obstacles that
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impaired the agency's ability to ameliorate labor and financial segmen-
tation and hindered its innovative plans to coordinate intermediation in
the two factor markets.
History and Programmatic Description
Restoration was founded in 1967 as the nation's first Community
Development Corporation (CDC). New York's two U.S. Senators, Jacob Javits
and Robert Kennedy, both played leading roles in conceiving and funding
the organization. The purpose of the corporation was to "promote urban
revitalization" by involving local leaders and residents in the "simul-
taneous economic, physical and social redevelopment of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant community." 1
In 1969 the CDC project was transformed in 1972 from a temporary
demonstration program to an ongoing federal endeavor funded through Title
VII of the Economic Opportunity Act.
Although some federal monies are still available today, the Reagan
Administration has dismantled the program's major funding agency (the
Community Service Administration) and cut back the grants to Title VII
CDCs. Thus most CDCs,including Restoration, have been forced to contract
their operations appreciably in the last three years.
Restoration, since its inception, has had a tri-partite structure,
with all of its major programs falling into one of three major divisions:
Physical Development, Economic Development and Nonprofit Community Programs.2
The nonprofit division has jurisdiction over all of Restoration's
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manpower programs. The Comprehensive Manpower subsidiary has administered
the following programs:
- the Job TAP Center which refers unemployed workers to
jobs and training programs;
- various work experience programs, many of them tied to
other Restoration projects, particularly the beautifica-
tion and rehabilitation efforts undertaken by the Physical
Development division; and
- the Payment Credits program which provides credits
against the loans issued by the Economic Development
division, in exchange for on-the-job training of a
firms' employees.
The nonprofit division used to administer a variety of other social
and cultural programs, via a network of community centers located
throughout Bedford Stuyvesant. Most of these centers were dissolved after
the recent funding reductions. The programmatic agenda of these centers
included youth development, sanitation, sponsorship of local artists, and
health-related matters.
The Physical Development division administers a variety of programs
aimed at improving local housing and developing sites for commercial and
industrial users. Among the most prominent programs in this division are
the following:
- the HIP program, which focuses on the external renova-
tion of owner occupied homes;
- the Commercial Center and the commercial revitalization
programs which attempt to strengthen Bedford Stuyvesant's
retail and service sectors;
- the construction and rehabilitation of individual
industrial facilities; the most ambitious endeavor was
the refurbishment of an electronics assembly plant for
IBM and the subsequent construction of a new plant for
the firm.
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As of 1981, the Physical Development division was the largest depart-
ment in terms of level of funding and expenditures (see chart). It is
also the division that has experienced the largest budget deficit. Hence
it has received a great deal of attention from Restoration's executive
staff.
Restoration's Economic Development Programs: The Early Years (1967-1972)
One of Restoration's original funding proposals, written in 1968,
states that the Economic Development Department has the following five
objectives:3
1. to create a large number of jobs;
2. to target jobs to those residents who are unemployed or
underemployed;
3. to help local residents create or expand their own
businesses;
4. to create jobs as quickly as possible;
5. to facilitate the upward mobility and training of local
workers.
These goals were assigned different weights at different points in
Restoration's history in response to changing political conditions and
shifts in the priorities and economic strategies of Restoration's leaders.
In the earliest period when Restoration's staff wrote the document
from which the above list of goals was abstracted, the organization's
leadership attempted to realize each of these objectives. A relatively
high local unemployment rate, low rate of business expansion, and the
outmigrations of a few large firms led local leaders to be very concerned
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about the lack of jobs and its effect on the welfare and social stability
of the neighborhood. Historically, many of the best local jobs, e.g.
in construction) had been taken by non-residents. This reinforced the
agency's concern about targeting jobs tomembers of the community. There
seems to have been some sense of the problems stemming from labor market
segmentation, e.g., that many of the jobs that residents did obtain were
in low skill occupations with little opportunity for advancement.
Restoration's attempt to promote minority ownership was another goal
that was pursued particularly vigorously during the first few years of
its existence. The adoption of this development strategy can be attributed
to many factors.
First, black ownership of businesses is, in part, an extension of
the fifth goal, e.g., facilitating the upward mobility of local workers.
However, since it was recognized that business owners represent only
a small proportion of the local work force, this was not the primary
justification for giving special treatment to minority owner/managers.5
Another motivating factor for pursuing this goal was that white non-
resident ownership of local businesses represents a significant income
drain on the community's economy.6 Owners' wages are brought home, and
their consumption expenditures and savings are received by stores and
banks located outside of the neighborhood. To the extent that profits
are reinvested in new business ventures, this too is often done outside
the community.
Third, most of the local minority owned businesses were locked out
of the private capital markets, being unable to obtain funds from
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traditional financial intermediaries. Because of the discrimination,
defective communication, and closed social network dilemmas discussed in
Chapter IV, local minority entrepeneurs had poor access to private
capital markets. Thus by aiding viable minority firms, Restoration
increased the probability that its loans were being granted to businesses
which would be unable to function in the absence of the special treatment
afforded them by the corporation.
But perhaps the primary reason that this goal was felt to be so
important during the early years of Restoration's history was the emergence
of a political and social ideology formulated by the leaders of the black
liberation movement. Many spokesmen during this period, including Roy
Innes and Floyd M. Kissick of CORE, attributed the absence of political
strength among minorities to their lack of economic power, particularly
their lack of power over businesses. Moreover, black ownership of business
was seen as a primary means of enhancing black pride and achieving black
self-determination. There was a fairly active and radical chapter of
CORE in Bedford Stuyvesant in the late sixties, which contributed to the
popularization of these concepts among neighborhood residents and leaders. 8
Finally, the goal of black ownership was also adopted, in a somewhat
diluted form, by the Nixon Administration when it developed its Black
Capitalism program.9 Therefore, Restoration could expect to gain support
for their programs within the community and to some extent in Washington
by targeting financial resources to firms owned and managed by black
residents. 10
The fifth goal, to create jobs quickly, was another objective given
priority status primarily during the first chapter of Restoration's
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existence. Throughout Restoration's history, the leaders of the Corpora-
tion have recognized the severity of the economic problems facing local
residents. However, in 1968, the director of Restoration and those
federal officials responsible for evaluating the agency's administrative
effectiveness had recently witnessed several racial riots; in the summer
of 1967, major disruptions had taken place in Roxbury, Newark and Detroit,
as well as in 23 other cities.11 Although minor riots had already occured
in Bedford Stuyvesant and East Harlem by 1968, many government officials
and neighborhood leaders were afraid that New York would soon experience
a larger, full blown uprising.12 Thus, there was considerable pressure on
Restoration to make some quick job-creating investments that would amelio-
rate these tensions. 1 3
Another factor contributing to the pressure to develop jobs quickly
was the receipt of a very large amount of funds which Restoration
needed to disburse fairly expiditiously if the program was to survive.
Like many government "demonstration programs," the rate of expenditure of
Restoration's funds was closely monitored by federal decision makers and
partially determined: (a) the level of Restoration's bi-annual allocation
two years hence; (b) the national program's annual appropriation granted
by Congress; (c) the overall appraisal of the CDC concept; and (d) the
decision to reclassify the program from a R & D project to full operational
status. Hence, the heads of both Restoration and their federal funding
agency applied a substantial amount of pressure on the program administra-
tors to spend the funds quickly.
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Although Restoration's Economic Development division had a wide
variety of separate programs, most of its activities fell into one of
three general categories:
1. Providing debt or equity financing to new or existing
firms in the area. Most of the early loans were for
five to ten years at no interest.
2. Providing a wide range of technical assistance: devel-
oping financial applications, accounting services, manage-
ment assistance, etc.
3. Assistance in obtaining services from one of the other
two divisions of the corporation: e.g., either land
assembly, rehabilitation and construction services from
the Physical Development division or employee referral
and training credits from the Comprehensive Manpower
subsidiary of the Nonprofit division.
In order to quickly create a large number of jobs, give a few entre-
peneurial residents an opportunity for mobility, and help black owned
businesses obtain financing, Restoration intitially invested in a wide
variety of primarily small, high risk minority firms. 1 4
Birch has found that minority owned firms are, in the aggregate, con-
siderably different from other businesses.15 They are disproportionately
concentrated in the service sector, underrepresented in manufacturing, and
considerably smaller than their white owned counterparts. Thus, by limiting
investments to minority owned firms Restoration was to some extent targeting
its investments to smaller personal service and retail sector firms, most
of which provide little training, have weak internal labor markets, and
pay low wages.
However, Restoration also wanted to create a large number of higher
quality jobs. According to some Restoration officials, this could best be
173
achieved by assisting firms in the manufacturing sector.16 The conflict
among Restoration's goals was heightened by the perceived necessity of
making several quick investments, which precluded an extended search for
the exceptional ventures which were minority owned, providing good jobs
and were viable businesses.
CGnseauentlv. Restoration was driven to make a large number of quick loans
to firms in both the manufacturing and retail sectors, most of which
soon after failed. Of the approximately 49 investments made between the
years of 1967 and 1972 (for which data was available) 36 of them (73.5%)
were unable to pay back their loans. In 1977 Restoration had classified
all of these loans as "in litigation or losses." This typically meant the
owner had declared bankruptcy and the venture had been dissolved or
reorganized. Another 9 firms (18%) were over six months late in making
their loan repayments.17 These default and failure rates are very high
relative to those of comparable loan programs; approximately 40-50% of
the minority recipients of other programs tend to pay back their loans
on time according to Edelstein and Bates.18 (See chart on next page.)
However, one must take care in comparing default rates among minority
loan programs because some loan officers may tend to "cream" the applicant
pool. In addition, they may have a better pool from which to select
debtors, depending on the local and national economic environments at
the time when the firms received and paid back their loans. Moreover, if
a particular study measures the default rate shortly after the loans are
granted, the repayment will be substantially lower than if it was calcu-
lated after all of the installments fall due. All three problems are
confronted in comparing the default rates of Restoration's early loans to
COMPARATIVE DEFAULT RATES OF MINORITY LOAN PROGRAMS
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those of the other programs, each of which were evaluated under more
favorable conditions. However, one might still argue that the discrepancy
between Restoration's default rate, which approached 92% in the early
years, and that of the other programs, which never exceeded 64%, is too
large to be attributed to these three factors. In any case, the high rate
of default was perceived as reflecting an excessively permissive loan
screening methodology.
I t seems that these loans, most of which were granted during
the first two years of the program's existence, were made somewhat hastily,
on the basis of relatively little information regarding a firm's potential.
The loan review analyses that were written in 1977 by the Economic Develop-
ment staff, tracing the reasons for a firm's failure reveal that most of
the businesses had major problems in the areas of management, product
development, technology, cash flow, and/or marketing. Frequently, if
any sales plan, market analysis, or operational plan had been undertaken
prior to the granting of a loan, it was quite sketchy or inaccurate.19
Although Restoration staff often attempted to put the business back
on its feet by tightening up the reporting relationships among personnel
or revising the firm's products, the former's recommendations were often
met by resistance from management, reflecting a failure on the part of the
Economic Development Department to select cooperative entrepeneurs.
The Economic Development Department's investment policies in the
periods 1967 - 1974 defined the limits within which financial and labor
market intermediation could be coupled. As we shall see, during this
period, when the coordination of these functions was eagerly pursued,
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in the form of the Payment Credits program, the agency's hasty investments
severely constrained its ability to ameliorate labor segmen-tation. As a
result of the Payment Credits program's failures and the decline of
training as a priority relative to the agency's commercial development
goals, Restoration discontinued its innovative attempt to coordinate inter-
mediation in the two input markets.*
The Payment Credits Program**
The Payment Credits project enabled recipients of Restoration's loans
to reduce their outstanding debt by providing on-the-job training to
their own employees. The design of this project was quite impressive,
with numerous built-in safeguards and supportive services. Unfortunately,
for reasons described below, many of the procedural guidelines were
virtually ignored, giving participating firms substantially more freedom
than had been envisioned by the architects of the program.20
Interested firms were obligated to submit a proposal*** outlining
the kinds of jobs for which training was required and the manner in
which this training was to be carried out. Employers could only receive
training subsidies for those workers who were certified as low-income
residents of Bedford Stuyvesant (e.g., members of households with incomes
*However, after 1978, Restoration reestablished an investment/
training policy which has been more successful than its earlier efforts(see be ow).
**Also referred to as the Training Credits Program.
*** Restoration staff provided assistance in developing this proposal.
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below 125% of the federal poverty guidelines). The training period was
to be determined on the basis of standards developed in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles. The employer was responsible for orienting the
trainees during their first two weeks of employment to the jobs, products,
machinery, policies and operations of the firm.
Any employer receiving the loan credits was required to select per-
sonnel who were capable of performing three distinct training functions:
1. A supervisor/trainer, who "must possess relevant job and
communication skills" and have an "ability to relate to the
'disadvantaged"'. The ratio of supervisors to trainees
could not exceed 1:5.
2. A counselor, selected from the "senior levels of the
Subcontractor's workforce... to provide individual assis-
tance for in-plant job related problems and to bridge
the traditional gap between supervisor and trainee."
3. An "experienced employee" in the same or similar job as
the trainee who must be "an individual to whom the new
trainee can relate and who will be available for advice
on a regular basis."
In cases where the firm's workforce was small, the program guidelines
did permit the owner/manager "to assume one or more of the afore-
mentioned roles."
The employers were also obligated to give each trainee some medical
and dental insurance, the cost of which was fully subsidized by Restora-
tion. Moreover, whenever it was necessary, Restoration was to provide
supplementary classroom training to strengthen the trainees basic or
vocational skills. Finally, there was a fairly complex clearance
procedure for approval of all training subsidies with several staff in
Restoration signing off on a credit invoice only after verifying that the
firm was in compliance with the training plan and program regulations.
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Soon after the training credits program was initiated several major
problems surfaced. First, many of the firms receiving credits had few if
any jobs which required training. For example, a typical firm was Barnes,
Cordova and Eley, a local moving, trucking and storage business employing
from 18 to 24 workers on an "as needed" basis. Between 1968 and 1974
Barnes received $37,000 worth of credits against its $67,000 loan. For
firms like Barnes, most of the proposed educational and counseling
services which were linked to the program were of no apparent use since
the trainees did not need to learn any particular skills. Nor did they
need to undergo a social or emotional transition, since the jobs were
much like those they had held previously.*
On the other hand, there were cases where firms did require some
pre-employment skills and the managers became dissatisfied with the
quality of the employees who were eligible to participate in the program.
Restoration counselors initially made some attempts to mediate between
employers and those workers who had difficulty performing their job duties;
however, many employers continued to have no patience with their trainees.
The low quality of the jobs in the firms receiving training credits
was partially the result of the hurried investment pattern that characterized
the early economic development programs. The Payment Credits programs
was most active during the years 1968-1973, the period in which Restoration
attempted to create large numbers of jobs quickly by investing in small
high risk businesses. Most of these firms either had few jobs which required
training,or uncooperative managers. But another, more fundamental, though
*The program was not targeted to unemployed youth who, one might
argue, could benefit from any work experience.
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related defect plagued the program
One of the most significant flaws of the Payment Credits project
was that although it was originally intended as a training effort it was
soon perceived by each of the relevant actors as simply a mechanism for
decreasing the debt of the recipients of economic development loans. The
staff in the Economic Development division was concerned about the failure
rate of the firms in the loan portfolio; they viewed the granting of
credits as a technique to assist firms experiencing major cash flow or
other financial difficulties. One staff person noted that the program's
principal function was to "pull the subcontractor out of the red." Although
the personnel in the Manpower office of Restoration objected to this use
of the subsidies, they were unable to convince the economic development
staff that the program's original training goals should be given precedence
over the default reduction objectives. The managers of assisted firms
quickly learned that the corporation did not consider the program's
training objectives as high priorities.
A whole series of abuses resulted from this informal shift in the
program's goals. The first problem cited, namely that most of the
participating firms had production processes requiring few skills, was
in a sense a by-product of the transformation of the program's objectives.
Training credit applications were soon evaluated largely on the basis of
the seriousness of the firms' financial problems, rather than the quality
of companies' jobs or their workers' training needs. Many retroactive,
"rough justice" credits were granted to firms on the basis of the nominal
amount of training undertaken in the recent past. Most training periods
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were systematically defined as three years, even when the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles indicated shorter training requirements for the firms'
jobs. Ironically, the Payment Credits recipients, instead of providing
better jobs and an opportunity for upward mobility, more often were
dissolved soon after the credits were granted, sending their workers to
look for new jobs without'having acquired any new skills.
Another set of problems threatened to make the program ineffectual
even for those firms which could have provided some meaningful on-the-job
training. Managers typically functioned in all three of the training-
related roles spelled out by the training credit contract. Although Resto-
ration personnel attempted to perform the role of counselor, as noted
above, they were not always able to resolve conflicts between managers,
supervisors, coworkers and trainees. In addition, many employers convinced
Restoration to allow them to select employees residing outside of Bedford
Stuyvesant, often members of their family or friends. Manpower staff
discovered that in many cases where the employer selected his own personnel,
rather than asking for referrals from Restoration's TAP Center, employees
tended to exhibit high rates of absenteeism. Finally there were indica-
tions that the employers were receiving kickbacks from their workers,
paying the trainees only part of the wages agreed upon in the training
contract.
As the Manpower personnel discovered the scope of the abuses described
above, their criticisms of the loose structure of the program became more
persuasive. Towards the end of the program's existence they succeed in
winning a consensus to compell firms to accept Restoration referrals
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for at least half of their training slots. In this way they were assured
that a majority of the trainees would be Bedford Stuyvesant residents.
Second, starting at the point of intake, the Manpower counselors were able
to develop more stable relationships with the participants, facilitating
a better resolution of employer/worker conflicts and reducing the possi-
bility of kickbacks. Although this reform improved the overall effective-
ness of the program, the training credits project was soon discontinued.
Thus, ironically, Restoration's attempt to create jobs quickly for
Bedford Stuyvesant residents was carried out in a self-defeating manner.
Not only were most of the jobs in Restoration-financed firms confined to
the secondary sector, but even after providing specific subsidies to
improve the training opportunities available to local workers, many of
the jobs still failed to enhance workers' skills and were held by non-
residents. Firms with decent jobs which could have provided some valuable
training were perceived as so close to bankruptcy that Restoration
refrained from obligating them to comply with either the letter or the
intent of the Payment Credits guidelines. The Payment Credits program
was- terminated in 1974.
Although it was one of Restoration's most innovative development
initiatives, the training credits program was emasculated by the Economic
Development Department's "quick results" investment policy. Contributing
to the demise of the project was the need to finance small retail and
service firms locating in the Corporation's commercial property. These
firms had even fewer jobs that required training than those assisted during
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the years 1967 -1973. Thus, training became somewhat of a non-issue with
respect to Corporation-financed firms, until around 1978 when Restoration
began to conceive a new development strategy.
Commercial Investment Activity: 1974-1978
The Economic Development Loan program shifted dramatically in focus
after 1973, with much less investment being made in the manufacturing
sector and also a significant decline in the default rate.22 This shift
occured largely as a result of the need to assist the firms locating in
Restoration's Commercial Center.23 To understand why the Commercial Center
was developed and how the economic development loan program was used to
address the needs of the Center and its tenants, it is necessary to digress
for a moment and provide some background on this impressive project.
There were several development goals which Restoration was trying to
achieve by constructing the multimillion dollar Commercial Center.2 4
First and foremost, Restoration hoped the Center would symbolize the
'restoration of confidence" in Bedford Stuyvesant among its residents and
the business community. By transforming one of the most deteriorated
sites into a stunning multi-purpose commercial plaza, Restoration's
leaders felt that the reputation of both the corporation and the neigh-
borhood would be enhanced. As a hub of commercial activity, the center
might stimulate new investments in the surrounding area. Secondly,
Restoration staff, having undertaken some market analyses of the local
retail sector concluded that there were relatively few large, competitively
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priced stores in the neighborhood, and that much of residents' shopping
was being carried out in other nearby communities, producing a signifi-
cant income drain. Thus, the construction of a retail center could
simultaneously reduce this flow of income outside the area and increase the
availability of moderately priced, high quality consumer goods.
However, the concept of building a commercial "hub" was problematic
in three respects. First, most of the jobs that would be generated by
the retail and service firms locating in the center would be fairly unstable,
low-paying, and offer little opportunity for promotion. Second, with the
exception of the supermarket, the number of jobs per dollar invested in
these firms was fairly low, although the administrative cost of screening
each business would be comparable to that required to evaluate larger
establishments. Finally, the center might compete with existing retail
firms clustered along Nostrand Avenue. (Though, as indicated above, one
might equally argue that the center would strengthen these firms by
diverting shoppers from downtown Brooklyn to the Nostrand Avenue/Fulton
Street commercial "nexus.")
The decision to build the Commercial Center had a predictable effect
on the Economic Development's business investment policies, particularly
given the manner in which the Plaza's construction was financed.
Restoration had been unable to obtain permanent financing for the
$7.5 million project because it had not succeeded in winning a letter of
intent from any anchor tenant prior to construction.25 Having to rely
on an interim construction loan in 1973, Restoration was in a vulnerable
position, the threat of illiquidity being fairly significant. The
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relatively short term five year loan from Chemical and Citibank would have
been very difficult to repay unless longer term financing was obtained.
To achieve this goal, Restoration needed to fill up the Center with
tenants that had good bond ratings. To attract such tenants, Restoration
made a large number of equity and debt investments in fairly well estab-
lished retail and service businesses that were willing to locate in the
Commercial Center or in other nearby Restoration-owned commercial space.
These investments tended to be considerably more profitable than those
undertaken during the first phase of Restoration's economic development
loan program. However the selection of highly rated tenants deviated
from Restoration's original plan to fill the Center with firms owned by
local entrepeneurs who could not obtain reasonably priced financing or
space.
Although no data was available on the race of the owners or managers
of the firms assisted during the two phases of the Economic Development
Loan program, Restoration could probably find more local minority business-
men who were willing and qualified to run firms in the retail or personal
industries than in the manufacturing sector. As noted above, these
industries are easier for minority entrepeneurs to penetrate, because
they are less vulnerable to discrimination from suppliers or purchasers,
and require a smaller amount of start-up capital. Moreover, minorities
have had more experience in these lines of businesses historically.26.5
This is another possible reason the default rate declined during the second
phase of development.
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While 78% of the loans granted from 1967 - 1972 were in the "litigation
or loss category," only 24% of those granted after 1972 were similarly
classified.* Although not all the Economic Development loans granted after
'73 went to tenants of the Commercial Center or Restoration's other commer-
cial properties, almost all of them did go to retail or service firms
employing low skilled labor with some increase in loans to construction
firms doing business with Restoration. From 1967-1972 when manufacturing
businesses received 24% of the loans and the retail/service and construc-
tion sectors received 60% and 15.5% respectively; after 1972 there were
no loans made tomanufacturing firms with 77% going to retail or service
businesses, and 23% to construction.
The decline in the loan program's default rate was, in part, simply
due to Restoration's growing sophistication in screening applicants. How-
ever, this improvement was also a response to the heightened pressure on
Restoration staff to ensure that: (1) firms locating in the Commercial
Center, many of which also received debt orequity financing, were suffici-
ently viable to pay their rent in a timely manner and, concommitantly,
receive a decent bond rating; and (2) all new debt and equity securities
purchased by the Corp.had relatively low risks of default, paying a safe
and competitive rate of return.
The perceived urgency of realizing the second goal, decreasing the
portfolio's default rate, was reinforced by new signals emited from
Washington.
*This discrepency is partially due to the fact that the firms
receiving the more recent loans may not have had time to default; but
there does seem to be a significant improvement in the repayment
pattern, irrespective of this measurement problem.
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The Community Service Administration (CSA) the principal federal
funding agency of Restoration and other Title VII CDCs, began to revise
its performance criteria in 1975. First it specified that CDC ventures
should "attain self sufficiency over the short term."26 CSA also began
to force the CDCs themselves to become fiscally self reliant, decreasing
their overall funding levels. These funding cuts impaired the CDSs'
ability to (a) finance risky (high variance) ventures, and (b) screen
and refer businesses to private intermediaries. Both of these problems
will be examined below.
In the summer of 1977 the Economic Development Loan Program was
discontinued. Although the default rates had declined, they were still
significantly higher than other private and public loan programs. Thus,
Restoration's leadership continued to question the efficacy of the program.
But more relevant to the demise of the program was a second revision in
CSA's policies relating to the approval of CDC investments.
Since 1969, CDCs had been granted bi-annual allocations out of which
they issued loans without obtaining clearance from Washington. In 1977,
CSA decided that all new investments would have to be approved individually
by their Office of Economic Development.27 In conjunction with the con-
tinued decline in Restoration's funding levels, this policy severely
constrained the Economic Development Department's flexibility. Restoration
decided that, henceforth, it was only worthwhile to purchase equity
securities in larger denominations since so much time and energy was
exhausted in obtaining approval for each investment.
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Recent Attempts to Couple Financial and Labor Market Intermediation:
The Cablevision Experiment
During the last five years Restoration has changed its invesment
policies in a way that has enhanced the potential for coordinating
business development programs with the training and referral functions
performed by its Comprehensive Manpower subsidiary. Concurrently, however,
the corporation curtailed its efforts to ameliorate financial segmentation.
Restoration has decided that it must finance only intermediate sized
firms which generate a sizeable number of jobs, provide some opportunities
for promotion, and require proportionately smaller expenditures of
administrative resources in originating and servicing an investment. 2 8
This strategy is partially the result of the radical decline in federal
funding for CDC administrative budgets.* To achieve this goal it has
moved back into the manufacturing and higher skilled business service
sectors which have somewhat broader training needs and opportunities for
promotion. In addition, new economic development personnel have been
hired during the last few years, one of whom has experience administering
employment and training programs. In this manner, the corporation has
strengthened those projects jointly administered by the Economic Develop-
ment and Manpower Departments.
The experience of the training credits program was useful in that it
taught many Restoration personnel the difficulty of coupling financial
*
Today Restoration's entire federal funding is in the form of
individual venture grants. Since its administrative overhead is no
longer funded directly, the agency is compelled to select even fewer and
larger ventures to reduce information and transaction expenses.
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and labor market intermediation. Manpower staff learned that care must
be taken in selecting firms receiving debt or equity financing and training
subsidies. The assisted businesses must be sufficiently viable and stable
to afford its workers some opportunity to acquire skills during the course
of the production process. Moreover, Restoration staff increased their
commitment to select only income eligible residents of Bedford Stuyvesant
to participate in training programs.
Cablevision is a fairly large company which operates cable systems
in Long Island, New Jersey and the Midwest.29 In 1979, Cablevision
approached Restoration to find out whether the latter was interested in
investing in a Brooklyn cable subsidiary. Believing the city was about to
allocate the franchises for the borough, Cablevision wanted to convince a
community-based organization to become a co-owner in order to improve the
company's chances of obtaining the rights to operate the Brooklyn system.
Restoration, with its diverse political ties, was a particularly attractive
partner.
After a prolonged negotiation and delays in receiving CSA approval,
Restoration invested $150,000. In return, the CDC received 9% of the
equity of the Brooklyn cable subsidiary, 2% of franchises elsewhere in
the city, and a commitment to begin training 15 disadvantaged Bedford
Stuyvesant residents. After working in Long Island these workers would
"form a core of skilled, engineering individuals required to construct and
operate the television system for Cablevision Brooklyn." 30 The goal was to
allow this first group of trained residents to supervise a much larger
corps of Bedford Stuyvesant workers when the firm introduced cable TV
to Brooklyn.
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This was a particularly good investment for Restoration since the 9%
equity interest could easily be valued at $6 million.31 Most important,
Cablevision made an informal agreement to hire many of the Brooklyn
system employees from Bedford Stuyvesant, utilizing Restoration's labor
referral system.
An attraction of the firm was the promotional opportunities it
offered. A majority of the executive staff in the company were said to
have been promoted from entry level positions, many of them from the
installation or construction departments. Although mobility to the top
levels of the firm may become more difficult as the company matures, the
rapid expansion of the industry should continue to provide some opportuni-
ties for promotion unless management destroys existing career ladders.
Notwithstanding the basic advantages of the Cablevision agreement,
the placement and training of the first set of trainess was frought with
so many problems that soon the project was forced to come to a halt. Each
of the participants resigned or was dismissed within the first few months.
The following were the problems to which Restoration attributed each
of the terminations:
Number of Trainees Principle Reason for Termination
2 Personal Problems (resignation)
1 Better Job Opportunities (resignation)
2 Often Late and Absent (dismissal)
2 No Ability to Perform Job Functions:
largely a skill problem. (dismissal)
1 Unsuitable for Position: primarily an
attitude problem. (dismissal)
3 Unexplained (resignation)
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To understand these problems it is useful to examine the experience
of this first group and contrast it with their successors, who to date
have fared somewhat better. The first group of participants was
selected by Restoration and Cablevision in a somewhat sporadic manner over
a fairly prolonged period. After the company agreed to hire aparticipant
r-eferred by Restoration's Manpower Department, he was immediately given
a job assignment and put to work without any orientation or formal training.
The trainees' coworkers were supposed to simultaneously meet their own
production quotas and provide OJT. This made it quite difficult for the
participants to acquire the skills needed to perform their job duties
efficiently. The trainees also found it difficult to travel to Long
Island, becoming physically drained from the long commute.
Another serious problem was the antagonism expressed by the trainees'
coworkers toward them, a particularly troublesome state of affairs given
the participants' dependence on their peers for on-the-job training. The
coworkers' negative attitude seems to have been motivated by several
concerns. The trainees suspected that the existing work force was simply
articulating their deep rooted class and racial prejudices. Indeed,
Cablevision's labor force was almost entirely white, while the trainees
were all Hispanic or black. Whatever the reason, the trainees found it
exceedingly difficult to obtain training from their peers.
Although the precise meanings of the reasons for leaving are not
clear, it is apparent that each of them, with the possible exception of
"better job opportunities," could have stemmed from a difficulty in
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acquiring skills and dealing with the coworkers' antagonism. The variation
among the reasons may have been due more to unique individual reactions
to a shared set of problems than to actual substantive differences in the
difficulties faced by each of the trainees.
The Economic Development and Manpower staff persevered and made several
positive revisions in the program which seem to have improved the situa-
tion substantially for the second group of participants. Restoration's
leaders were quite familiar with the managers and the structure of Cable-
vision, having undertaken prolonged inquiries and negotiations prior to
providing financing to the firm. This enabled the Corporation to perform
an incisive inquiry to determine why the training program had been so
unsuccessful. Even more importantly, the firm was dependent on Restoration,
not only for financial assistance but for political support in obtaining
the franchise. This dependence gave Restoration a substantial degree of
leverage in its effort to compel the company to agree to adopt
the Manpower coordinator's proposals for restructuring Cablevision's on-
the-job training system.
A series of extensive meetings attended by executive staff from
Restoration and Cablevision were held to decide how the program should be
improved. After a large number of internal memoranda were written
analyzing the program's weaknesses, letters were sent to Cablevision
sharing Restoration's diagnosis of the problems. Eventually, Restoration
developed a final list of recommendations which were agreed to, in full,
by Cablevision:
- Participants were to be screened and began working as
a group to facilitate the development of an "esprit
de corps."
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- Cablevision was to provide an elaborate orientation for
the trainees, to give the participants a sense of the
opportunities for vertical and lateral movement in the
firm, reinforce their esprit de corps and allow super-
visors (rather than coworkers) to provide skill training
in a more formal context.
- The participant's coworkers were to be given an incentive
to refine the trainees' skills including a reduction of
formers' production quotas.
Ken Diaz went out to Cablevision at least once a week to talk with
the trainees and management about the training program. The discussions
with trainees were held both in groups and individually. In order to
minimize the adverse impact of any negative rumors on the participants'
morale, Diaz tried to act quickly to either substantiate a charge,
demanding that management address the matter immediately, or refute it and
convince the trainees that they need not be concerned.*
The group counseling enabled the trainees to express their tensions
about the job, and anger they felt both toward the older cable workers
and their co-trainees.
Initially, the structural reforms in the program appeared to pay
off. The rate of turnover was radically reduced and most of the trainees
succeeded in meeting their production quotas. However, during the last
year the trainees in Cablevision have encountered new major difficulties.
First, the inter-racial conflicts have flared up again. The workers who
have had the most difficulty in dealing with the prejudice of their white
*Among the false rumors that were circulated was that the trainees
were about to be transferred to other jobs that were less desirable; among
those having some basis in fact were that coworkers were complaining too
much about the trainees' performance, the quotas were about to be increased
significantly, and the trainees were to be split up and assigned to two
overlapping shifts which would force all of them to stay at work much
longer since they commuted together in the same Restoration-owned van.
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peers are those located in work rooms where there is very little space or
privacy. In contrast, the workers assigned to the construction and
installation crews are measurably more independent, and have adjusted
to the social organization of the firm fairly well. (This finding is
consistent with Kornblum's observation regarding the types of work
stations that heightened inter-racial tension in the steel mill.)
The lack of communication and poor relations between the trainees and
the other workers in Cablevision has fostered a number of other problems.
For instance, one of the new trainees has produced at twice the rate of
his peers. He was either unaware or uninterested in the informal ceiling
on daily output set by the other employees. This has exacerbated the
inter-racial conflict appreciably. Second, the other workers continue to
refuse to provide adequate training for the Restoration employees.
Several Restoration workers were convined by their white peers to adopt
production techniques that they later found to be inefficient and rarely
used by any other worker. In addition, some trainees on the construction
crews have been deprived of safety equipment that is regularly issued to
other workers. Finally, one trainee was convinced by his supervisor and
coworkers that he should resign because of his failure to come to work.
He had taken two days' leave without permission; however the absence was
due to the unexpected birth of his child.
Cablevision management has refused to consider promoting any of the
trainees to the supervisor vacancies that have appeared, even though,
according to the Restoration training coordinator, many of them have
demonstrated supervisory capabilities. This refusal violates the intent
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of the original agreement which was directed toward producing some super-
visors from Bedford Stuyvesant who could help manage the cable hook-ups in
Brooklyn.
In addition, Cablevision has refused to replace the original crew of
workers who resigned or were fired during the first months of the program.
Again this is inconsistent with the terms of the original agreement which
stipulated that 15 positions would be available for Restoration-referred
employees.
In contrast to the first series of problems that arose during the
training project, this set of difficulties has proved to be relatively
intractable. The Restoration training coordinator has found it difficult
to make any headway in resolving these issues largely because Restoration's
leverage over Cablevision has declined. In part this is because
Restoration's political influence with the municipal government has proven to
be much weaker than Cablevision had envisaged. Thus Cablevision does not
feel as though it has anything to lose by damaging its relationship with
Restoration. In fact Cablevision is currently considering legal action to
reduce Restoration's share in the limited partnership agreement from the
9% level originally assented to in the contract. Cablevision has worked
out the basic terms of its franchise agreement with the city so that what-
ever political influence Restoration still exercizes is less useful to the
firm.
Restoration's leverage over Cablevision proved to be rather precarious
given the agency's unstable position in local political coalitions and the
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firm's limited needs for lobbying assistance. But in the end it was
really the CDC's financial crisis which paralyzed the training coordi-
nator in his attempt to address the trainee's difficulties. All of the
attention of Restoration's top management is currently focused on filling
the agency's large budget gap.
If the dispute only revolved around the future of the 7 -15 trainees
involved in the current phase of the program then the breakdown in negotia-
tions would be less significant. However, the fate of these initial
trainees may determine the rate at which Bedford Stuyvesant residents can
be hired when the expansion phase occurs. The similarity in racial back-
grounds between the trained Bedford Stuyvesant workers hired in phase one
and the hundreds of workers needed during the Brooklyn expansion would
facilitate the training process. The comparability in backgrounds would
have helped the trainees hired in the second phase transcend
the problems confronted by the initial crew of Bedford Stuyvesant workers.
They would develop skills and acquire social support much more rapidly.
In the absence of such an arrangement it is unclear whether Cablevision
will be able to hire workers from the Bedford Stuyvesant community to
execute this phase of the project.
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Addressing Labor and Capital Segmentation: Implications of
Restoration's Experience
The history of Restoration's development efforts highlights the problems
CDCs face when they try to address labor and capital market segmentation.
The case study reveals the formidible obstacles confronted by unskilled
minority workers who attempt to penetrate a primary sector firm with an
all white labor force. The case also indicates the difficulties involved
in providing financial assistance to firms whose high variance risk levels
or anonymity has isolated them from private capital markets. Finally the
genesis of Restoration's development programs shed light on the strengths
and weaknesses, benefits and dangers associated with linking financial
and labor market intermediation.
A different set of dilemmas confronted Restoration during each of two
principal chapters of its existence. During the early years, Restoration
was blessed with a generous federal funding source which supported the
CDC's policy of employing a broad range of criteria in assessing business
ventures. Moreover the agency was encouraged in its efforts to marry
labor and financial intermediation.
However this "reform" period was also characterized by a confluence
of administrative and political pressures to spend funds quickly. In the
final analysis it was this latter objective which undermined Restoration's
ability and will to use development finance resources to enhance the
training opportunities available to local residents.
In contrast, during the second chapter of Restoration's existence,
the CDC encountered increasingly strident demands to narrow its investment
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criteria. These demands were accompanied by a radical reduction in the
level of public funds granted to the Corporation. These two forces sharply
constrained the agency's ability to address financial segmentation through
risk taking or the subsidization of information dissemination. They also
made it more difficult to develop comprehensive programs to assist
secondary workers obtain primary sector jobs and thereby reduce labor
market segmentation. In spite of these trends, Restoration did manage to
re-establish a program that linked its development finance role in a
constructive fashion with its labor intermediation functions.
During the first five years of Restoration's existence, when the
Training Credits and Economic Development Loan programs were at their
height, the agency was obligated to maintain a high rate of program
expenditure. These pressures impaired the agency's ability to address
financial market segmentation in a manner that was consistent with its
labor market goals of creating higher quality employment and training
opportunities for local residents.
It is true that the funds were targeted to local minority
entrepeneurs, an objective which in itself tends to focus resources on
firms with poor access to capital markets. As noted in Section III,
minority entrepeneurs have trouble raising capital because of pure
racial prejudices, narrow social networks and an inability to communicate
with personnel employed by financial intermediaries.
Moreover, the liberal funding environment allowed Restoration to
finance firms whose variance risk was unacceptably high as far as private
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FIs are concerned. Since most individual CDCs, Restoration included, had
undiversified portfolios, the only way they could bear these high variance
risks was if Washington functioned as a "collective diversifying agent."
By compensating the CDCs whose projects failed due to the realizationcd
downside unsystematic risks, the federal government would serve as an
insurer of portfolios. In this manner all of the CDC's portfolio would
merge in effect, diversifying away the unsystematic risks embedded in each
of them individually.
Thus Restoration was encouraged to deal with two important imperfec-
tions that plague financial markets: discriminatory financing criteria
and excessive risk aversion. However, as argued above, to address finan-
cial market imperfections without exacerbating labor market segmentation,
it is useful to acquire, analyze and disseminate detailed information on
potentially viable ventures, focusing financial assistance on ventures
whose anonymity rather than high variance risks or instability cuts them
off from private FIs.
It is apparent, however, from both the records of the Economic Develop-
ment Loan program and various interviews with Restoration personnel that
Restoration's lending officers did not feel that they had time to do an
extensive analysis of the operations of each of the borrowers' strengths
and weaknesses.
The time constraints imposed on Restoration's loan officers and the
concomitant high rate of defaults gave rise to a series of problems that
put the program in grave jeopardy. The growing chorus of critics who
emerged within and outside of the agency viewed the defaults as a
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reflection of Restoration's lack of business acumen or of its patronistic
orientation. Moreover the defaults directly undercut the flow of funds
that were re-channeled into the program. Finally, staff concerned with
employment stability were critical of the loan program because it created
so many businesses which had very short life spans.
The Training Credits program is a good example of how coordinating
training and development finance roles can result in the weakening of
the former function. A defacto form of coordination was achieved which
undercut the program's original linkage goals. The program's designers had
viewed the financial subsidization of the firm as a means for developing a
training program. Instead the training subsidies became the means to
improve the financial health of the borrowers. The reversal in the
program's aims resulted from the institutional power possessed by the
Economic Development office and the importance the organization placed on
the default reduction goals.
The fiscal and political constraints that impinged on Restoration
during the development of the Commercial Center were quite different from
those in force during the earliest chapter of its history, Washington was
sending signals to all of the Title VII CDCs indicating that it would only
approve firms which could reach break-even fairly quickly.
But the most important factor in this period that deterred the corpo-
ration from assisting firms with poor access to capital markets was the
need to attract enterprises with high bond ratings to the Commercial Center.
Restoration's lack of permanent construction financing compelled the
agency to employ conventional criteria in selecting the Center's tenants.
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Unless Restoration adopted the methodology of private financial intermedi-
aries in its lessee selection process it was unlikely to raise funds from
these sources. It is conceivable that Restoration might have developed
new information on some local entrepeneurs' commercial ventures that could
be used to shape the way these firms were assessed by financial institu-
tions. But this option was foreclosed once construction was well under
way. Finding it had to quickly refinance a multi-million dollar project,
Restoration chose tenants that would be initially perceived as creditworthy
enterprises.
Restoration was able to use its financial participation in the Cable-
vision project as a tool to formulate a strategy to expand training
opportunities for local residents. This is a prototypical form of linkage.
Although its influence over Cablevision was shortlived because of its
political nature, the agency was able to use this leverage to improve its
own understanding of the problems faced by the Cablevision trainees and
induce the firm's management to adopt the initial recommendations for
corrective action.
Retoration's analysis of the trainee's problems was very acute,
reflecting a detailed understanding of the economic and social roles
performed by the Cablevision coworkers. Restoration discovered how the
Cablevision white workers withheld their knowledge of the production
process; to employ the language introduced in Section IV, the trainess
were deprived of informal intermediation in the internal labor market. The
genesis of the Cablevision training program indicates how public agencies
might try to address minority employees' difficulties in adapting to the
productive, social, and organizational structure of A firm.
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The restructuring of supervisory incentives was an important first
step in improving the trainees' access to informal OJT. However, conflicts
persisted even after the quota was revised. The tension between the two
racial groups was deep rooted, perhaps reflecting the white workers' fears
of displacement or the degredation of their occupational status. It was
not enough to give the older workers the option to provide training since
they perceived the Bedford Stuyvesant workers as a threat to their job
security, status and the career ladders in place within the firm. Thus
they had an interest in ensuring that the participants were unable to
retain their jobs.
Restoration dealt with these problems by formalizing the training program
and then providing counseling services to the trainees. The formal
training curriculum succeeded in increasing the new participants' indepen-
dence from the older workers, providing an alternative means of obtaining
skills in addition to informal OJT. The counseling service allowed Diaz
to identify tensions and disagreements before they manifested themselves
in full blown conflicts. More importantly, it enhanced the esprit de corps
among the trainees, providing a source of emotional support that was needed
in the absence of positive relations between the trainees and the bulk
of the Cablevision work force.
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In sum, the Restoration case study demonstrates that there are a
variety of ways labor and financial intermediation can be linked. From the
standpoint of the segmentation theories presented in this paper some of
these linkage outcomes are decidedly less attractive than others. Restora-
tion linked the two intermediation functions during the training credits
program but only in a fashion which perverted the original mobility goals
of the program. During the Cablevision experiment Restoration revived
its linkage efforts and succeeded in making some headway in addressing
labor segmentation through a small pilot program.
Restoration's difficulty in following through with strategies to
ameliorate factor market segmentation arose in the first instance from
federal pressure to spend quickly and, in the second, from federal cutbacks
and demands to achieve fiscal independence. Both of these environments,
representing polar-opposite political configurations, proved to be counter-
productive insofar as a reduction in factor market segmentation is concerned.
The lack of financial autonomy can increase the degree to which a
development agency is compelled to adopt the investment criteria of private
financial intermediaries. During the development of the Commercial Center
this was demonstrated through Restoration's perceived obligation to cream
tenants for the complex. Restoration's ability to absorb financial risks
and subsidize the generation and dissemination of information about new
ventures has been radically compromised by the recent funding cuts.
Screening and information dissemination services which can reduce
information barriers in capital markets carry a substantial price tag.
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Although there may be some room for profit-maximizing activities in a
campaign to reduce financial market segmentation,32 this solution has a
limited application. Given the delining marginal cost of information dis-
semination, this function can only be performed efficiently if it is subsi-
dized. To the extent that CDCs find it desirable to compensate for excessive
risk aversion in the private sector, they cannot afford to bear these
risks themselves unless their funding source acts as a collective diversi-
fying agent.
Lack of financial independence also prevents CDCs from addressing
labor market segmentation. Clearly, if a development agency must depend
entirely on project income for its future revenue stream, it will not be
able to favor projects with low profits and high social returns, decrease
dependence on welfare, ameliorate labor bottlenecks, or create a more
equitable distribution of jobs and income. Often it is necessary to offer
interest, tax, or wage subsidies as an incentive to develop employment and
training opportunities that are conducive to the integration of secondary
workers into the primary sector.
In addition, development agencies must collect special information
to identify which ventures lend themselves to such a plan. Although some
of the information required to assess private production plans or to
develop alternative training proposals is collected during the course of a
normal financing evaluation of a venture, other essential pieces of data
require an independent effort, an. effort that must be subsidized with
public funds. Financial weakness also prevents a development agency from
intervening after start-up to improve the OJT process, resolve inter-
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racial disputes, or induce management to utilize the firm's career
ladders.
There are many institutional, political and economic problems that a
development agency must confront when it attempts to coordinate inter-
mediation in the two factor markets. This is clearly demonstrated by the
history of Restoration's development programs. To convince public
officials that coordination is a worthy objective one must develop a
fairly compelling rationale.
Although part of this rationale has been described in the conclusion
of Chapter IV, the argument presented there focused largely on the inter-
dependence of the ends of factor market intermediation. However, this
linkage of policy goals does not necessarily require the actual
institutional merging of intermediation functions.
To see why this day-to-day coordination is necessary one must also
elaborate the relation between the means employed by labor and capital
intermediaries in the public sector. Restoration's experience highlights
some of the costs and benefits involved in such an effort. It is now
necessary to outline more systematically the strengths and weaknesses,
dangers and opportunities that derive from coupling interventions in the
two factor markets.
CHAPTER VI
LINKING CAPITAL AND
LABOR MARKET INTERVENTIONS:
SYNERGIES AND IMPEDIMENTS
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Introduction
A broad array of public officials and private researchers have
urged development finance and manpower agencies to coordinate their efforts.1
But many of these advocates have not provided a detailed explanation of
why coordination is an important goal. In part, the absence of analytical
policy analysis in this area is attributable to the intuitive logic behind
linking job development and training activities.
The widespread commitment to coordination also reflects the fact
that it is a fairly innocuous goal: pursuing this objective does not
necessarily involve the creation of whole new forms of public intervention
but only the consolidation and rationalization of existing programs.
Moreover, it is a goal which draws a broad mix of supporters with varying
ideological commitments. Conservatives, liberals, and radicals are all
critical of bureaucracies which pursue their own parochial goals in de-
fiance of local needs, values, institutions, or the objectives of other
public bureaucracies.
Finally, coordination is frequently adopted as a goal because of
the perceived complexity of social problems although even this justifica-
tion often conceals other hidden agendas. In the 1960's, antipoverty
programs emphasized the need to address many of the physical, political,
social and economic problems of low income citizens simultaneously.
212
Frequently this strategy was the product of a compromise among various
groups and agencies which had different interests, programs, and political
goals and found coordination to be an uncontroversial common ground. In
other cases the goal was endorsed because it gave power to local leaders
or directors of new federal agencies who found a source of legitimation
in the role of coordinator.2
Although coordination of public agencies has broad support as a
general goal and is nominally pursued by a large number of governmental
organizations, itis a very difficult objective to realize. Thus it should
not be treated casually by those who endorse it. A compelling justifica-
tion for the linkage position is needed before a large amount of
resources are devoted to carrying it out. Political executives can
easily find all of their energies consumed trying to placate the staff
of agencies who view real coordination as a threat to their autonomy.3
Moreover, given the pervasiveness of short term crisis management in
public agencies it is very difficult to shift to the relatively lengthy
planning horizon that is required when organizations try to mutually co-
ordinate their actions.4 Sometimes coordination conflicts with other
important goals like fostering more client participation, or making
organizations more flexible and responsive to changing needs.5 Thus the
rationale for accepting this aim must be very compelling before it is
pursued actively.
Labor and financial interventions need to be coordinated for a
great variety of reasons. However, the two principal rationales pertain
to the ends and means of public policy: the goals of reducing segmentation
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in the two factor markets are dynamically related; secondly, the
strategies and institutional mechanisms in which the interventions are
embodied are quite similar and complementary.
The factor market policy agenda that was examined in this thesis
is the amelioration of segmentation. In the labor market this objective
involves assisting disadvantaged workers obtain and retain jobs with
training and promotional opportunities. It also requires public develop-
ment agencies to increase the aggregate number of higher quality jobs,
or, at minimum, avoid increasing the size of the secondary sector at the
expense of the primary.
In the capital market, a segmentation reduction program is aimed
at facilitating the flow of financial resources into small firms whose
anonymity or unstable earnings prevent them from gaining access to private
financial intermediaries.
These objectives are not always consistent. In particular,
heightening the instability of employment by financing high risk firms
may exacerbate labor market segmentation. A risky firm is likely to be
one with large oscillations in its demand for labor. Perturbations in
labor demand reduce firms' ability and incentive to provide meaningful
training opportunities to unskilled workers.
In Chapter IV it was argued that one means of reconciling the
labor and capital market agenda is to focus public assistance on those
firms impeded by imperfect information dissemination systems rather than
those inhibited by excessive risk aversion.
On the other hand, although excessive risk aversion does limit
the number of unstable employment opportunities, development agencies
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must still be concerned about its impact on the aggregate employment level.
Small dynamic young firms may have considerable job and innovation gene-
rating capabilities. Though by no means inevitable, the creation of new
jobs can help secondary workers by widening the array of employment
options or simply reducing the length of their unemployment spells.
The need for goal linkage is clear when development agencies must
choose between these competing aims. The policy mix must reflect a care-
ful recognition of the costs and benefits associated with each segmentation
reduction strategy. Policy analysts can attempt to focus their efforts
on those sectors where the two sets of development goals are compatible
but they will ultimately find that some prioritization of economic ob-
jectives is necessary. In the final analysis this prioritization schema
can only be legitimately defined by disadvantaged workers themselves,
whose unemployment and lack of access to training opportunities provide
the most compelling justifications for factor market interventions.
Aside from this interdependence in the aims of public policy,
there is also a close connection between the strategies and institutional
mechanisms employed to reduce factor market segmentation. Both types of
intermediaries must collect a vast amount of economic intelligence. In-
deed one of the principal market failures they should address is the
limitations in private intermediaries' collection and transmission of
information.
Public finance entities must develop high quality data on
relatively unknown firms, assessing their technologies, market potential,
the viability of their management team, as well as all the other
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conventional elements of a business plan. However, these are precisely
the types of facts that a labor market intermediary should obtain in order
to determine whether a firm can provide valuable on-the-job training.
Most intermediaries develop a special rapport with their clients
which gives the former exclusive access to valuable information as well as
a great deal of economic leverage. Sometimes neither an LI nor an FI
in isolation possess sufficient influence over a firm to convince
management to accept either of their recommendations. However, if they
work together, intermediaries can use the combined weight of financial
and training resources to compel managers to revise their production
plans in a socially beneficial manner. In this way development agents
can reduce segmentation and maximize other public goods.
Information and leverage are useful both before and after a
venture is initiated. Often a training program falters in the initial
phases of a project. In other cases a firm experiences financial
difficulties that threaten to vitiate the social and economic benefits
generated by the enterprise. Consequently, it is necessary to use
the knowledge, resources and influence of both labor and financial
intermediaries to resolve these issues.
In this chapter I will attempt to elaborate why the coordination
of development finance and labor market intermediariation is a useful
objective. Throughout most of what follows I will assume that the
principal policy agenda is to reduce factor market segmentation. How-
ever, many of the arguments regarding the costs and benefits of
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coordinating these two intermediation functions will apply to public
agencies that have completely different policy goals.
Next I will attempt to clarify the need for linkage by focusing
on the sequential stages of a development program. This analysis of the
process of intermediation is useful both because it differentiates between
the means/ends justifications for linkage and because it captures some of
the substantive content of the actual tasks performed by intermediaries.
In each case I will try to highlight not only the advantages of marrying
these two functions but also the dangers and obstacles that emerge in
pursuing linkages.
Finally, a very brief summary of the major rationales for co-
ordinating labor and capital market intermediation is provided at the end
of the chapter.
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There are five major phases of intermediaries' involvement in any
development program. During each of these phases labor and financial
market intermediation should be coordinated. The exigency of a linkage
policy arises out of the peculiar functions performed in each of these
stages. The stages consist of the following activities:
1) Setting basic development goals.
2) Developing long term plans and targeting specific industries
and firms,
3) Negotiating the terms of a venture with other participants.
4) Monitoring and exercising control over the venture.
5) Exiting from the venture and facilitating the transfer of
workers and capital to other firms.
Goal Setting
The first task of a public intermediary should be to define its
economic and social mission. The importance of coordinating labor and
financial intermediation goals has been explored at length above and in
Chapter IV. I will summarize the principal arguments and then turn to
an analysis of the obstacles that impede these institutions from formulat-
ing a consistent development agenda.
Coordination of the aims of public agencies that intervene in
labor and capital markets is necessary because their objectives are often
in conflict. This is particularly true of development programs engaged
in ameliorating factor market segmentation. Public intermediaries must
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weigh the relative benefits to be reaped from reducing financial as opposed
to labor market segmentation.
Where small firms financing problems stem principally from basic
flaws in information dissemination mechanisms, the two objectives can be
reconciled. However, when the main segmenting force in a capital market
is the excessive risk aversion of investors, the tension between the two
sets of goals are likely to be significant.
Using the language of the neoclassical paradigm, investment cri-
teria should not only reflect conventional rate of return and systematic
risk considerations but should also account for both the positive and
negative "externalities" generated by firms. The costs of relegating a
class of workers to unstable dead-end jobs, forcing them on and off public
assistance programs, draining the resources of publically sponsored job
referral programs and exacerbating labor bottlenecks are quite high but
are not reflected in the expenses of secondary firms. On the other hand
these costs must also be weighed against some secondary firm's ability to
generate large numbers of jobs and develop new technologies. These social
benefits are also insufficiently internalized by private investors. The
fact that these two types of externalities offset each other does not
vitiate the rationale behind creating a public FI since it is unlikely that
the social costs and benefits are exactly equal.
It is necessary for public intermediaries to pursue a common set
of goals in order to project a consistent message to the business
community. Unless there exists a fairly uniform stream of signals emitted
by public agencies, managers and potential entrepreneurs will be confused
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as to how they can expect to obtain the most valuable forms of subsidies,
loan guarantees, procurement contracts, etc.
If public FI's and LI's do not succeed in cooperating they will
reduce their aggregate impact on the economy. When an LI develops
counseling and OJT wage subsidy programs that are tailored to large pri-
mary sector businesses, these resources will be inefficiently utilized
unless a public FI seeks to attract and retain such firms. The problems
associated with integrating disadvantaged workers into these enterprises
are fairly unique and call for a distinct institutional response.
Counselors and labor market analysts must familiarize themselves with the
recruitment and training policies of these firms as well as the referral
role and perceived economic interests of their unions.*
Conversely if a public FI is committed to creating a large number
of jobs by financing a variety of small unstable firms, LI's should
attempt to mitigate the impact of the concomitant employment instability.
As suggested above, LI's can develop a set of re-training and upgrading
programs that cut across firms. By filling the gaps in career ladders
erected between and among a cluster of ventures, the LI can partially
compensate for the perturbations in labor demands. Hence, goal coordina-
tion is needed because FI's and LI's have resources that can be used
synergistically when they formulate a consistent and coherent agenda.
Many public labor and financial intermediaries find it difficult
to coordinate because their managers embrace quite distinct world views.6
*This point will be elaborated below when the negotiation phase
of a development program is examined.
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Public FI's are often convinced that any major public intervention in the
affairs of a business--any additional "red tape" imposed on local firms--
will scare investors away from the region. As noted above in Chapter II,
this is partially due to the lack of precedents for intervention among
development planners. The lack of precedents, in turn, is attributable
to a fairly accurate diagnosis of the fiercely self-assertive ideology of
American industrial management.
As Reich points out this independent posture does not manifest it-
self in managers' opposition to all forms of public economic intervention:
most industries are eager to obtain protection and subsidies in the form
of tariff barriers, low interest loans, loan guarantees, price supports,
etc. Thus the laissez-faire rhetoric of American managers is somewhat
misleading. The central commitment that lies at the core of this value
system is the goal of maintaining managerial discretion.
Part of the discrepancy in the world views of public FI's and
LI's is simply that the former accept the legitimacy of managerial dis-
cretion while the latter do not.8 However, the conflict is often con-
siderably more complex. The leadership of FI's tend to view the economy
as offering little scope for public intervention. Particularly in
distressed regions where there is a rapid outmigration of population and
economic activity, development managers perceive only a very narrow range
of options.9 Typically the choice is seen as simply offering a wide array
of incentives that can slow the disinvestment trend or not taking any
action at all. Public FI's are reticent to tie incentives to any quid
pro quos relating to environmental concerns, job generation, or
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recruitment and training policies. It is feared that such demands will
neutralize the attraction of the public subsidies.
LI's are not always more eager to intervene in the affairs of a
firm. However, most manpower agencies are principally concerned with the
placement and retention of their clients, many of whom are disadvantaged
workers. Many other manpower agencies seek to ensure that these workers
secure relatively meaningful training and promotional opportunities.
This "client-based" commitment fosters an interest in the actual internal
operations of a firm. Moreover, some personnel working in manpower
agencies have succeeded in negotiating a change in a firm's recruitment
and training policies. This experience may lead them to adopt an economic
model that offers considerably more room to maneuver.11 In this sense the
development visions of labor and financial intermediaries are in tension.
The dissonance of the world views embraced by the leaders of
financial and labor market intermediaries makes it difficult for them to
communicate with one another. Subscribing to somewhat different economic
frameworks, they can not always agree on the significance or ramifications
of specific policy interventions.
Moreover, since the institutional. cultures of the two organiza-
tions reflect these disparate "maps of the world," it is insufficient to
simply secure a formal agreement that stipulates how programs will be
coordinated in the future. 12
The literature on the linkage issue clearly shows that success in
coordination requires cooperation and commitment from not only the leader-
13
ship but also the staff of financial and labor imtermediaries. Unless
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the staff from each organization who are "matrixed," outstationed and/or
placed on joint planning committees can communicate with their counterparts,
a successful linkage effort is not likely to occur.
The importance of world views is reflected in the relative success
experienced by Private Industry Councils (PIC's) in establishing a rapport
with public FI's. The PIC's were created in one of the final revisions of
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). This legislation
and subsequent provisions embedded in the recent Job Training Partnership
Act, delegate a large measure of administrative responsibilities for local
manpower programs to representatives of local firms. Thus PIC's are
managed by personnel who are quite sympathetic to the autonomy concerns of
private industry. Many FI's have found in their local PIC's, a corp of
staff with whom they can communicate and work out a mutually agreeable
14
development program.
One clear danger of this trend is the subordination of the re-
cruitment and training objectives discussed in Chapters I and II, to the
aims of private industry and/or public development finance agencies. 15
Coordination is not a value neutral exercise. Fundamental social goals
come into conflict in any linkage effort, particularly in this first phase
when a basic agenda is being negotiated.
Ironically even when the major political actors fully endorse the
goal of reducing labor market segmentation, this objective can be sub-
merged by financial intermediaries. This was demonstrated clearly by the
early history of Restoration's Training Credits program.
The importance of reaching an accord among the staff who actually
carry out a development program is explored somewhat more below. One
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must analyze the specific linkages that can be achieved during the
implementation process to appreciate the full significance of this issue:
the critical point is simply that the economic values, and models embraced
by the main players in any development program can frustrate attempts to
formulate a consistent agenda.
This is intuitively clear when one recognizes the range of policy
goals that must be assessed. Notwithstanding the arguments presented
above regarding the importance of helping secondary workers obtain and
retain sector jobs, regions with a high rate of job loss should attempt to
increase the sheer number of employment opportunities.
There is no objective way to assign weights to these competing
objectives. In the final analysis a decision should be made that reflects
the needs and desires of disadvantaged workers themselves. This is
probably best achieved in some democratic fashion. The problem of defining
a basic agenda is one of the most compelling justifications for creating
participatory mechanisms which engage the residents of distressed com-
munities in the affairs of development agencies. The beneficiaries of the
intermediary can make the most legitimate choice between the goals of
'more or better" jobs.
Long Term Planning and Targeting
Specific Industries
The second phase of a development project involves targeting re-
sources to specific industries and firms. A sophisticated economic
analysis is required to carry out this mission successfully. The
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complexity of the issues involved in this screening process are often too
great to obtain definitive answers regarding the economic effects of
assisting a specific industry. However, public intermediaries must none-
theless attempt to operationalize their goals by making such assessments.
This essay has examined many different criteria for selecting in-
dustries to participate in a development program. Among the most important
firm-screening considerations discussed above are:
1) The opportunities for training and advancement offered by a
venture and the impact of the business on other firm's ability
to provide stable jobs with career ladders.
2) The number of jobs and innovations that are likely to be genera-
ted by a venture, and the impact of the business on other
enterprises technological initiative and employment.
3) The financial return on public capital invested in the firm.
The first criteria is one that labor market intermediaries often use
in selecting firms to participate in a subsidized on-the-job training
effort. 6  The second two criteria are used by many development financial
entities in selecting businesses to assist. Firms' employment levels
are analyzed somewhat more frequently than their innovative potentials,
but even the former assessment typically focuses on the direct, rather
than the indirect or induced impacts.-18 Few development finance entities
evaluate the displacement issue.
Regardless of how sophisticated the methodology employed, these three
types of evaluations share a great deal in common. Each of them require
a great deal of information on a venture including its:
a) technology
b) markets and competition
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c) timing of development
d) organizational structure and culture, and
e) labor force requirements.
The extent of the overlap in data needs is made clear by elaborating
why each of these five features of a venture are critical determinants of
the training, job growth, and financial concerns listed above. This
elaboration is provided in Appendix A.
Good information on particular industries can be very expensive and
difficult to obtain. Formal industry surveys can cost several thousand
dollars. Individual firms are reticent to provide information on their
technologies, organizational structure and investment plans because of
their proprietary concerns or their conflicts with unions and public
regulatory agencies. Thus it is particularly important that those public
agencies who have access to any of this valuable information share it with
other agencies.
Public FI's tend to have access to more industrial information than
do LI's because of the former's larger resources, legal independence, and
prescribed functions. 19
First and foremost, a public FI can demand a detailed business plan
from all the firms involved in a development project before any final in-
vestment decision is made. This document describes each of the five
critical features of a firm and industry described above. (However, some-
times it is manipulated to paint a distorted picture of a venture: e.g.
larger number of jobs, lower profit rate, etc.)
Secondly, their legal autonomy and financial resources give public
Fl's access to the services of consultants. Many consultants are happy to
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provide a great deal of free information in the hopes of securing a
contract some time in the future. Since there is a low marginal cost to
sharing information that they have already compiled for another client,
consultants can serve as a very inexpensive source of data. FI's must,
however, offer sizeable contracts to periodically sustain their interest.
Thirdly, manufacturers of machinery and equipment are often willing
to provide information to public FI's when the latter are involved in the
design, financing, or marketing of a major new venture. These firms are
quite familiar with the lay out, production techniques, staffing structures,
procurement needs inventory, control systems, packaging, and shipping
process of the industries they serve. Thus access to just a bit of their
time can be very instructive to FI's who carry out financial feasibility
and input/output analysis and LI's who assess the training and promotional
structure of an industry.
Fourthly, trade associations often serve as the link between the pub-
lic and private sectors. They are aware of the industry's more global
interests and usually take the lead in lobbying campaigns for public
support. Public FI's frequently provide, or facilitate the provision of
this support (e.g. low interest loans, inter-governmental assistance in
obtaining tariff protection, infrastructure assistance, and R&D grants).
Hence, public financial intermediaries requiring data on an industry can
secure guidance from trade association representatives. These repre-
sentatives can offer an excellent overview of the industry and refer a
development agency to particular firms or consultants with expertise in
special areas.
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Public LI's, though considerably less well informed than FI's, do
have access to a great deal of useful data.20 Since most manpower agencies
were compelled to develop annual and master plans under the old CETA
program they have a rich array of employment information. They also have
special access to information systems funded through the Department of
Labor which details the training and labor force needs of specific in-
dustries. Finally they are intimately familiar with the educational and
training infrastructure of a region. As indicated in the Appendix these
types of data are all useful in carrying out a financial feasibility
analysis, technological assessment, and job generation projections.
Thus, in sum, public FI's and LI's can obtain information which is
of mutual interest to both of them. FI's have access to considerably
more data because of their legal autonomy and prescribed functions, so
it is particularly important that they share their information base with
LI's.
It is possible that the analysts employed by a public FI will analyze
not only the job generation and financial sides of a venture but also
its impact on labor market segmentation and local training opportunities.
However, few development agencies employ staff with this array of skills
or concerns. Moreover, if the FI employs any labor analysts they usually
play a minor role in the agency. Concerns about labor issues are usually
voiced in long term development plans or studies but are often ignored
during the venture evaluation phase. Many ventures are evaluated ex-
clusively on the basis of their financial viability.
Although widening the scope of any venture evaluation is largely a
political issue, requiring the commitment of the agencies directors and
any political bodies to which they are accountable, it is also an
objective which requires excellent planning and internal organizational
controls. Even agencies with progressive executives find the joint evalu-
ation of ventures on financial and social grounds an elusive goal.
Financial and marketing analysts often wield the most influence in a
development agency because the organization's survival often hinges on
their actions. In addition, these staff often have the most extensive
contacts with powerful third parties. They have strong ties with repre-
sentatives of firms or other public and private FI's interested in in-
vesting in local ventures. Without their participation it would be
difficult to foster any development in an area.
As noted above, financial analysts frequently do not share the same
skills or objectives as those of labor market analysts; thus conflicts
between the two groups arise as a matter of course. Sometimes agency
directors can manage these conflicts and can at least achieve reasonable
compromises with regard to basic goals or to long term planning strategies.
But it is more difficult for a director to ensure on a day-to-day basis,
that reasonable agreements regarding specific ventures are worked out and
vital information exchanged.
The problem is even more accute when two distinct organizations are
responsible for the labor and financial functions, as is the case in most
states and many cities. Frequently a department of employment is respon-
sible for developing broad labor policies and training programs while a
public financial intermediary takes the lead in designing and implementing
economic development projects. In this case, the conflicts in goals,
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political constituencies, and style of operation are heightened and a
good working relationship is more difficult to achieve and maintain.2 1
Negotiating With Management and Unions
The third phase of venture development requiring coordination between
LI's and FI's are the negotiations relating to the terms of public
financial support, permit approvals and zoning changes. Among the issues
that is likely to generate the most heated debates between public financial
and labor market intermediaries is the amount of pressure that should be
applied on a private firm to change its production strategy in accordance
with public development goals.
To be successful in this stage of a venture the public intermediary
must convince private investors and the other major participants that the
former's development plan is both a) economically viable, given each of
their respective interests, and b) politically necessary, given the views
of the development agency's political constituency. 22
For instance, management and union heads often need to be convinced
to employ more disadvantaged workers in jobs re-designed to facilitate
training. The resources of both FI's and LI's must be applied to this
task. An intimate knowledge of the history of the industry's labor
relations, how labor has been recruited and trained in the past and the
value of public permits and subsidies is required to confront these
issues; thus the expertise of both financial and labor market analysts
will be quite useful.
Financial analysts must demonstrate that any decline in the return
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on investment fostered by a re-structuring of the venture, is small and
can easily be absorbed by stockholders. The full leverage of all public
financial and training resources must be applied to gain approval from
the principals. Financial analysts should determine whether an expansion
in public subsidies is required to compensate investors for any losses
they will sustain as a result of the restructuring of the new venture.
Few if any of these losses need be compensated if a) the revised project
surpasses the investors true hurdle rates and b) management needs public
zoning or franchise approvals to implement the venture.
It is also necessary to convince union leaders to accept the pro-
posed recruitment and training plan of a venture. Union members and
executives may be threatened by attempts to hire and train minority dis-
advantaged workers. As noted above, these perceived threats may reflect
the older workers' overt racism or the fear that providing secondary
workers with access to jobs in their industry and occupation will impair
their job security and promotional opportunities or that of their family
and friends. Finally union leaders sometimes must worry that a new
demographic group will elect different stewards and presidents to repre-
sent them in the collective bargaining process.
To convince the union representative to accede to the training
demands one must demonstrate that public approval of the venture is
required to make the project viable. Again the major levers are financial
subsidies, but zoning and training contracts are also useful. It may
be helpful to first get management to accept the training proposals and
then convince them to discuss these plans with union representatives.
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An analysis of the labor history of the industry must also be
completed to determine how the demands will be perceived by the union.
If membership has dropped recently because of shifts in the local in-
dustrial structure the union leaders may be more amenable to the public
demands. Assuming the new trainees will join the union, the leadership
may be convinced that the public subsidies are required to save their
industry. However, if there is an ongoing history of racial strife in
the union and the current leadership represents a coalition of the most
intransigent union members, then the program will be viewed as more
threatening.
The timing of negotiations with both management and labor is also
critical. Clearly, if any of the representatives of the development
agency ever imply that the approval of the public subsidies or permits
is a "fait accompli" the room for future negotiation is eliminated. This
point is illustrated by the history of one recent project in New York City.
The Economic Capital Corporation, a development finance entity in
New York recently provided financing for the Intrepid museum in exchange
for an agreement by management that most of the museum's jobs would be
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filled by disadvantaged workers referred through the city's manpower agency.
The Intrepid, a retired aircraft carrier permanently stationed on a New
York City pier, was converted into a public museum using an Urban Develop-
ment Action Grant issued by the federal government.
Unfortunately, ECC neglected to consult the ILA, the union that ex-
pected to have jurisdiction and recruitment authority over the project.
When the museum began operations, a major conflict arose between the
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manpower agency, local community groups and the ILA, each of which had
been convinced that they had recruitment rights to the venture's jobs.
The ILA eventually succeeded in gaining full authority over the recruit-
ment process. This outcome was the result of many factors including
pressures from the museum's management to minimize any delay in start-up,
a fairly weak public commitment to recruitment and training of disadvantaged
workers, and the extensive political clout of the union.
According to the vice president of the manpower agency, a middle
ground might have been reached had ECC negotiated with the union prior to
the initiation of the project. If this had been done a compromise might
have been reached which allocated some of the job vacancies to the man-
power referral agency and others to the union hiring hall. Alternatively
the union could have been given the right to fill all of the positions,
but required to give special preference to low income workers who have
been unemployed for an extended period. ECC should have claimed that the
public Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG), which was critical to the
venture's success, was contingent upon some compromise. However, once
the loan was approved there was little leverage that could be exercised
by the city.
All of the participants in a project must be convinced that the
public development agency is serious about its proposals for re-structuring
the venture prior to the granting of any public approvals. At minimum,
this will require developing a political argument and possibly a diverse
coalition of supporters. In effect, the development agency must demon-
strate that its political leadership and constituencies are so committed
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to the public elements of the venture that the latter are willing to risk
losing the entire project to ensure that these features are adopted. The
private investors and union officials must be convinced that their
threats to walk away from the deal will not succeed in compelling the
public agency to drop all of its demands. Sometimes this can be done by
mobilizing grass roots support for the development agency's recommendations.
This political mobilization can occur either directly under the leader-
ship of the public intermediary, or indirectly by inciting community
leaders to organize with seemingly unintended leaks of the private firms'
development plans.
Sometimes a development agency can use its own political resources
as leverage to secure a favorable agreement from a venture's management.
Restoration was able to exploit its city-wide political ties to secure a
modest training and recruitment agreement from Cablevision. The per-
ception of political influence is more critical than its reality. As
Cablevision soon discovered, Restoration was not always a useful ally in
the former's attempt to win the Brooklyn franchise.
In addition, to the residents of the communities that will be
directly affected by the venture, there are other institutions to whom
the intermediary may claim it is beholden. If some of the intermediaries'
resources come from other levels of government or from private foundations
the development officials can assert that these funding sources require
certain social benefits to be generated by its projects.
Indeed, there are often statutory restrictions on the use of
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development funds which provide a legal foundation for these claims.*
Local laws that codify a quid pro quo can also be useful. For
instance Portland passed a landmark statute declaring that all local
development subsidies are contingent on a formal agreement to use the city's
manpower agency for recruitment purposes. Such a mandate simplifies the
strategic bargaining problems faced by a development agency. Other
cities, such as Cincinnati, Fresno and San Antonio have developed somewhat
more flexible requirements.2 4
Post Start-Up Interventions
The fourth stage of venture development requiring some coordination
between labor and financial functions takes place after start-up when the
intermediation services are actually provided. Like any private venture
capitalist, a public FI should monitor the project closely, provide a
great deal of technical assistance and exercise an appreciable amount of
control. In fact ventures conceived by private entrepreneurs should not
be funded unless the latter are willing to share a great deal of infor-
mation and relinquish some control over the enterprise after start-up
occurs. This financing maxim is embraced by most private venture
capitalists.25
*The UDAG loan issues to the Intrepid museum could have served
this purpose. The authorizing legislation of this program dictates that
all projects receiving UDAG funds must benefit low and moderate income
residents an an area. Although this stipulation is typically ignored by
federal compliance officials it still provides a political justification
for development agents who wish to ameliorate labor market segmentation
or create jobs for disadvantaged groups.
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Problems frequently encountered by labor market intermediaries
can be resolved much more quickly, judiciously, and effectively by a
development agency that functions as both an FI and a LI. Firms partici-
pating in training programs often lodge complaints with an LI after a
subsidized OJT project has begun. The three most common complaints are:
* workers referred by the LI are unsuitable for the
jobs in their establishments;
* the supplementary classroom or vocational training
received by workers before or after being assigned
to their permanent work stations is inadequate,
and does not relate directly enough to the firms'
production process; and
* the paper work and reporting requirements required
by the LI is too burdensome.2 6
A development agency which has provided debt or equity capital
to a firm making such complaints is in a better position to evaluate
the validity of each point. By evaluating financial statements,
interviewing a cross-section of the firm's personnel including both
financial managers and the new trainees, and analyzing the actual super-
visory and productive organization of the enterprise as it evolves the
development staff can identify the major reasons trainees are perceived
as unproductive.
If the firm's complaints are justified the recruitment and
classroom training program can be revised accordingly. In some cases
these complaints have no foundation whatsoever. In other cases where
older employees have attempted to prevent the disadvantaged trainees from
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developing skills and retaining their jobs, special corrective actions are
in order. The LI might have to recommend a revision in the firm's incentive
systems, reporting relationships, layout or productive process to facilitate
on-the-job training and encourage cooperation among the various factions in
the work force. The last recourse should be the dismissal of intransigent
workers.
Major changes in production might be necessary to resolve these
conflicts. For instance, if fiscally feasible it might be useful for a
firm to adopt a new technology which requires an intermediate level of
cooperation between disadvantaged and majority work forces. In this case,
financial analysts must demonstrate again that the firms owners will not
sustain an appreciable financial loss as a result of these changes. Like
in the third phase of development when the projects' original structure
was negotiated, the development agency will have to use its full financial
leverage to gain acceptance of these recommendations.
As witnessed in the Restoration case study, a development agency's
political strength can also be useful in resolving these dilemmas. Unfor-
tunately, Restorations political leverage was short-lived: Cablevision
soon realized that the CDC could not exercise an appreciable amount of
influence at the city wide level. Moreover, after Cablevision won the
franchise it no longer had any use for Restoration's political ties.
Staff members of an FI are less likely to be inclined to intervene
in a venture after start-up. In part this is because many of them have
adopted a world view that accepts broad managerial perogatives. However,
when the public development agency's own capital is invested, FI's
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frequently believe that the firm should be left alone to improve its
27
ability to earn a profit.
The history of the Training Credits project made clear that the
officials responsible for development finance functions were reticent to
intervene when managers abused the program. They were not interested in
achieving the program's original training goals. Instead they sought to
maximize the firm's profits by giving it a great deal of discretion over
how the training project was administered. Thus, not only were subsidies
granted to firms that were unwilling and incapable of providing training,
but no effort was made to stop managers who disobeyed the formal rules
regarding hiring local workers.
However this desire to minimize the scope of intervention is often
counter-productive even from the perspective of maximizing the FI's return
on capital. First, the FI should be concerned that a borrower may liquify
the firm and reduce the value of any public investment. But more impor-
tantly, training programs can often be utilized to improve the financial
position of a firm.
Often financial problems are actually manifestations of training
needs. A public LI's ability to design and implement specially tailored
training programs is one of its greatest strengths. In addition it can
often help determine whether additional training is needed by a firm's
employees even when this need is unrecognized by management. If the FI
and LI can quickly diagnose these problems together and develop a new
training program to address them, a major financial crisis can be avoided.
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The following are four examples of financial dilemmas that
reflect training needs:
a) If the firm is having difficulty obtaining supplies at
a specified quantity, quality, and price or if it is
incurring excessive interest expenses on its inven-
tories the public intermediary can provide training
in procurement and inventory control policies.
b) If the firm is having trouble dealing with unexpected
shifts in its cash flow needs, clerks can be taught
how to implement new accounting and management infor-
mation systems to track and forecast payables,
receivables and other crucial accounting items.
c) If the demand for a firm's product is insufficient, the
intermediary can teach employees how to undertake new
market analyses or product surveys, and then, on the
basis of the results, how to revise its advertising
and sales practices.
d) If the technology of the firm is inappropriate or
out-moded, the intermediary can help the firm to
select new production equipment and train workers
how to use it.
Although all of these programs should increase the profitability of the
new venture, the intermediary may have to develop some informed arguments
and apply some leverage to convince management they are necessary.
Exit: Reallocation of Factors
The last but not least important phase of venture development is
the "exit stage." At some point it may be necessary to dis-invest from
the project and transfer capital and labor to other enterprises. Planning
for this eventuality requires all of the resources of both labor and
financial intermediaries. To the extent that it can be accomplished
without substantial dislocations in the local community, it is possible
that segmentation in both markets can be addressed simultaneously.
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As noted above, development agencies might try to invest in
"clusters" of firms whose earnings and employment levels are negatively
correlated. This diversification approach to development, requires
"portfolio managers" who are skilled in adjusting to trends in both the
capital and labor markets. If managed well this policy will a) reduce
the unsystematic financial risk borne by the development agency, b)
provide credit to firms with relatively high variance risks who are
excluded by private capital markets, c) ensure that a stable number of jobs
are available in the local labor market and d) minimize transitional or
"frictional problems" associated with transferring workers and capital among
enterprises.*
To achieve this broad set of goals, the public agency must monitor
shifts in the economic environments of each of its ventures. The inter-
mediary must make sure that the ventures' performance remains negatively
correlated with one another. Moreover, it must try to structure the
cluster so that the labor demands that covary negatively are in similar
occupations. Workers displaced by one firm should be in roughly the same
skill class as those in firms undergoing expansion. The development agency
must track and forecast these contractions and expansions to facilitate
the labor shifts and provide re-training or upgrading services to the
displaced workers. It must analyze shifts in technology and product mix
which might change the earnings cycle or occupational structure of the
firms. If there is a change in the inter-relationships of labor demands
*The opportunities and obstacles offered by this cluster strategy
are quite similar to those confronted by training programs that attempt
to facilitate the transfer of labor from declining mature industries to
growing sectors that require skilled personnel.2 8
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the intermediary may need to add a new venture and/or dis-invest from an
older one.
If the development strategy involves constructing career ladders
across firms then the labor market analysts must take remedial actions
when crucial links in a promotion sequence are eliminated by a business
failure. Training and investment policies may need to be revised to
reconstruct workable career paths.
This portfolio management function is perhaps the archetypical
example of a development task where the coordination of labor and
financial intermediation is necessary. An intricate understanding of the
dynamics of firm's earnings and occupational structure is clearly essential
to perform this task well. Moreover, those LI staff responsible for re-
training and referral programs must work closely with the investment
planners to decide how to revise the existing cluster of ventures to
promote employment stability and viable career ladders while simultaneously
diversifying away unsystematic financial risks.
This last phase of venture development ties back into the first
one--goal setting and long term planning. As ventures fail and development
officials attempt to assist displaced workers, the intermediaries and
their constituencies can re-assess the value of job stabilization goals
vis-a-vis employment expansion objectives. Industrial targets can be
redefined to accomodate the current development priorities, the changing
occupational mix of jobless workers, and any recent transformations in
technologies, resource constraints and final demand. This dynamic planning
process ensures that a development agency remains sensitive to both
the constraints imposed by the economic environment and constantly
evolving social goals.
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Conclusion
Without the linkage of labor and financial intermediation, a
development program is likely to be ineffectual, inequitable, and inconsis-
tent. Although coordination of these functions is a formidable task given
both the political and organizational obstacles that thwart development
officials, it is a goal whose benefits far outweigh its costs.
Coordinating labor and financial intermediation is necessary in
every phase of a development program: fundamental labor and capital
market policy goals must be reconciled; industrial targets and specific
ventures must be identified using both labor and financial analysis;
the resources of both types of intermediaries must be marshalled to convince
private agents to accept a socially beneficial master plan; both financial
guidance and skills-development assistance must be provided to a venture
after start-up; and any movement of factors of production among ventures
must be carefully orchestrated by both FI's and LI's.
Labor and capital market segmentation are closely related problems.
This fact must be recognized when development agents create policies and
institutions to address the discontinuities in either factor market. The
two types of segmentation derive from similar economic phenomena: the
instability in product markets or rates of return; the scarcity and high
cost of economic data that is both intricate and trustworthy; and the
concomitant dependence on exclusive social networks to provide information
or assistance in the two input markets.
Thus, the difficulties faced by small firms seeking financing and
disadvantaged workers seeking stable jobs are analagous in many respects.
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However, eliminating the discontinuities in both labor and capital markets
simultaneously can be quite difficult. Weights must be placed on the
competing objectives of improving the quality of jobs and increasing the
number of jobs.
The need to link the two forms of intermediation arises in part
because of this interconnection in the causes of capital and labor market
segmentation. The institutional articulation of public policy in these
two areas is made necessary by the complementarity of the information and
leverage possessed by labor and financial intermediaries. By joining
forces, the two intermediaries can extend their ability to formulate and
realize a coherent development agenda.
Development finance as applied by local public intermediaries
currently lacks an intellectual and ethical identity. Although some
practitioners have attempted to inject a public purpose into their work,
many others refuse to deviate from the methodology employed on Wall Street.
In part this may be attributable to the current mystique surrounding
private financial institutions, one of the few sectors whose growth has
not been stifled by the economic decline of 1979-1982.
The financial industry of New York City recently exceeded the size
of the local manufacturing sector. Aside from indicating why public
financial analysis might be attracted to the techniques utilized by
private FI's, this fact reflects one of the greatest unfulfilled economic
development needs of the region. The raft of development agencies in the
New York area have not succeeded in arresting the decline of firms that
provide on-the-job training and promotional opportunities to blue
collar workers. Too many young bright analysts in economic development
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agencies learn only the techniques used by bankers; they do not gain, in
addition, a facility for assessing the social rate of return of ventures.
Broadening the financial methodologies utilized by development agencies is
necessary if only to justify their existence. Intervention in the private
market is hardly defensible unless public agencies offer an alternative
modus operandi.
The small but growing movement to coordinate development finance
and employment policies is encouraging. Although it is founded more on
common sense than on any particular theoretical framework this should not
deter those engaged in the effort. The intuition of practitioners is just
as robust as any abstract insights that might be afforded by analytical
research.
However, it is incumbant on both practitioners and researchers to
help develop a coherent set of principles for this field. These principles
are needed to provide guidance in the formulation of policy and the
erection of new institutions. In the absence of a compelling rationale
for linkage, public officials cannot be convinced to invest the political
resources, time and energy required to make LI/FI coordination a reality
rather than a pretense. The opportunity exists to create a more effective
and equitable system of development institutions. This opportunity should
not be ignored.
244
NOTES
245
Chapter 1
1. This depiction of dualist theory is provided by Glen Cain, "The Challenge
of Dual and Radical Theories of the Labor Market Orthodox Theory,"
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 14 (1976), p. 1215. Although
this essay is a critique of segmented labor market analysis, it pro-
vides a balanced description of the framework's primary tenets.
2. David Gordon, "Class, Production, and the Ghetto: A Study of Labor
Market Stratification," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics.
Harvard University, 1971.
3. See footnotes 20 and 30 below.
4. David Gordon, op. cit., pp. 357-367.
5. David Gordon, op. cit., chapters 3 and 4.
6. Thomas Bailey and Marcia Freedman, "Immigrant and Native-Born Workers in
the Restaurant Industry." (New York: Conservation of Human Resources,
1981).
7. Michael Piore, "Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Stratification," in
Labor Market Segmentation, Edwards et al. (eds.). (Lexington: Heath,
1975).
8. Michael Piore, "Wage Determination in Low-Wage Labor Markets and the
Role of Minimum-Wage Legislation," in Unemployment and Inflation,
Michael Piore (ed.). (White Plains: Sharpe, 1979).
9. Michael Piore, "Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Stratification,"
op. cit. Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain. (New York: Basic,
1979.
10. Michael Piore and Susan Berger, Dualism and Discontinuity in Indus-
trial Societies. (New York: Cambridge, 1980), Chapter 2.
11. Michael Piore and Peter Doeringer, Internal Labor Markets and Man-
power Analysis. (Lexington: Heath, 1978), Chapter 2. R. Edwards,
Contested Terrain. (New York: Basic, 1979).
12. Wilbur Thompson, A Preface to Urban Economics. (Baltimore: Hopkins,
1972).
13. Wilbur Thompson, ibid., p. 137. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of
Great American Cities. (New York: Random, 1961), p. 170.
14. Michael Conroy, The Challenge of Urban Economic Development. (Lex-
ington: Heath, 1975), p. 65.
246
15. Marcia Freedman, Labor Markets: Segments and Shelters. (Montclair:
Universe, 1976), esp. pp. 41-45.
16. Wilbur Thompson, ibid. p. 139.
17. Roger Waldinger, "Ethnic Enterprises: A Critique and Reformulation."
(Cambridge: Joint Center of Urban Studies, 1982), p. 20, and
Roger Waldinger, Immigration and Industrial Change: A Case Study
of Immigrants in the New York Apparel Industry, Ph.D. Dissertation,
Harvard University, 1983.
18. Emmanual Tobier and Mark Willis, "Has New York's Printing Industry
Bottomed Out?" New York Affairs, p. 6, (1980).
19. Pacific Studies Center, "Background Report on Silicon Valley," prepared
for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, September, 1982.
20. H. N. Broom, Small Business Management. (Cincinnati: South Western,
1961).
21. Paul Cournoyer, "The New England Retail Grocery Industry," (Cambridge:
The Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1980).
22. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Enterprise Statistics," Bureau of the
Census, 1972. See also Bradley R. Schiller, "Corporate Kidnap: The
Disappearance of Small-Business Employees," The Public Interest
(Summer 1983) (forthcoming). Schiller focuses primarily on new
young workers' wages so the application of his findings on compensa-
tion by size of firm are limited largely to this population.
23. J. E. Baldwin and R. E. Daski, "Occupational Differences Among Metro-
politan Areas," Monthly Labor Review, May 1976. See also Schiller,
op. cit.
24. Shiller, op. cit.
25.Marcia Freedman, op. cit., p. 119.
26. Dean Morse, The Peripheral Worker. (New York: Columbia, 1969).
27. Marcia Freedman, op. cit., pp. 126, 118.
28. David Birch and Susan MacCracken, "Corporate Evolution: A Micro-Based
Analysis," (Cambridge: MIT Program on Neighborhood and Regional
Change, 1981), p. 44.
29.Catherine Armington and Marjorie Odle, "Sources of Employment Growth,
1978-1980," (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March
1982); and by the same authors, "Sources of Job Growth: A New Look
at the Saml Business Role," Coimmentary, (Fall 1982).
247
30. Catherine Armington, "Further Examination of Sources of Recent Employ-
ment Growth," (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March
1983).
31. Ibid., p. 7.
32. Catherine Armington, ibid.
33. Michael Piore and Suzanne Berger, Dualism and Discontinuity in Indus-
trial Societies, esp. Chapter 4., op. cit.
34. Donald Stone, Industrial Location in Metropolitan Areas. (New York:
Praeger, 1974)
35. Martin Carnoy and Russell Rumberger, "Segmented Labor Markets: Some
Empirical Forays," (Palo Alto, California: Center for Economic
Studies Discussion Paper No. 75-2, 1975); and Harold Birnbaum, The
Determinants of Earnings: The Economic Significance of Job Experi-
ence and the Effects of Cohorts on Age-Earnings Profiles, (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1974). Duane Leigh, "An Analysis
of the Determinants of Occupational Upgrading," (Final Report No.
DIMA 91-53-74-23-1, 1975), and Paul James Andrisani, An Empirical
Analysis of Dual Labor Market Theory, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1973). (All the works here cited are referred
to by Paul Osterman in a reply to a comment in the "Communications"
section of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review (January 1977),
p. 221.
36. Gary Becker, Human Capital. (Chicago: University of Chicago , 1975),
Chapters, II and III.
37. Christopher Jencks, et al. Who Gets Ahead? The Determinants of
Economic Success in America. (New York: Basic, 1979) ; and
D. Featherman and R. Hauser, Opportunity and Change, (New York:
Academic Press, 1978); P. Blau and 0. Duncan, The American Occupa-
tional Structure, (New York: John Wiley, 1967); Bennet Harrison,
Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1972). For a neoclassical critique of some of this literature, see
Glen Cain, op. cit.
38. Michael Piore, "Notes for a Thoery of Labor Market Stratification,"
ibid., p. 137; and Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers. (New York:
Free Press, 1962).
39. Charles Vallentine, Culture and Poverty. (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1968).
40. U.S. Department of Labor, "Facts About Women's Absenteeism and Labor
Turnover," (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969)
cited by Freedman, ibid., p. 91.
248
41. Ray Marshall, "The Economics of Discrimination: A Survey," Journal
of Economic Literature, (September 1974), pp. 361-370.
42. Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination. (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1971).
43. Stanley Aronowitz, False Primises: The Shaping of American Working
Class Consciousness, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), p. 177; and Paul
Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Modern Reader,
1966), p. 249. For a liberal view see Lester Thurow, Poverty and
Discrimination, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1969).
44. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis. (New York:
Harper, 1945), Part II.
45. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia. (New York: Basic, 1974).
46. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. (New York:
Vintage, 1963). pg. 216
47. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), "Guide-
lines for Project Evaluation," (New York: United Nations, 1972).
48. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University,
1971).
49. James Tobin, "Inflation and Unemployment," American Economic Review,
(March 1972), p. 178.
50. Lester Thurow, "Youth Unemployment," (New York: The Rockefeller Founda-
tion, 1977), p. 26.
51. Walter Oi, "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political
Economy, (December 1962), p. 538.
52. James Medoff, "Churning and Mismatch in U.S. Labor Markets," National
Bureau of Economic Research, May 1983, and "Labor Markets in Imbal-
ance: A Review of Qualitative Evidence," National Bureau of Economic
Research, November 1982.
53. James Medoff, "Churning and Mismatch in U.S. Labor Markets," R. cit.,
p. 6.
249
Chapter II
1. This problem has -also been explored by Belden Daniels and Michael
Kieschnick, Theory and Practice in the Design of Development Finance
Innovations, (Cambridge: Counsel for Community Development, 1978),
p. 53.
2. Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, "Recruit-
ment, Job Search and -U.S. Employment Service," R&D 'Monograph #3,
pp. 1-37.
3. Garth Mangum, The Manpower Development and Training Act, (Baltimore:
Hopkins, 1968), Chapter 3. Ewan Clague, Manpower Policies and Pro-
grams, (Washington: 'Upjohn, 1973), p. 14.
4. Peter Bearse, "On the Linkage of Employment and Training and Economic
Development," (Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Employment
Policy, 1982).
5. See Mary Corcoran, ibid., and Lloyd Reynolds, The Structure of the Labor
Market (New York: Harper Brothers, 1951).
6. See for instance Carl Rosenfeld, "Job Search of the Unemployed,"
Special Labor Force Report, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
Department of Labor (DOL), May 1976; and "Job Seeking Methods by
American Workers," Monthly Labor Review, August, 1975; Anne Young,
"Job Search of Recipients of Unemployment Insurance," Monthly Labor
Review, February 1979; Mary Corcoran et al. "Information and Influ-
ence Networks in Labor Markets," in 5,000 American Families: Patterns
of Economic Progress, Vol, VIII, Greg Duncan et al. (ed.) (Ann Arbor:
Institute for Social Research, 1980); and for professional workers
see Mark Granovetter, Getting a Job, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1974).
7. See Carl Rosenfeld, op. cit., and Mary Corcoran, et al., op cit.
8. George Stigler, "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political
Economy (June 1961); and "Information in the Labor Market," Journal
of Political Economy (October 1962). See also Albert Rees, "Informa-
tion Networks in Labor Markets," American Economic Review (May 1966).
9. Albert Rees, ibid.
10. Ibid. p. 561.
10.5 Albert Rees and George Schultz, Workers and Wages in an Urban Labor
Market. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970); Ivar Berg, Education
and Jobs. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America. (New York: Basic Books, ]976)!
and Lester Thurow, Generating Inequality. (New York: Basic Looks, 1975)
11. Mark Granovetter, Getting a Job, op. cit.
12. Dean Morse, The Peripheral Worker, op. cit.
250
13. Marcia Freedman, Segments and Shelters, op. cit., p. 91.
14. Stanley Leiberson, A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants
Since 1880. (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), pp. 340-343.
14.1 William Kornblum, op. cit., p. 57.
14.2 Eric Hobsbawm, "The Aristocracy of Labour," in Labouring Men: Studies
in the History of Labour by Eric Hobsbawm. (London: Widenfeld and
Nicolson, 1964).
15. David Gordon, op. cit., part. Chapter 5.
16. Lloyd Reynolds, The Structure of Labor Markets, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1951), pp. 82-88; Harvey Hilaski, "How Poverty Area Resi-
dents Look for Work," Monthly Labor Review (March 1971), p. 41; a
more elaborate analysis of racial inequality as expressed in the ex-
ternal labor market is in Henry Becker's "Personal Networks of Oppor-
tunity in Obtaining Jobs," (Baltimore: Center for Social Organiza-
tion of Schools, Johns Hopkins, 1979); see also Henry Becker's
"How Young People Find Career-Entry Jobs," (Baltimore: Center for
Social Organization of Schools, Johns Hopkins, 1977).
17. John and Beatrice MacDonald, "Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood
Formation and Social Networks," in An Urban World, Charles Tilly
(ed.), (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); see also Michael Piore, Birds
of Passage, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1979), p. 140, for
instance; Roger Waldinger, "Ethnic Enterprise: A Critique of Refor-
mulation," Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1982, p. 12.
18. Mary Corcoran, et al., op. cit.
19. David Stevens, "A Re-Examination of What is Known About Jobseeking
Behavior in the United States," in Labor Market Intermediaries,
Eli Ginzberg, (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Man-
power Policy, 1978).
20. See, for instance, Elliott Liebow, Tally's Corner. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967).
21. The Corcoran study cited frequently above only surveys respondents
who are employed, and asks them about the techniques used to find
their first and current jobs. Examples of studies focused narrow-
ly on the issue of search techniques used by unemployed workers,
regardless of whether the search resulted in employment are: Harvey
Hilaski, "How Poverty Area Residents Look for Work," op. cit.,
and U.S. Department of Labor, "The Job Search of Ghetto Workers,"
Poverty Area Profiles, Regional Report No. 21, (June 1971), Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Mid-Atlantic Regional Office, New York.
251
22. Paul Osterman, "Internal Labor Markets in White Collar Firms," Dis-
cussion Paper # 90, Department of Economics, Boston University.
23. Daniel Hammermesh, "Subsidies for Jobs in the Private Sector," in
Creating Jobs, John Palmer (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978),
pp. 89 and 96; and Michael Redmond, "Analysis of the Start-Up Oper-
ations of the New York City Private Industry Council," Independent
Monitoring Unit, Department of Employment, City of New York, 1980,
pp. 1, 2, and 5.
24. George Haynes, Negro Newcomers in Detroit, Michigan. (New York: Home
Missions Council, 1918), p. 18, cited in Stanley Leiberson, A Piece
of the Pie, op. cit.
25. David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919, (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1965), p. 46, cited in Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the
Pie, op. cit.
26. Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society. (New York, 1966). p. 119.
27. Daniel Hammermesh, "Subsidies for Jobs in the Private Sector," in
Creating Jobs, John Palmer (ed.), (Washington: Brookings, 1978),
pp. 89 and 96.
28. Joseph Ullman, "Interfirm Differences in the Cost of Search for Cleri-
cal Workers," Journal of Business, (April 1968), p. 153; Martin
Gannon, "Sources of Referral and Employee Turnover," Journal of
Applied Psychology, (1971), # 51, p. 226; and Thomas Bailey and
Marcia Freedman, "Immigrant and Native Born Workers in the Restaurant
Industry," Conservation of Human Resources, Columbia University,
(July 1981), p. 50.
29. William Kornblum, Blue Collar Community. (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1974), p. 57.
30. Many of the following points regarding on-the-job training are ex-
tracted from Michael Piore and Peter Doeringer, Internal Labor Mar-
kets and Manpower Analysis, (Lexington: Heath, 1971), Chapter 2.
31. Peter Wright, The Coloured Worker in British Industry. (London:
Oxford University, 1968), p. 161.
32. William Kornblum, op. cit.
33. Everett Hughes, "The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry," American
Sociological Review, (October 1946), p. 515; and William Kornblum,
op. cit.
34. Gerald Suttles, The Social Order of the Slum, (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1968), Chapter 4.
252
35. Michael Piore, et al., p. cit.
36. Michael Piore, et al., op. cit.
37. L. M. Davidson, The Process of Employing the Disadvantaged, Ph.D.
Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T., 1973; and Wendel Cooke, Industry Atti-
tudes About the Employment of Negroes, Master's Thesis, M.I.T.,1968; Kornblum, op. cit.
38. William Kornblum, op. cit., p. 52
39. William Kornblum, op. cit., pp. 47, 52.
40. Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises: The Shaping of the American Working
Class Consciousness. (New York: McGraw, 1973), p. 177.
41. William Kornblum, op. cit., p. 48.
42. Barbara Garson, All The Live Long Day: The Meaning and Demeaning of
Routine Work. (New York: Doubleday, 1975). pg. 34
43. Ibid. pg. 35
44. Stanley Davis and Paul Lawrence, Matrix, (Reading: Addison Wesley,
1977); Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain, op. cit.
45. Paul Osterman, "Internal Labor Markets in White Collar Firms," Dis-
cussion Paper No. 90, Department of Economics, Boston University.
46. Ibid.
47. John Kotter, Organizational Dynamics. (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1978),
p. 17.
48. This phenomenon was confirmed in an interview with Andrew Gordon of
the Economic Capital Corporation, City of New York. Mr. Gordon
manages all referrals to the Private Industry Council (PIC) and
was the original outstationed PIC employee funded under the Targeted
Jobs Demonstration Project.
49. Ibid.
50. Robert Reich, The Next American Frontier. (New York: Times Books,
1983).
51. Andrew Gordon interview, op. cit.
52. See Karl Van Horn, "A Final Report on the Tergeted Jobs Demonstration
Project," (Rutgers: Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics, 1983).
53. Interview with Katherine Tullberg, Boston Private Industry Council,
May 3, 1982.
253
Chapter III
1. E. F. Fama and M. H. Miller, The Theory of Finance, (New York: Holt,
1972), Chapters 1 and 2; Lester Chandler, The Monetary Financial
System, (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 32.
2. W. F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Thoery of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance Vol. 19, (September
1964), pp. 425-442; and John Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk and
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital
Budgets," Review of Economics and Statistics (February 1965), pp 13-
37.
3. For debt pricing, see R. Merton, "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:
The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, (May
1974), p. 449.
4. Michael Kieschnick, Venture Capital and Urban Development. (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1980), p. 40.
5. E. F. Fama and M. H. Miller, The Theory of Finance, op. cit.; and
Eugene Fama, Foundations of Finance: Portfolio Decisions and Secur-
ity Prices, (New York: Basic, 1976).
6. Anton Finelli, "Business Development, Venturing and Risk: An Overview,"
Center for Community Economic Development Newsletter, February-March
1978, pp. 16-22; and Managing Venture Investments, Center for Commun-
ity Economic Development, Washington, D.C., 1980; and Sanford Jacobs,
"Venture Capital Has Its Price: Conflicts Over Firms' Control," Wall
Street Journal, 10/18/82, p. 37.
7. Belden Daniels and Michael Kieschnick, Theory and Practice in the Design
of Development Finance Innovations, op. cit., p. 80.
8. E. Solomon and J. Laya, "Measurement of Company Profitability: Some
Systematic Errors in the Accounting Rate of Return," in A. A. Robi-
chek, (ed.) Financial Research and Management Decisions, (New York:
John Wiley, 1967), p. 152.
9. Belden Daniels and Michael Keischnick, Theory and Practice in the
Design of Development Finance Innovations, p. cit., p. 86; see also
Belden Daniels, et al., Small Business and Capital Markets, (Cambridge;
Council for Community Development, 1981), p. 6.
10. Sanjoy Basu, "The Relationship Between Earnings' Yield, Market Value
and Return for NYSE Common Stocks: Further Evidence," Journal of
Financial Economics Vol. 12, No. 1, (June 1983) (forthcoming). For
small stocks' higher variance risk, see Phillip Brown, et al., "Stock
Return Seasonalities and the Tax-Loss Selling Hypothesis: Analysis of
the Arguments and Australian Evidnece," Journal of Financial Economics,
(June 1983), p. cit.
254
11. Some authors like Daniels seem to imply that super-normal returns and
high profits refer to precisely the same phenomenon. This is not the
case as indicated in the above discussion on why high profits should
not lead to excess returns. Moreover, as argued here, high returns
so not always foster excessive earnings. See Daniels, et al., Small
Business and Capital Markets, op. cit., p. 4.
12. See Daniels, et al., Small Business and Capital Markets, Op. cit.,
p. 5; and Wall Street Journal, "A Comparison of the Exchanges,"
October 8, 1979.
13. Ibid.
14. The author was unable to obtain some of the studies referred to by
Daniels. However, both Daniels and Barbe assert that these studies
did not control for systematic risk.
15. Marc Reinganum, "The Anamalous Stock Market Behavior of Small Firms
in January," Journal of Financial Economics, (June 1983).
16. Richard Roll, "A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect,"
Journal of Finance Vol. 36 (1981), p. 879.
17. Richard Roll, "The Turn of the Year Effect and the Return: Premium
of Small Firms," Journal of Portfolio Management (1982).
18. Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium,"
Working Paper No. 22-82, (Los Angeles: Graduate School of Manage-
ment, UCLA), 1982).
19. Marc Reinganum, "The Anomalous Stock Market Behavior of Small Firms
in January," op. cit.; and Brown, et al. "Stock Market Seasonality
and the Tax-Loss Selling Hypothesis," op. cit.
20. Sanjoy Basu, "The Relationship Between Earnings, Yield, Market Value
and Return for NYSE Common Stocks: Further Evidence," op. cit.
21. Paul Schultz, "Transaction Costs and the Small Firm Effect: A Comment,"
Journal of Financial Economics (June 1983) (forthcoming).
22. See Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, (Prince-
ton: Princeton University, 1966); and Richard Hofstadter, "What
Happened to the Antitrust Movement," in Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style of American Politics and Other Essays, (Chicago: University
og Chicago, 1967).
23. David Birch, "Who Creates Jobs?", The Public Interest (Fall 1981), p.
71.
255
24. Harvey Garn and Larry Ledebur, "The Role of Small Business Enterprise
in Economic Development," a study prepared for the use of the Joint
Economic Committee, 5/14/81/
25. Catherine Armington and Marjorie Odle, "Sources of Job Growth," op.
cit.
26. David Birch and Susan MacCracken, Corporate Evolution, op. cit., p.
51.
27. Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Deindustrialization of
America, (New York: Basic, 1982), p. 224.
28. Ibid.
28.5 Catherine Armington and Marjorie Odle, "Sources of Job Growth," p. cit.
p. 7.
29. John Kendrick, Postwar Productivity Trends in the U.S., 1948-1969.
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973).
30. James Shuman, The Kondratieff Wave. (New York: World Publishing, 1972).
31. Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, The Em-
ployment Impact of Technological Change (Washington, D.C. 1966).
32. For an attempt to address this issue see Clinton Bourdon, "Labor
Productivity and Technological Innovation: From Automation Scare to
Productivity Decline," in Technological Innovation for a Dynamic
Economy, Christopher Hill and James Utterback (eds.), (Cambridge:
Pergamon, 1980).
33. U.S. Department of Commerce, Panel on Invention and Innovation,
"Technological Innovation, Its Environment and Management," (1967).
34. Robert Samuelson, "A False Religion," National Journal, November 20,
1982.
35. W. K. Scheirer, Small Firms and Federal R&D, Office of Management and
Budget Report No. OMB/OFOO/CA/7701, Washington, D.C.
36. Clinton Boundon, op. cit.
37. See Ezra Vogel, "The State: Meritocratic Guidance and Private Init-
iative," from Japan as Number One (Cambridge: Harvard University,
1979); Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich, Minding America's Business
(New York: Harcourt, 1982).
256
Chapter IV
1. Tim Campbell and William Kracaw, "Information Production, Market
Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation," Journal
of Finance (September 1980), p. 863; and H. E. Leland and D. H.
Pyle, "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial
Intermediation," Journal of Finance, (May 1977) p. 32. Both of these
articles deal with the interesting question of whether firms can be
prevented from paying financial intermediaries to disseminate false
information about them. Although these articles lack grounding in
institutional realities, the theoretical issues they raise are
quite relevant to an analysis of informational market failures.
Campbell and Kracaw actually attribute the existence of financial
intermediaries to the need to resolve this "moral hazard."
2. Lester Chandler, The Monetary Financial System, op. cit., p. 71.
3. For a comparison of the assumptions made by the "new" and "old" finan-
cial theories see Peter Albin, "Information Exchange in Security
Markets and the Assumption of 'Homogeneous Beliefs'," Journal of
Finance (august 1972), pp. 1217-1226.
4. E. G. Fama, "Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates and Capital Budgeting Under
Uncertainty," Journal of Financial Economics, (August 1977), p. 3.
5. Albert Rees, op. cit.
6. Belden Daniels and Larry Litvak, Innovations in Development Finance
(Washington, D.C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1979), pp.
47-52.
7. Arnold Heggestad, "Market Structure, Risk and Profitability in Commer-
cial Banking," Journal of Finance, (September 1977), p. 1207;
and Franklin Edwards and Arnold Heggestad, "Uncertainty, Market
Structure and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis and
Managerial Motives in Banking," Quarterly Journal of Economics
(February 1969), p. 79. See also other works of Edwards, including
"Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-preference
Behavior in Banking," Journal of Political Economy (January 1977),
p. 147; Concentration and Competition in Commercial Banking: A
Statistical Study, Research Report to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, No. 26, 1964.
8. For a discussion of small firms' variance risk, see Brown et al.,
"Stock Return Seasonalities and the Tax Loss Selling Hypothesis,"
op. cit.
257
9. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, (Boston: Houghton,
1971), and Richard Caves, "Uncertainty, Market Structure and Per-
formance," in J. W. Markham and G. F. Papanek (eds.), Industrial Organiza-
tion and Economic Development (New York: Houghton, 1970).
10. Robert Zevin, Vice President of the United States Trust Company,
asserts that smaller banks' portfolios are considerably safer than
those of larger banks. Their loss ratios are considerably lower
than that of their larger competitors and the amount of riskless
investments (i.e., federal funds) they make is considerably greater.
It is possible that the problematic international clients of the
major money center banks have transformed the position of these
larger financial intermediaries since the date of Heggestad and Ed-
ward's analysis.
11. National Association of Securities Dealers, Small Business Financing:
The Current Environment and Suggestions for Improvement, (Washington,
D.C.: NASD, May 1979).
12. Lawrence Litvak, Pension Funds and Economic Renewal (Washington, D.C.:
The Council of State Planning Agencies, 1981).
13. See Brown, et al., "Stock Return Seasonalities and the Tax Loss Sell-
ing Hypothesis," op. cit.
14. Belden Daniels and Larry Litvak, op. cit., p. 41.
15. Thomas K. McGraw, "With the Consent of the Governed: SEC's Formative
Years," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management Vol. 1, No. 3
(1982), p. 346.
16. Ibid.
17. See George Stigler, "The Economics of Information," Journal of Poli-
tical Economy (June 1961).
18. See Harvey Leibenstein, Beyond Economic Man. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1976).
19. Arthur Okun descrives something akin to this process in Prices and
Quantities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981). Okun looks at
the macroeconomic ramifications of bilateral relationships in which
pairs of agents are interdependent. This interdependence arises
largely because of the agents' mutual familiarity: in order to econ-
omize on information collection which has an ambiguous payoff, mem-
bers of these pairs attempt to retain and reinforce their current
economic relationships. See also William Shepherd, "Public Enter-
prise in Financial Sectors," in Shepherd's Public Enterprise (Lexing-
ton: Heath, 1974) and Harvey Leibenstein, op. cit.
255U
20. Michael Kiechnick, op. cit.
21. Robert Zevin of the U.S. Trust Company confirmed that few financial
analysts in the investment industry rely on the notion of systematic
risk; to the extent that risk is assessed it is typically variance
risk that is captured.
22. This type of sensitivity analysis is suggested in A. Hax and K. Wiig,
"The Use of Decision Analysis in Capital Investment Problems,"
Sloan Management Review (Winter 1976), p. 19.
23. See Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities. (New York: Random, 1969).
24. William Shepherd, "Public Enterprise in Financial Sectors" in Shep-
herd's Public Enterprise (Lexington: Heath, 1974), p. 187.
25. Ibid., p. 190, and Arthur Okun, op. cit.
26. Belden Daniels and Larry Litvak, op. cit., p. 54.
27. Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer, Economic Democracy: The Challenge
of the 1980's (New York: Sharpe, 1980), pp. 144, 191. Carnoy and
Shearer document many forms of discrimination performed by financial
intermediaries, but they concentrate on FI's prejudices against
firms owned or managed by workers.
28. Timothy Bates and William Bradford, Financing Black Economic Develop-
ment. (New York: Academic Press, 1979).
29. See for instance Robert Kuttnes, "Development of Federal Reinvestment
Polocy," in Reinvestment in Urban Communities (New York, PLI, 1977),
p. 9.
30. Carol Greenwald, Banks are Dangerous to Your Wealth.(Englewood: Pren-
tice, 1980).
31. Ivan Light, Ethnic Enterprises in America: Business and Welfare Among
Chinese, Japanese and Blacks. (Los Angeles: University of Califor-
nia, 1972).
32. Ibid., pp. 59-62.
33. George Akerloff, "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics (Spring 1972).
34. Ivan Light, op. cit.
259
35. Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie, op. cit., p. 366.
36. Something akin to this view is provided by Liberson, ibid., p. 379.
37. For both types of criticisms see Bela Gold, "Changing Perspectives
on Size, Scale and Returns," Journal of Economic Literature (March
1981), p. 5.
38. Robert Reich, The Next American Frontier. (New York: Times Books,
1983).
39. Suzanne Berger and Michael Piore, Dualism and Discontinuity in In-
dustrial Society, ( New York; Cambridge University, 1980), Chapter
IV; see also E. Zayas, Employment and the Small Business Sector,
(Washington, D.C.: National Federation of Independent Business,
1978).
40. Whether management and unions in larger firms are inclined to develop
such innovative measures is a critical issue that must be assessed
empirically. See Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer, Economic Demo-
cracy op. cit., Chapter 7 and Fred Best, Work Sharing, (Kalamazoo:
Upjohn Institute, 1981).
41. See for example, David Gordon, The Working Poor: Toward A State Agenda
(Washington, D.C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1979), pp.
54-59.
42. Michael Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Soc-
ieties, (New York: Cambridge University, 1979); and Charles Sabel,
"Marginal Workers in Industrial Society," in Unemployment and In-
flation, Michael Piore (ed.), (White Plains: Sharpe, 1979).
43. Gary Becker, Human Capital, op. cit.
44. Paul Osterman, "Internal Labor Markets in White Collar Firms," op.
cit.
45. See Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind, "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment," American Economic Review Vol. 60, No. 3 (June
1970.
260
Chapter V
1. Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corp.: Summary of Achievements, Bedford
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, 1981/82.
2. Four separate bi-annual proposals, submitted by Restoration to the
Community Services Administration, were used to gather primary data
on the Corp.'s programs. These proposals describe both:the history
and the future plans of each programmatic department. "Special Im-
pact Program II, IV, V, and VII," proposals "for a grant under
Title I (VII after 1972) as amended for Bedford Stuyvesant, Brook-
lyn New York" (1968, 1972, 1974, 1980). See also Barry Stein, "Re-
building Bedford Stuyvesant," (Cambridge: CCED, 1975); Harvey Garn
et al., "Evaluating CDC's--A Summary Report" (WashingtonL Urban In-
stitute, 1974); and Abt Associates, Inc., "An Evaluation of the SIP"
(Cambridge, 1973).
3. "Special Impact Program II", op. cit. , pp. 31-38.
4. Richard Schaffer provided a verbal description of the goals, objectives,
and strategies of the Corp.'s leaders during various phases of the
agency's history. Richard Schaffer, Interview, April 22 and May 5,
1981.
5. Ibid.
6. Richard Schaffer, Income Flows in Urban Poverty Areas (Lexington:
Heath, 1973), p. 19; and Stephan Michelson, "Assessing Economic
Impact: The Multiplier" CCED Newsletter, October-November 1976,
p. 15.
7. For a summary of this material see A Lawyers Manual on Community-
Based Economic Development (Berkeley: National Housing and Economic
Development Law Project, 1974), pp. 2-4.
8. See Henry Etzkowitz and Gerald Schaflender, Ghetto Crisis: Bureau-
cracy vs. Progress in Bedford Stuyvesant (Boston: Little Brown,
1969).
9. A Lawyer's Manual on Community Based Economic Developmentp. cit.
pp. 5-10.
10. Schaffer, Interview, op_. cit.
11. Henry Etzkowitz and Gerald Schaflunder, op.. cit., p. 6.
12. Ibid.
13. Schaffer, Interview, op. cit.
261
14. A note on the source of data on the Economic Development loans: Two
reports were used to obtain information on loans. The first was
an October, 1977 report written by Economic Development staff em-
titled SIP Loans "Summary Information and Classification," which
described each borrower individually, when the firm's loan was gran-
ted, whether payments were on schedule and the nature of any prob-
lems which would affect repayment. Another report, "SIP Loans Liti-
gation Status Report," issued in April of 1977, accessed the possi-
bility of retrieving funds from firms which were extremely late in
paying back their loans; most of these firms had been discontinued.
Although this sample does not represent the entire portfolio, it
does constitute over two thirds of all the loans issued by Restora-
tion. Lending activity came to a halt in the fall of 1977.
15. David Birch, Job Creation in Cities, op. cit.
.16. Tom Bettridge, Interview, March 20.
17. "Summary Information and Classification," Restoration, October 1977;
"SIP Loans and Litigation Status Report," Restoration, April 1977.
18. See the following articles written by Timothy Bates: "Financ-
ing Black Enterprise," Journal of Finance Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (June
1974), pp. 751-756; and "Analysis of a Commercial Bank Minority
Lending Program: Comment," Journal of Finance Vol. XXXII, No. 5
(December 1977); and Bates' book: Black Capitalism: A Quantitative
Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973). See also the work of Robert
Edelstein, i.e., "Improving the Selection of Credit Risks: An Anal-
ysis of a Commercial Bank Minority Lending Program," Journal of
Finance Vol. XXX No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 37-55. Edelstein has found
that minority businessmen who are residents of the communities in
which their firms are located, have substantially lower default
rates.
19. "SIP Loans and Litigation Status Report," op. cit.
20. The following staff in Restoration were exceptionally forthcoming
in providing background on the Payments Credits Program: Ken Cooke,
Charles Palms, Richard Shaffer, Tom Bettridge, and Ken Diaz. A
Number of documents were also helpful, including the "Model Contract"
with credit recipients, and "Payments Credits for Job Training,"
a general program outline.
21. "Payments Credits for Job Training," and "Summary Information and
Classification Report," October 1977.
22."SIP Loans Litigation Status Report," op. cit.
23.. Bettridge, Interview,og. cit., Schaffer, Interview, op. cit.
24. Ibid. See also "Restoration of Confidence," April 1981 and one of
the first funding proposals for the Center, "Bedford Stuyvesant
Shopping Center," OMBE 0160-40, pp. 1-3.
262
25. See Coordinated Urban Economic Development: A Case Study Analysis
Chap. 4, Case Study 9, "Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation"
pp. 94-108. National Council for Urban Economic Development, March
1978.
25.5 See Timothy Bates, Black Capitalism: A Quantitative Analysis, op.
cit., Roger Waldinger, "Ethnic Enterprise: A Critique and Reformula-
tion," op. cit., and David Birch, Job Creation in Cities, p. cit.
26. Stephan Michelson, "On Profit Maximization by SIP Ventures," CCED
Newsletter, (June-July 1977) p. 1.
27. Bettridge and Schaffer, Interviews, op. cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Several key personnel in Restoration were extremely helpful in pro-
viding a detailed description of the Cablevision investment/training
project, particularly Ken Diaz, Tom Bettridge, Richard Schaffer, and
Charles Palms. Among the documents describing the genesis of the
program are: "Memorandum" from Charles Palms to Clifton Daniels,
(11/12/80); "Memorandum" from Charles Palms to Curtis Wood, (11/12/80),
"Memorandum" from Charles Palms to Clifton Daniels, (11/14/80);
Cablevision's Contract with Restoration, (7/11/80); Letter from
Clifton Daniels to Tony Clarkson, Vice President, Atlantic Cable,
(2/4/81); Schedule of Orientation for Participants, (4/15/81).
30. Cablevision Contract, op. cit.
31. Schaffer and Bettridge, Interviews, op. cit.
32. Some development finance analysts assert that small and middle sized
banks can perfect capital markets by developing innovative lending
programs that concentrate on the small dynamic firms that are ignored
by the rest of the financial market. In defense of this view, one
can cite the relatively impressive financial performance of New En-
gland's smaller commercial banks (See "The Best Earning Bankers of
New England," in New England Business, April 18, 1983). As noted
above, an alternative explanation for this phenomenon is the trouble
large banks have recently experienced with their overseas borrowers.
263
Chapter VI
1. One of the most thoughtful analytical essays on the coordination issue
is Peter Bearse's "On the Linkage of Employment and Training and
Economic Development," The National Commission for Employment Poli-
cy, Washington, D.C., February 1982. Another useful document pub-
lished by the same organization is the "Sixth Annual Report ot the
President and the Congress," December, 1980. A helpful piece that
is grounded on practitioners' experience is "The Targeted Jobs Demon-
stration Program (TJDP) Conference: A Summary of Conference Pro-
ceedings" prepared for the TJDP Interagency Monitoring Board by
Rutgers University's Eagleton Institute of Politics. Karl van
Horn at the Eagleton Institue has generated an array of interesting
documents related to the TJDP which was an attempt by the Carter
Administration to encourage coordination of development finance and
E&T policy. Among his most useful interpretive essays is "A Final
Report on the Targeted Jobs Demonstration Program," (Rutgers:
Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics, January 1983). Another ex-
haustive empirical analysis of the linkage issue has been carried
out by Joseph Fisher et al., "CETA and Economic Development Program
Coordination: Guidebook and Case Studies." National Council for
Urban Economic Development, July 1981. Other relevant works include:
"Meshing Employment Resources with Development Needs," National
Governors' Association, Employment and Vocational Training Program,
December, 1981; National Alliance of Business, "Job Creation Through
Economic Development: The Role of Private Industry Councils." Also,
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Community, Econ-
omic, and Manpower Development Linkages," written for HUD by the
National Council of Urban Economic Development. Examples of prac-
tical guidebooks in this field include The Massachusetts State Em-
ployment and Training Council, "CETA and Local Economic Development,"
April, 1979; and Massachusetts Community Economic Development Assis-
tance Corporation "CDC/CETA Coordination Handbook," June 1982.
2. Martin Rein and Peter Marris, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and
Community Action in the U.S. (London: Routledge, 1967).
3. Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1971); J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (McGraw-
Hill, 1967).
4. For an excellent account of the effects of crisis management on pub-
lic bureaucracies, see Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy,
(New York: Russel Sage, 1980).
5. Martin Rein and Peter Marris, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and
Community Action in the U.S., op. cit.
264
6. See for instance, Carl van Horn, "A Final Report on the Targeted Jobs
Demonstration Program," op. cit., p. 40. Also see Peter Bearse
"On the Linkage of Employment and Training and Economic Development,"
op. cit. The conclusions regarding the world views of public FI's
were gleaned during many interviews, but particularly those with
Alan Bell of the New York Public Development Corporation and Andrew
Gordon of the New York Economic Capital Corporation, op. cit. Those
pertaining to LI's were founded on interviews with Ken Diaz and
Charles Palms of the Bedford Stuyvesane Restoration Corporation, as
well as Dan Donovan of the New York City Private Industry Council,
op. cit.
7. See for instance Robert Reich and Ira Magaziner, Minding America's
Business, op. cit., Chapter 17; also Robert Reich, The Next Ameri-
can Frontier, op. cit., and for an overseas comparison, Ezra Vogel,
"The State: Meritocratic Guidance and Private Initiative," op. cit.
8. See Karl Van Horn, "A Final Report on the Targeted Jobs Demonstration
Project," op. cit., p. 40.
9. Ibid., and Peter Bearse, "On the Linkage of Employment and Training
and Economic Development," op. cit, p. 30. Interview with Alan
Bell, Vice President of the New York Pulbic Development Corp.
10. Peter Bearse, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
11. Interview with Ken Diaz, Restoration, op. cit.
12. Karl Van Horn, op. cit., p. 102.
13. Karl Van Horn, op. cit., pp. 98-100; Interview with Andrew Gordon of
the New York City Economic Capital Corporation and Dan Donovan of the
New York Private Industry Council.
14. See Joseph Fischer et al., "CETA and Economic Development Program
Coordination," op. cit., particularly case studies on Buffalo, Wor-
cestor, Fall River, and Tocoma and pp. 101-103.
15. This kind of co-optation of PIC's is quite common and applies to the
great majority of the cases examined by Fischer and Van Horn. See
for instance case study on Buffalo in Fischer.
16. See Peter Bearse, "On the Linkage of Employment and Training and
Economic Development Programs," op. cit.; Interview with Dan Dono-
van of the New York City, PIC.
17. Interviews with various development finance staff including Alan Bell
of the Public Development Corporation. These conclusions were con-
firmed by my own experience working at the Port Authority of New York &
New Jersey as a financial/employment analyst. See works by Bearse and
Van Horn cited above and "Monthly/Budget Report," ECC of New York, 3/82.
265
18. The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey is one notable exception,
This agency utilizes a fairly sophisticaled input-out model to assess
the employment impacts of a venture.
19. The observations on both LI's and FI's access to data is primarily
based on personal experiences working in manpower and economic devel-
opment agencies. However, a useful source on both of these issues
is Peter Bearse, "On the Linkage of Employment and Training and
Economic Development Programs," op. cit., especially page 60. For
a survey of LI's information sources ; Ree Marcia Freedman and
Anna Dutka, "Training Information for Policy Guidance," R&D monograph
#76, U.S. Department of Labor E&T Administration, 1980.
20. See Marcia Freedman and Anna Dutka, op. cit., Chapters 5 and 6.
21. See Joseph Fischer, "Ceta and Economic Development Program Coordina-
tion," op. cit., p. 277, and Karl Van Horn, op. cit., p. 99.
22. Interviews with Andrew Gordon and Don Donovan, op. cit.
23. Ibid., pp. 211, 245, 287.
24. Joseph Fischer, op. cit.,page 100-130.
25. See Footnote #33, Chapter II.
26. Daniel Hammermesh, "Subsidies for Jobs in the Private Sector," in
Creating Jobs, John Palmer (ed.), (Washington, D.C., Brookings,
1978), pp. 89 and 96. See also Coordinated Urban Economic Develop-
ment: A Case Study Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: National Council for
Urban Economic Development, March 1978), Chapter 5, Case studies
12, 13, and 14, espec. p. 139; and Michael Redmond, "Analysis of the
Start-Up Operations of the New York City Private Industry Council,"
Independent Monitoring Unit, Department of Employment, City of New
York, 1980, pp. 1, 2 and 5.
27. Personal experience in the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
confirmed this observation.
28. Robert Reich and Ira Magaziner, op. cit., Chap. 7-10.
266
Appendix
1. For a useful source on the typical information requirements of a con-
ventional business plan's assessment of financial viability see J.
Timmons, et al., New Venture Creation (Homewook: R, D. Irwin, 1977).
The job and technology analysis is based on the works cited in Chap-
ters I and II as well as Karen Polenske, The U.S. Multinational Input-
Output Accounts and Models (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980) and
Bennett Harrison and Andrew Sum, "Labor Market Data Needs from the
'Dual' and 'Segmented' Labor Market Research," (Washington, D,C.:
National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, 1979.
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The Shared Information Needs of Financial and Labor Market Intermediaries
The following is a brief outline of the information needs required to
carry out the public intermediation functions described in Chapter VI. The
information required to undertake the following three types of assessments
is briefly analyzed:
a) the evaluation of a firm's financial feasibility from a
risk/return standpoint;
b) the assessment of the job and technology impacts.
of a venture; and
c) the evaluation of the training and promotional opportunities
offered by a firm as well as the impact of the venture on the
quality of other firms' jobs.
Five types of data are useful for each of these assessments. These
include information on a firm's
a) technology
b) markets and competitors
c) timing of development and expansion/start-up status
d) organizational structure and culture
e) labor force requirements.
The extent of the overlap in data needs will be demonstrated by
elaborating why each of these five features of a venture are critical
determinants of the training, job and technology generation, and
financial concerns described above.
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A. Technology
a) Financial Viability
To determine how profitable a firm will be one must be familiar with
its product design and production process. Thus any financial intermediary,
whether public or private, must assess the viability of a firm's technology.
The FI needs to determine the likelihood that a firm will achieve
a competitive edge through improving production tolerances, yields and cost
economies. A financial analyst should also estimate the cost and time
required to complete product prototypes and to refine a process with new
special tooling. If the venture involves no innovations whatsoever, the
financial analyst must judge whether the firms' technology is likely to
become outmoded in the near future.
b) Job and Technology Generation
By definition, technological assessment is required to determine
whether a venture is likely to generate an important innovation. A deeper
understanding of the industry's structure is needed however to estimate
how the firm's innovative behavior will affect other firms' technological
generation capacities and inclinations.
Second, to derive a decent esimate of the indirect and induced
multiplier effects of firms' labor and input needs it is useful to be
familiar with the firm's technology. The direct requirements
coefficients in an input-output (I/0) matrix should be updated or
revised to reflect the firm's idiosyncratic input demands. Even if a
rough "back of the envelope" I/O analysis is attempted
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it is useful to get a sense of how the firm's technology will affect its
labor and supply needs and concomitantly its indirect and induced impacts.
Third, if the firm's technology is truly new and viewed as too risky
by private financial intermediaries, it is less likely that public
funds will simply displace private investment in the firm. Since
technological risks are almost entirely systematic, this risk aversion
is often inefficient. If the technology ultimately strengthens the com-
petitive advantage of a firm or industry that is tied to a local labor
force,supply network and/or market, then the venture may produce net new
jobs to the target area. The FI should assess the employment trade-offs
associated with: (a) automation and rationalization of production)vs.
(b) cost reductions that lead to expansions in output.
c) Training & Promotion Opportunities
To assess a firm's ability to provide on-the-job training opportuni-
ties for disadvantaged workers, one must determine how the firm's tech-
nology affects it demands for skilled labor: unless the technology requires
workers with some measure of skills it is unlikely that such training
opportunities will be afforded. More importantly, public agencies must
assess whether the technology (a) is firm-specific and (b) requires skills
supplied in a tight occupational labor market. These factors will increase
the firm's incentive to train.
In addition, a technology often determines whether work stations are
sufficiently-proximate to one another both physically and functionally to
allow workers to observe their more senior colleagues. Ideally, production
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technology and layout should require a sequential development of skills,
with a continuity of job functions being performed next to one another,
each slightly more sophisticated than the next.
To the extent that there exist discontinuities in the personnel
structure, career ladders can be constructed to bridge them if supplemen-
tary classroom training is available.
A firm's technology will also determineto some extentwhether its
products can be inventoried. The ability to store products allows a firm
to accommodate vacillations in demand by allowing inventories to vary
widely rather than constantly revising the firm's rate of output. Thus
for example the innovations in the food industry which have enhanced shelf
life have attenuated the sector's cyclical demand for labor.
The firm's technology also has a variety of indirect impacts on other
firms' employment staibility. For instance, if the technology requires the
entire labor force to work nine to five, this will heighten the daily
fluctuations in the markets of local retail and service establishments.
If instead the firm's technology (and managerial strategy) permit personnel
to work and consume during off-peak hours this will stabilize the output
and employment of these other businesses.
Finally, the degree to which technological progress in a sector
occurs at an extremely rapid pace will partially determine the stability
of employment in the industry. However if the sector is experiencing
rapid growth, then the instability of employment may not prevent employers
from providing on-the-job training.
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B. Markets and Competition
a) Financial Analysis
The most important component of any business plan is the market analysis.
An FI must check the accuracy of a firm's market research. This research
includes the management's analysis of their customers' purchasing decision
criteria, the size and growth rate of their market segment, and the risks
posed by competitors, macro-economic trends, and the development of new
tastes. The estimation of cash flows and systematic and unsystematic
risks will rely principally on these factors.
b) Jobs and Technological Innovation Generation
To assess whether the firm is likely to create net new jobs it is
necessary to determine whether: (:1) its main competitors lie within the
target area (city, region, nation), (2) it serves an export market
and (3) its products will substitute for goods that are currently imported.
c) Training & Promitional Opportunities
Market stability will reduce employment turnover and thereby improve
the firm's ability and inclination to provide on-the-job training.
If the personnel of local competitors possess the same skills
(mechanical, organizational, and conceptual) as that of the firm's work
force, the venture management will be less interested in providing training.
However, collective training programs that are funded jointly by the
industryrnd the public sector might be feasible in this case.
273
C. Timing of a Venture and Start Up vs. Expansion Status
a. Financial Viability
To assess the net present value of a project it is critical that
the timing of cash flows are assessed properly. If the venture is a new
one the financial analyst must assess when any planned construction will
occur and when sales receipts can be anticipated. If the venture is an
expansion it is necessary to properly assess when the added revenues
will be realized and when capital equipment and inventory expenses will
rise.
b. Job and Technology Generation
Many firms publicize job generation estimates that pertain to a
planning horizon which is quite distant in the future. In addition,
managers seeking public capital often provide development agencies with
staffing projections that are based on the most optimistic scenario,
rather than their most likely guess. Managers of new start-ups are partic-
ularly ambitious in their estimates, since there is no ratio of sales-to-
labor force available against which their figures can be checked.
c. Training and Promtion Opportunities
As noted in Chapter II start-ups are often more attractive from the
standpoint of new formal or informal recruitment networks that benefit
secondary workers. Start-ups have the greatest potential for establishing
informal hiring networks which extend disadvantaged groups' access to
valuable job information.
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Expansions can also be exploited by labor intermediaries, though it
is critical to plan in advance for these projects. By placing an initial
corps of secondary workers in a firm prior to its expansion the LI can
ensure that disadvantaged personnel hired later will find a supportive
group of' established employees who can help the former adjust to the
production and social structure of the firm. It is necessary to obtain
a good estimate of the timing of the expansion so the initial corps can
be placed and trained in advance.
D. Organizational Structure and Culture
a) Financial Analysis
In analyzing payroll costs, the financial analyst must become fami-
liar with the firm's organizational structure. The FI must also become
personally intimate with the venture's management team. This is necessary
in order to form a judgment not only of the manager's abilities, motiva-
tions and integrity but also to assess whether the firm will allow the
FI to participate in its affairs.
b) Job Technology Generation
The ability of a firm to innovate often hinges on an open organiza-
tional structure and culture: workers must have the freedom to communicate
with personnel in other units, departments and businesses.
The firm's desire to purchase inputs and services from local enter-
prises in order to develop a close rapport with their suppliers and/or
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enhance the local image of the firm is frequently a function of the
culture and attitudes of leading managers.
c) Training and Promotional Opportunities
The organizational structure of a firm will determine the layout
and degree of functional interaction between personnel with different
skills. These are both critical forces affecting the extent of on-the-
job training carried out in the firm.
The culture of the firm will also affect whether supervisors are
committed to promoting from within or filling key positions from the
external labor market. Finally, the culture will effect the degree of
racial conflicts likely to arise if blacks are hired to work side by side
with older white workers.
E. Labor Force Requirements: Recruitment and Training Policies
a) Financial Viability
Since close to two thirds of the expenses of most businesses are
payroll costs, the financial analyst must assess the labor force require-
ments of a venture carefully. The number, wages and skill of workers are
all critical parameters that should be analyzed in a proforma. The
financial analyst must also be aware of labor supply issues: does the local
work -force possess the necessary skills, and if not, what is the cost
and time required to train them?
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b) Job and Technology Generation
Clearly, to estimate the job generation capability of a firm, one
must be familiar with its labor force requirements. To determine
whether the venture's jobs are likely to be given to local workers requires
a knowledge of the firm's recruitment and training policies. Such
estimates must be made for both the near term and any future expansions
that are anticipated.
c) Training and Promotional Opportunities
As noted above, a firm must require a labor force with skills that
are insufficiently developed among local residents in order to have a
clear commitment to training. Ideally the firm should be amenable to
using new recruiting devices: e.g., either utilizing secondary workers'
social networks or the public labor market intermediary workers.
One way to reconcile the goals of compensating for excessive risk
aversion and improving job quality goals is to support clusters of small
firms which employ workers in similar occupations. Development agencies
can improve wcrkers' chances of finding a new job quickly after they are
laid off if the correlation among the market size of new ventures is low.
Moreover, if career ladders can be constructed across these firms then
promotional opportunities for secondary workers can also be expanded.
The likelihood of success in such an effort hinges on the compatibility
of the occupational structures of the cluster firms.
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